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Ibn Kammūna's Understanding of the Body*

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Abstract

Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284) is one of the prominent names to have presented the new structuring that emerged after the classical period studies of Islamic philosophy following the 12th century. This article deals with his theory of the body, previously undiscussed in the academic community. The subject has been handled in connection with the philosophy of nature and metaphysics concerning questions such as how the body exists as a possible essence and how the principles guiding this process are reflected in the field of nature, as well as what the body is and what its constituent elements, types, qualities, and additions are. Thus, Ibn Kammūna has been determined to consider the first body to be the first sphere, the later bodies to occur in the process of emanation, and the cause of the body to be the intellect. In addition, he established the body consisting of matter and form to be continuous, to point to itself, and to be an infinitely divisible substance. However, he is observed to have not evaluated matter and form, which are constituent elements of the body, under the category of substance.

Moreover, this article also reviews Ibn Kammūna's approach to the main claims of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist traditions about the body contained in his original works and commentaries. Through the proofs and reasoning made in the details of these claims, Ibn Kammūna is understood to have thought mostly in line with Ibn Sīnā about the definition and essence of the body. He occasionally agreed with Suhrawardī about the properties and additions of the body. This study investigates how Ibn Kammūna shaped Ibn Sīnā's theory of the body, upon which Suhrawardī had expanded, and whether its content is original in this context. Thus, I aim to contribute to the field by following the processes of change, expansion, and transfer of philosophical accumulation in Islamic thought after these two philosophers who had founded of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist schools.

Keywords: Ibn Kammūna, body, substance, accident, matter, form.

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Introduction

Although the problem of the body seems to concern today's science to a large extent, it does continue to be discussed in the field of philosophy. The different perspectives in the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī schools in the Islamic philosophical tradition have also affected their understanding of the body. The Peripatetics following Aristotle studied the body under the metaphysic sciences based on its existence and studied the body under the natural sciences in terms of its subjectivity to motion and ability to be sensed. They defined it as a three-dimensional, continuous, and continuously divisible substance. Regarded as the most important representative of this school, Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) stated the natural body, to have two principles consisting of matter and form. In addition to these are the accidents, which consist of nine categories.[1] Suhrawardī (d. 1191), the founder of Ishrāqī philosophy, opposed the Peripatetics' theory of substance consisting of matter and form and explained what he called a dark barrier (*barzākh*) using the concept of magnitude.[2] Unlike these two traditions, the theologians who accept the atomic view, however, consider the body to be made of non-spatial (*ghayr mutaḥayyiz*) atoms, not matter and form, and the attachments of the body differ in this respect.

Ibn Kammūna, who quoted from Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* and Suhrawardī's *al-Talwīḥāt* in his commentaries, also made good use of philosophers such as Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1210) and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274). He also benefitted from the philosophical accumulation that had passed down to his time and made his contemporaries accept him. In one of his correspondences, Tūsī's addressed him as "The most intelligent of friends and unique to his time, the dear philosopher Ibn Kammūna," which supports this very fact.[3] Hitherto, studies have been conducted in relation to his works on metaphysics, the soul, prophethood, epistemology, ethics, general philosophy, and the history of religions. The subject of the body, which has a fundamental role in Ibn Kammūna's philosophy, has not yet been handled as a

1 Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Najāt*, ed. Majid Fakhry, (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāk al-Jadīda, 1982), 135-136; *al-Najāt: Felsefenin Temel Konuları*, trans. by Kübra Şenel (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayıncılık, 2013), 89-90. According to Aristotle, the principles that should be examined in the natural sciences are primarily matter, form, and non-existence. Aristotle, *Fizik*, Translated by Saffet Babür (İstanbul: YKY, 2012), 25, 29.

2 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi: Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, trans. by Tahir Uluç (İstanbul: İz Yayınları, 2012), 94–96, 118; Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, ed. John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai (Provo: Brigham Young University, 1999), 56–59, 76.

3 Ibn Kammūna, *"Ajwibat al-Masā'il İzziddīn Abū Riḍā Sa'd ibn Manṣūr ibn Kammūna," Ajwibat al-Masā'il al Nāṣīriyya [Felsefe Mektupları Tûsî ile Bazı Çağdaşları Arasında Felsefî Yazışmalar]*, trans. by Murat Demirkol (Ankara: Fecr Yayınları, 2015), 71.

separate study.[4] Because the basic assumptions of the schools of thought on this subject are determinative in fields such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and theology, the concepts in this issue should be analyzed well. For this reason, I deal with basic topics such as Ibn Kammūna's understanding of the body, definition, proof, classification, constituents of the body's essence, qualities of these constituents, and additions in this article. As far as the limits of this article allow, I've consulted Ibn Sīnā's and Suhrawardī's views that Ibn Kammūna had commented on and attempted to answer the following questions in order to make the subject more precise and to determine Ibn Kammūna's position on the identified problems:

a. Which principles did Ibn Kammūna prioritize in the definition of the body?

b. Although he considered the body to consist of matter and form, why did he criticize the Peripatetics for naming these substances?

c. Which school did he adopt in his classifications of substance and accident?

d. Although Suhrawardī regarded the body as a substance that consists of matter and form in *al-Talwīḥāt*, he opposed this composition in *al-Ishrāq*, viewing the body as a simple substance consisting of magnitude. In addition, while he considered magnitude to be an accident in the former, he stated magnitude to be a substance in the latter. While the philosophical community considers this to be contradictory, how did Ibn Kammūna's approach this problem?

e. What was Ibn Kammūna's contribution to the theory of body in the tradition of Islamic thought?

Ibn Kammūna wrote about the body and its related subjects from various perspectives in his works. Although the chapter "Natural Bodies, Their Constituents and Rulings" from his most voluminous work, *al-Jadīd fi-l-ḥikma*, seems to be directly related to the body, almost every other chapter in that book also has an aspect concerning the subject. He discussed this subject in his commentaries under various headings, as well as in other treatises and letters, although not with extensive passages. In this respect, this study reviews his works on the body, in particular *al-Jadīd fi-l-ḥikma*. This study also consults the books of the philosophers being compared.

4 Although the article "Ibn Kammūna and the 'New Wisdom' of the Thirteenth Century" deals with issues related to nature and the universe, it does not include basic issues related to the body. See Y. Tzvi Langermann, "Ibn Kammūna and the New Wisdom of the Thirteenth Century", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15/2 (2005): 277–327. Although Ibn Kammūna's ideas on the body were touched upon in my previous studies, these studies do not include the broad and concise discussions. See Fatma Zehra Pattabanoğlu, *İbn Kemmûne ve Felsefesi* (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2014); "İbn Kemmûne'nin Evren Tasavvuru", *Erdem* 77/2 (2019): 61–86.

As can be seen in Ibn Kammūna's works, although the proof of the body's existence, how it came into existence as a contingent essence, and the determination of its principles require a metaphysical study, bodies and corporeal beings are the subjects of the natural sciences.[5] As most of the issues related to nature are perceived through the senses, they include inquiries that are clear to the imagination. Every science has a subject that speaks of its essential accidents and inseparable concomitants. The subject of this science is the natural body not as a result of being absolute but as a result of being subject to motion and change. Thus, Ibn Kammūna excluded the mathematical body, which is considered to be one of the accidents, by narrowing the subject of this science with the natural body.[6] Based upon functions of the body such as motion, space, divisibility, and being material in the philosophy of nature, the principles of the body and its attachments are included in the field of fundamental physics. In this context, Ibn Kammūna's opinion was that, in order to know the natural body, firstly its proof, secondly its description, and thirdly the constituent parts of its nature should be discussed in accordance with the principles of natural science.[7] Upon briefly explaining the proof of the body's existence, its kind, and how it came into being, I will now proceed to its classification. Next, I will evaluate the concepts of substance-accident and matter-form as a metaphysical problem while dealing with the constituent principles of the body and briefly include the attributes of the natural body, which is the subject of natural philosophy.

A. The Body: Its Proof and Description

Ibn Kammūna asserted that the natural body is known through the senses.[8] The senses denote the body, and this is a clear indicator of the body's existence. As Ibn Kammūna informed, Suhrawardī had referred to the body as intelligible for the first time in *al-Talwīḥāt* explaining "The body's existence needs to be accepted because the sound mind judges it. The body is not just a sensible thing. Indeed, the perception of the senses is limited to the body's surface and appearance. Senses are in the auxiliary position, and the mind necessarily makes judgments about it." Ibn Kammūna added that the senses not only perceive some accidents such as surface from the body's quantity category and color from its quality category but

5 Hossein Ziai, "The Illuminationist Tradition", *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996), 487.

6 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt fi Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, ed. Hossein Ziai and Ahmed Alwishah (California: Mazda Publishers, 2003), 3–4.

7 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 4.

8 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd fi-l-ḥikma*, ed. Ḥamīd Marʿīd al-Kabīsī (Baghdād: Jāmiat Baghdād, 1982), 333.

also help the mind in regard to the necessity of the body's existence. Hence, while the body is sensible with regards to its accidents, it is intelligible in terms of its essence. Although the mind's judgment on the body's existence is based on sensory perception, it can also achieve the knowledge of the body's essence *a priori*. Because, after imagining the body, the mind decides about what it rules axiomatically. In the end, Ibn Kammūna discussed the following three views: The body is known by the senses in its all aspects, the body is known by the senses in some aspects, and the body is never known by the senses. He points out that knowing the body through the senses in some aspects can be considered the most accurate view. Just like air's absence of color, a mind that makes judgments about the body does not necessarily require it to be perceived through the senses through every aspect.[9]

When examining the body as being, the philosopher's concept of being itself needs to be looked at first. In this context, Ibn Kammūna classified existence as necessary-contingent and essential-accidental, then he separated it into three aspects (i.e., necessary, substance, and accident) based on the mental constructs' relations with the external quiddities:

> The existent that is due to itself and subsists by itself *(li-dhātihī wa bi-dhātihī)* (i.e., the one that exists without a cause and substituent apart from itself) is necessary because of itself. The existent that is due to itself but not by itself *(li-dhātihī wa lā bi-dhātihī)* is substance because it exists through itself and has a necessary cause. The existent that is neither due to itself nor by itself *(lā li-dhātihī wa lā bi-dhātihī)* is accident because it is not self-subsisting and has a necessitating cause.[10]

Ibn Kammūna stated that the necessary existent is one. Every other being, hence the body, is contingent. Because the body exists independently in the external world, it is a self-existent (*al-mawjūd bi-dhāt*),[11] and a substance according to the other classification. However, because accidents are attached to the body, the necessary existent is neither body nor related to the body. Everything appertaining to the sensible body is the discretion of the necessary existent. Each perceptible body reproduces by being divided into matter and form through quantitative and incorporeal division. Therefore, the sensible body and everything related to it are

9 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabiʿiyyāt*, 4-6; Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt: Hikmet Parıltıları*, trans. & ed. Ahmet Kamil Cihan and Salih Yalın (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2019), 208-209.

10 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 214.

11 Ibn Kammūna, "Taqrīb al-maḥajja wa-tahdhīb al-ḥujja (Talhīs al-ḥikma)"*A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad ʿIzz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings*, ed. Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 203; Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 215.

caused (*maʿlūl*).[12] Although Ibn Kammūna had separated the necessary from the substance in the above classification, he did consider the body to be in the substance category in a different passage from the same work. In this case, despite his statements appearing to contradict one another, he can be said to have been looking for a solution to the issue on the basis of the distinction between absolute (*mutlaq*) substance and delimited (*muqayyad*) substance as follows:

> The substance is either a necessary existent *(wājib al-wujūd)* whose existence is essential due to its necessity, or it is a contingent existent unlike this. The one that is not necessary is either possible or impossible. If it is not impossible because it accepts division *(li-kawni mawrūd al-qismati),* it is not the absolute substance but a delimited substance through its existence. As such, the substance is contingent. As is known, every contingent is either space-occupying *(mutaḥayyiz)* where this substance is a body because of the impossibility of the atom *(al-jawhar al-fard),* or it does not occupy a space *(ghayr mutaḥayyiz),* in which case it is an intelligible being or a separate being. In terms of management *(tadbīr)*, control over *(taṣarruf),* and perfecting, it is either related to the body, which would make it soul and spirit, or it has no relation to the body, in which case it is intellect.[13]

Ibn Kammūna is seen from these expressions to have changed the Peripatetics' classification, which consists of matter, form, body, soul, and intellect, and to have not included matter and form in the substance category. In this case, several questions emerge: How can the body, which itself is a substance, be composed of matter and form, which are not substances, and can substance subsist through accidents? However, as the answers to these questions will be dealt with under the separate title of *The Body's Constituent Principles,* I can postpone this for now and return to the topic on the definition of the body.

In *Kitāb al-Shifā*, Ibn Sīnā stated that the definition of the body cannot be made with respect to its three hypothetical dimensions. Even if the extents of the body change in actuality, it will remain as a body.[14] Although Suhrawardī in *al-Talwīḥāt* stated, "The body is the substance that can be assumed to have three dimensions intersecting at right angles,"[15] in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, he approached the body differently and envisioned

12 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-ilāhiyyāt*, Süleymaniye Library, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 854, 176a-b; In his *Taʿālīq* on *Kitāb al-Maʿālim*, Ibn Kammūna states that while explaining "the necessary" Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī emphasizes its incorporeality. Thus, in Ibn Kammūna's perspective, since the bodies and space-occupying beings are of the same species it is proved that the necessary being is not a body. Accordingly, if a specific magnitude is required for the body's essence, all bodies should require it and they all must need someone/something to distinguish them. Ibn Kammūna, *Taʿālīq ʿal- l-suʾālāt al-mūrada ʿala-l-uṣūlayn min Kitāb al-Maʿālim*, ed. Sabine Schmidtke and Reza Pourjavady (Tahran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007), 50.

13 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 259.

14 Ibn Sīnā, *Fizik*, trans. Muhittin Macit and Ferruh Özpilavcı, I (İstanbul: Litera Yayınları, 2004), 12.

15 Suhrawardī, "al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt", Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt fī Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, ed. Hossein Ziai ve Ahmed Alwishah, 4; Suhrawardī, *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt*, 208–209.

a holistic universe based on the metaphysics of light. Thus, while searching for a monistic system, which he tried to establish on the basis of light and magnitude, he developed a theory to integrate the perfect universe above that consists of the aether and the universe below (i.e., the world of elements).[16] As he reports, the body, which is the "indicated substance,"[17] is nothing more than a magnitude, and the three extents are the magnitudes of the body's sides that move in different directions.[18]

According to Ibn Kammūna, the body is a substance that can be indicated and divided; it has a natural space (*mutaḥayyiz*).[19] Also, every natural body must be composed of matter and form because the body itself has a structure that accepts conjunction and separation.[20] The definition of "The body itself is the substance that can be conceived as having three dimensions that intersect at right angles"[21] is not a definition (*ḥadd*) but rather a description (*rasm*) because the inclusion of the substance is unlike the inclusion of the genus. Therefore, the main elements of this description are made with the necessary properties, not with the essential constituent elements.[22] Because the extents are accidental for the body, the body cannot be defined through them. Ibn Kammūna explained this with the following famous example:

> When we take a piece of wax, make it the length of a finger, width of two fingers, and height of one finger and then give it a different shape than its current one (i.e., circular or another shape), each of these extents changes in terms of being a body but remain as wax. These extents are not the body's constituents, and unlike the celestial *(samāwī)* magnitudes and separate *(mufāriq)* magnitudes, which are required continuously, these extents are attached (added later) to the body. The example of wax's magnitude is also like this. Because the mentioned extents are accidental for the body, it is not possible to define the body through them.[23]

In *al-Talwīḥāt*, Suhrawardī stated magnitude to be an accident, while *in al-Ishrāq*, he described it as a substance. Ibn Kammūna stated that this might seem contradictory at first glance, but he argued against this opinion:

16 İshak Arslan, "An Early Attempt at Unifying the Universe: Suhrawardı's Concept of Miqdar", *Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences* 3/2 (May 2017): 45-67.

17 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi*, 118; *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 76.

18 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi*, 90; *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 53.

19 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 333; Ibn Kammūna, "Taqrīb al-maḥajja," 203.

20 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 336.

21 Ibn Sīnā, *Tanımlar Kitabı: Kitāb al-Ḥudūd*, trans. by Aygün Akyol and İclal Arslan, (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2013), 41, 42; Suhrawardī, "al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt," 4.

22 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 6; Ibn Sīnā, *Metafizik*, Translated by Ekrem Demirli & Ömer Türker, I (İstanbul: Litera Yayınları, 2004), 57, 59.

23 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 10. For similar statements see Ibn Sīnā, *İşaretler ve Tembihler: al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt,* trans. by Ali Durusoy, Muhittin Macit, & Ekrem Demirli (İstanbul: Litera Yayınları, 2005), 91; Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt maʿa Sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī*, Ed. Süleyman Dünyâ, II (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1960), 150.

> What Suhrawardī meant by magnitude and extent in *al-Talwīḥāt* is not the same as in *al-Ḥikma*. The explanation for this is given in the example of the candle. For example, if we change the length, width, and depth of the candle, in this case, we have what is permanent and what has been changed. What is permanent neither increases nor decreases. When the shape of the body changes, its width decreases or length increases, or vice versa, but there is no increase or decrease in its totality. What changes is the change of the magnitude's quantities. If by extension and magnitude we mean the former (i.e., what is permanent), then it is not an accident of the body but rather the body itself. In other words, it is substance, not accident. If we mean the latter, then the magnitude in the first meaning is accident. Pursuant to the terms in al-Talwīḥāt, the composition of the two is body, and the substance between the two is matter. With respect to the terminology used in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, this substantial extent is body and is called matter based on the structures that change in it. Composite species that happen to be bodies are called substrates with regard to the inherent. They are called matter with regard to the species that come from them. Therefore, the body is revealed in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* to be simple, and the fact that it is composed [of matter and form] herein *(al-Talwīḥāt)* is not a contradiction. The extent in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* is substance, while here *[in al-Talwīḥāt]*, it is accident. This body and extent in *al-Ḥikma* are not the same as the body and extent here. This supposition of a contradiction stems from *al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī* [homonymy]. Bodies are said to have commonality in being body but to differ in magnitude; the magnitude is not the body itself nor a part of it. Thus, magnitude is other than the body. Suhrawardī answered this as follows: The commonality of bodies in being body is the commonality between small and large common magnitudes in itself. The difference of the bodies in magnitude is the difference of the big and the small in their properties.[24]

According to Ibn Kammūna, Suhrawardī intended the measure of the candle's edges by the concept of magnitude, which he regarded as accident in *al-Talwīḥāt*. By magnitude in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq,* which he described as substance, he intended the candle's total measure. As far as Tahir Uluç is concerned, this point of view that attempts to bring the Ishrāqī and Peripatetic philosophies together is an attempt to bring Suhrawardī closer to Peripatetism. Indeed, Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī repeated the same expressions in *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. He even made multiple quotations from *al-Jadīd fi-l-ḥikma* in his work without mentioning any sources.[25] Suhrawardī, who had stated extent to be one in nature in *al-Talwīḥāt* and that bodies cannot have two extensions where one is substance and the other is accident, clearly contradicts his statements in *al-Ishrāq*. Yet Ibn Kammūna again tries to reconcile the two works. Accordingly, the

24 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 178b-179a. For similar statements see Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, ed. Abdullah Nūrānī and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq (Tahrān: Muassasa-i Chāb wa Intishārāt al-Hikma, 2001), 215-216.

25 Tahir Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi* (İnsan Yayınları: İstanbul: 2014), 103.

body is not just a substance but is the sum of substance and accident. The substance is the matter, and the accident is a constitutive extension.[26]

As Ibn Kammūna stated, although the body is complete and continuous in actuality, it has the potential to be infinitely divisible. As I will discuss later, the reason bodies are continuous in actuality is the body (continuity) form because the constituent elements of the body's essence are matter and form. While Ibn Kammūna adopted the Peripatetic approach in his works by claiming that the body could be established not by having dimensions but by having the body form, he stands closer to Ishrāqī thought in the description of the indicated and space-occupying substance. However, he criticized defining the body only through magnitude. Ibn Kammūna's theory on the body becomes more prominent in the chapters on the classification of the body and its constituent elements, which I will consider now.

B. Classification of the Body

Ibn Kammūna classified the body as being natural-mathematical, simple-compound, celestial-elemental, opaque-translucent-transparent, heavy-light, or moist-dry in terms of its structure, position, and properties. Accordingly, the body can be classified under four headings:

1. *Natural (Ṭabīʿī) Body and Mathematical Body*

The natural and mathematical distinction of the body is necessary to see whether the concept of magnitude indicates the essence of the body or one of its accidents. In this context, the Peripatetic and Illuminationist thoughts take place on different sides. As Ibn Sīnā stated, although the measure of the body changes in expanding and densifying bodies, the body does not change. The natural body is a substance in this respect, and the mathematical body is an accident for the body due to its essence.[27] As Suhrawardī reported, "The absolute body has absolute magnitude (*miqdār mutlaq*), while particular bodies have particular magnitudes. Therefore, just as bodies share in their abstract magnitude and differ by their particular different magnitudes, they also share in corporeality and differ in their particular divergent magnitudes."[28]

26 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 178a.

27 Ibn Sīnā, *Metafizik*, I, 57–61.

28 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi*, 91; *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 53.

As Ibn Kammūna claimed, the body's essence and dimensions are different things. Magnitudes have three dimensions: line, surface, and volume (*buʿd al-tāmm*). As in the candle example, the difference between these quantities and the natural body is the changeability of mathematical body, while the natural body is invariant. Line, surface, depth, and volume, which is the sum of these, are accidents, and the mathematical body is expressed by volume.[29] The natural body is expressed under the title of substance, and the mathematical body is under the title of continuous quantity (i.e., accidents). Magnitude is a permanent and continuous quantity.[30] While the natural body necessitates the mathematical body, the mathematical body ends on a section of the plane, the plane ends on a section of the line, and the line ends at a point.[31] Magnitude is not the species of the body in terms of being its constituent element or being a body. Although hyle itself lacks magnitude, magnitude's substrate (*maḥall*) is the matter. If this were not the case, the substrate of this magnitude would be another substrate. This would go on forever, which would again make for a contradiction.[32]

2. The Simple (*Basīṭ*) Body and the Compound Body

Separating the natural body from the mathematical body, Ibn Kammūna divided the natural body into simple and compound. If the natural body consists of bodies that have various natures in terms of the senses as in those of human body, it is a compound. If it has only one nature like air does, it is simple.[33] Celestial bodies and each of the four elements are simple bodies. These four elements (*rukūn*) have common matter and different forms and are essential parts of the corporeal world. The existents in our world are made up of these elements. As Ibn Kammūna stated, if the compound body that consists of these elements are put in a container, we get earthy (*arḍī*), watery (*māʾī*), and airy (*hawāʾī*) substances, and that is evidence of these elements' existences. Heat is needed when mixing them (*ikhtilāṭ*), and the body that heats due to its nature is fire. The existents originate from the activity (*fiʿl*) and passivity (*infiʿāl*) between the elements and the celestial bodies. These elements form the elemental body through composition (*tarkīb*) or through changing/separating (*istiḥāla*). These essential parts that form compound bodies through composition and separation are called *usṭuquss*. They are called elements in reference to their

29 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 265; Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl wa-l-jumal min muhimmat al-ʿilm wa-l-ʿamal (Sharḥ al-Ishārāt)*, Süleymaniye Library, Lâleli 2516, 102a-b, 103b.

30 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 8-9; *al-Jadīd*, 261, 265; "Taqrīb al-maḥajja", 202.

31 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 106a.

32 Ibn Kammūna *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 87.

33 Ibn Kammūna, "Taqrīb al-maḥajja", 204; *al-Jadīd*, 333.

occurrence during their separation without any composition. Thus, because each of them has a common matter and a different form, the species of generation and corruption increase to twelve when transformed into each other.[34]

3. The Celestial (*Falakī*) Bodies and the Elemental (*Unṣurī*) Bodies

For Ibn Kammūna, the celestial and elemental distinction of the body brings us to Aristotle's division of the superlunar and sublunar worlds, and the problem of how they exist takes us to the theory of emanation (*ṣudūr*). Accordingly, the celestial bodies are the beings of the superlunar world, and the elements are the beings of the sublunar world. In addition to *samāwiyyāt* and *falakiyyāt*, the celestial bodies are also called *athīriyyāt*. The nature of the element that makes up the superlunar world is one: the aether. The sublunar realm has elements that are diverse in nature. The compound bodies made up of these elements come into being through mixing (*imtizāj*).[35]

Islamic philosophers used emanation theory in the sense that everything emanates from God in an order due to His generosity of existence and perfection. They presented it as a solution to explain the bodies that come into existence. According to Ibn Kammūna, heavenly bodies are not the causes of each other but the effects of incorporeal causes. In line with this, the effect from God necessarily has an intellectual substance, and the other intellectual substances occur through the First Intellect. The heavenly bodies must also come into being through the intellects. If so, then every celestial body has an intellectual principle. Just as the intellect and the celestial sphere emerge from the First Intellect, other intellects and celestial bodies also come into existence through other intellects. Accordingly, the matter of the elemental world must come from the last one, namely the Active Intellect.[36] The existents that emanated from the First Intellect contemplates the Necessary Existent, and this condition is caused by God. Ibn Kammūna also explains this through the principle of the contingency of the most noble (*al-imkān al-ashraf*). According to this principle, the First Intellect has a contingency due to its very essence and a necessity (*wujūb*) due to its relation to the First Intellect. As such, it has two relations and contemplates them both. By this intellect that originated from the First Intellect contemplating about the necessity of its own existence and its relation to what came before, something superior must emerge (i.e., another intellect). By contemplating about its contingency, the body of the furthest sphere comes into existence. The

34 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 125b, 126a; *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 218, 225; "Taqrīb al-maḥajja", 204.

35 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 218.

36 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 222b, 226a; Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 130.

sphere of the fixed stars emerges from the second intellect, and the sphere of *Zuḥal* emerges from the third intellect, and this continues until it reaches the Active Intellect, which necessitates the realm of generation and corruption.[37]

The shape of the celestial bodies is spherical, and they are active in the events that occur in the sublunar world. Although the shapes of simple bodies must be spherical, this principle does not apply to all bodies because this shape must be determined in different magnitudes. Otherwise, all bodies would be alike.[38] Heavenly bodies have cyclical motions and cyclical tendencies, and this movement is willed (*nafsānī*); it is neither obligatory nor natural. Bodies made up of elements have a tendency to move toward their natural location, and this movement is linear.[39] The elemental bodies, which are the beings of the sublunar realm, are formed as a result of the mixture (*imtizāj*) of the four elements. These elements are the essential parts of generation and corruption. They have a common matter that accepts transforming into each other. Minerals, plants, and animal species occur through *imtizāj*, depending on which of the elements have dominance. Each of these creatures has a special form that establishes them. This is the first perfection, and the sensible qualities are secondary perfections.[40] As far as Ibn Kammūna is concerned, when some combination of the four elements come together (*ijtimāʿ*),similar, average qualities appear in all parts of the compound bodies with regard to the interaction of their opposite qualities; this is their mixture. This average quality is temperament (*mizāj)*. A difference exists between temperament and corruption (*fasād*). Corruption is the complete change (*tabaddul*), while temperament is the balance among the components. When the elements interact, they affect (*fiʿl*) due to their form and get affected (*infiʿāl*) due to their matter.[41] In this way, multiple different bodies on earth come into being through these mixtures.

37 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 235b; Suhrawardī, *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt*, 444. As stated by Suhrawardī, when a contingent being, lower in the hierarchy, exists, the contingent whose hierarchy is above must have existed before it. In that case, things that will come into existence must first be possible, and then be under the order of the closest lights, ruling lights, spheres, and their rulers and they should be in accordance with the hierarchy. Sühreverdî, *İşrâk Felsefesi,* 154-155. As Ibn Kammūna states, the superior contingent comes into existence before the deficient contingent and these beings are close angels, and they may be called intellects. Ibn Kammūna, "al-Kalimāt al-wajīza", *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad ʿIzz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings*, ed. Reza Pourjavady ve Sabine Schmidtke (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 150.

38 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 344.

39 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 104a; *al-Jadīd*, 391; *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 142. For detailed information on celestial bodies, see Pattabanoğlu, "İbn Kemmûne'nin Evren Tasavvuru", 69–76.

40 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 127b–129a; For similar statements see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 103-104.

41 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 359; *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 130b–131a.

4. The Body in Terms of Sensible Properties

Ibn Kammūna prioritized the degree of bodies' light transmission in terms of being the subject to the senses. Then he classified bodies based on their weight, temperature, and shape. Accordingly, the first classification divides the body, which has the feature of linear movement, into three categories: transparent, which allows light to pass through the object; opaque, which does not allow light to pass; and translucent, which only partially blocks and permits the light to pass. Secondly, the bodies are divided into the categories of light/hot or heavy/cold in terms of their weight and temperature. The third classification is related to how a body retains and loses its shape. If acquiring or abandoning a shape is easy, the body is called humid; it is called dry if changing its shape is difficult. The simple bodies of the sublunar realm are earth, water, air, and fire. In this case, as per the first classification based on transparency, earth is opaque, cold/heavy according to the second classification, and dry based on the third. Water is considered translucent, heavy/cold, and moist. Air is transparent, light/hot, and moist. Lastly, fire is transparent and light/hot, but with uncertain dryness/humidity.[42] In this respect, although Ibn Kammūna agreed with Suhrawardī's classification of bodily transmission of light,[43] he criticized him for not considering fire as an element because when minerals, plants, and animals (which are composed of the elements) put into a test container, earth, water, and air are obtained as substances. As for the substance of fire, its heating essence necessarily signifies its existence. As such, fire is what heats.[44] Therefore, fire is also an element because the substances extracted in these test containers depend only on the fire's heat.

Ibn Kammūna, who did not include the Illuminationist tradition on the metaphysics of light in *al-Jadīd fi-l-ḥikma*, did not use the definition of a dark substance (*barzakh*) because he followed Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and did not prefer explaining the difference of bodies through the perfection/imperfection of light. However, as he had narrated some passages from *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* in his commentary *al-Talwīḥāt* when needed, he did include the Ishrāqī discourses and talked about the differences bodies made of abstract light have.[45] In Ibn Kammūna's commentary on *al-Ishārāt*, he explains the proof of the necessary existent by drawing attention to an alternative explanation that can be made about the soul, then he states the body to be a dark substance that

42 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 347.

43 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi,* 177–179.

44 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 260; "Taqrīb al-maḥajja," 203.

45 Bkz. Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-ilāhiyyāt*, 272a–b, 275a.

share in their essence and differ in illumination.[46] Why Ibn Kammūna did not prefer Ishrāqī method in *al-Jadīd fi-l-ḥikma*, which he wrote after both commentaries can be explained based on these examples; his approach in his commentaries was to understand and explain these philosophers. For instance, Ibn Kammūna quotes from other works when needed in his works and narrates wide passages to draw attention to the various interpretations of the issues or concepts.[47] However, although Ibn Kammūna did not use the Ishrāqī method in his works, he should be noted to have included certain definitions and teachings from this tradition in his system of the body theory. For this reason, while discussions on the details of the issue help in identifying Ibn Kammūna's basic ideas, understanding his place in the Peripatetic and Ishrāqī tradition, and even distinguishing the changes that occurred in these traditions are fundamental. I now can move on to the constituent elements of the body to examine these details.

C. Constituent Principles of the Body: Matter and Form

Aristotle's proposition on the understanding of the hylomorphic body as consisting of matter and form[48] was accepted by the majority of philosophers in the Islamic world, and this thought required atomic theory to be rejected. In this context, the Peripatetics based the potentially and infinitely divisible substance on the understanding of the body being a continuous and complete structure in itself. The theologians, however, who adopted atomism, supported the idea that the piece that is finite does not accept division in any way and held the body to have parts in actuality.[49]

Although Suhrawardī agreed with the Peripatetics regarding rejecting the body as being composed of atoms, he also opposed understanding the body with obscure concepts that are not subject to sensation, such as matter and form. He tried to show its logical incoherence to be due to principle of explaining the unknown with what

46 Bkz. Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 179a–180a.

47 For detailed information about the tradition of Ibn Kammūna's philosophy, his sources and influences, see Ömer Mahir Alper, *Aklın Hazzı İbn Kemmûne'de Bilgi Teorisi* (İstanbul: Ayışığı Yayınları, 2004), 20–25; Fatma Zehra Pattabanoğlu, "Nûr Kavramı Bağlamında İbn Kemmûne'nin İşrâkî Gelenekteki Yeri", *Şeyhü'l-İşrâk'ın İzinde: İlk Dönem İşrâkî Şârihler,* ed. M. Nesim Doru, Ömer Bozkurt and Kamuran Gökdağ (Ankara: Divan Kitap Yayınları, 2015), 202–211.

48 According to Aristotle, the substance is the stable and the consistent thing in changing entities. There are three types of substances, the first is matter, the second is form, and the third is the combination of these two. Aristotle, *Metafizik*, trans. Ahmet Arslan (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınları, 1996), 314–315, 488–489.

49 Mehmet Sami Baga, "İbn Sînâ Sonrası İslâm Felsefesinde Cisim Teorisi: *Hikmetü'l-'Ayn* ve Şerhleri Çerçevesinde" (PhD Dissertation, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018), 217.

is known.[50] On the other hand, he objected to the idea of forms being a substance because they are constituent parts of the substance. He also claimed accidents to possibly be the constituents of substances. As he stated, whether form is substantial or accidental, it is merely the species' simple essence. Because elements have nothing else but corporeity and structure, qualities that can be strengthened and weakened only remain, as opposed to forms that cannot be perceived with the senses.[51] Therefore, although the essence of light is one, bodies have differences based on radiances in terms of perfection and deficiency. As the body has a self-subsisting magnitude, it has nothing that the Peripatetics would call hyle, whose only property is existence and accepts measures and forms. Therefore, it is mental, not sensible.[52]

As Ibn Kammūna stated, the external body cannot be made up of parts that do not accept division, whether in actuality or hypothetically. Likewise, the body cannot consist of actual infinite parts, whether or not each of these parts take on intelligible or hypothetical division. Thus, the body does not consist of actual infinite particles but can be divided potentially and infinitely. What is meant by the body is "a body which has actual infinite parts but itself is a finite being in actuality."[53] The structure of the body that accepts conjunction and separation is hyle (i.e., abstract matter). Matter is steady before, after, and at the moment of conjunction. Matter's essence has no conjunction (*ittiṣāl*) or separation (*infiṣāl*) nor unity (*wahda*) or multiplicity (*taʾaddud*). Matter is able to receive (*qābil*) these things that are in the body, thus it can only be their substituent. Continuity (uninterruptedness) or unity (totality) is its form (*wa-l-ittiṣāl aw al-wahidatu huwa al-ṣūra*).[54] The ipseity of continuity (*ittiṣāliyya*) is not self-subsistance but a thing that exists together with its adjacent (*muttaṣil*). Thus, the body's essence cannot be considered without it. The body consists of the "form that is called continuous" and "the matter that receives continuity." These are the constituents of the body. The sum of these two is substance. In Ibn Kammūna's perspective, however, this conjunction is not substance (*in kāna al-ittiṣālu alā haza-l-*

50 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi*, 39; *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 10.

51 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi*, 99; *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 62. For detailed information on the form which is not a substance, see Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi*, 93–98.

52 Suhrawardī, *İşrâk Felsefesi,* 94, 129; *The Philosophy of Illumination*, 56–57, 86. Theologians such as Māturīdī, Ghazzālī, and Shahristānī stated that admitting a form that constitutes the origin of beings would make it difficult to prove the existence and attributes of God and damage the idea of creating ex nihilo. For this reason, Rāzī regards the body as a substance that is not composed of matter and form, and the description of such a simple substance can only be made through its necessary attributes and effects. Eşref Altaş, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Epistle on *al-Hayūlā wa al-Sūrah*: A Study and Editio Princeps", *Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences* 1/1 (November 2014): 61-108.

53 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 333, 335.

54 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 336–337.

kitābi, laysa, bi-jawharin li-qiyāmihi heyūla, la-bi-zātihi) because it is not self-subsisting but subsists through matter. What is meant by separation, which establishes matter through the reception of the body, is separation through rupture (*wa-l-murād bi-l-infiṣāl alladhī athbatat heyūlā bi wāsiṭat kabūli-l-jism lahū, huwa infiṣālu-l-infikākī*).[55] The philosopher seems to think differently than Peripatetics, who stated the body itself to be a substance and its constituent elements to also be substances. He defined substance and accident as follows:

> In the terminology of this book, while substance exists by itself, accident does not; it is known as essence/structure.[56] In the terminology of the majority, substance when present in the external world is an essence that does not exist in a subject *(mawḍūʿ)*. Meanwhile, an accident is an essence that occurs in a subject when it exists in the external world. Through the subject *(mawḍūʿ),* the majority *(jumhūr)* means something that is independent of a place and of attachments throughout its own establishment. It is unlike a part in a substrate that spreads everywhere and does not separate from it; it is what is in something. The subject is more exclusive than the substrate. Accordingly, some substances may be in a substrate. While this substance is called form, its substrate is called hyle and matter. Then, the subject and matter, considered to be substrates; and the form and the accident are considered to be that which inheres/resides/dwells within.[57]

Unlike the majority's definition, Ibn Kammūna referred to the thing that exists by itself as substance and named accidents as essences. However, the majority limits this issue of whether or not substances and accidents take place in a subject only with the external world. As the philosopher declared in his statement, his classification of substance also differs from that of the majority. While the majority divided substance into five categories (i.e., matter, form, body, soul, and intellect), Ibn Kammūna divided it into four (i.e., necessary being, body, soul/spirit, and intellect) and accidents into four sections (i.e., quantity, quality, relativity, and motion).[58] Although Ibn Kammūna

55 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 337.

56 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Kāshif (al-Jadīd fī-l-ḥikma)*, ed. Hâmid Nâcî İsfahânî (Tehran: Mu'assasa-i Pizhūhishī-i Ḥikmat va Falsafa-i Īrān; Berlin: Institute of Islamic Studies Free University of Berlin, 2008), 131. In this edition, *hay'a* was written as *māhiyya* on page 255 in the copy we use, but in the footnote, it was stated that the concept of *hay'a* was included in other manuscripts. In the Ishrāqī tradition, the concept of *hay'a* is used as the word that corresponds to accident in Peripatetic thought. See Baga, "İbn Sînâ Sonrası İslâm Felsefesinde Cisim Teorisi," 22–23.

57 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 255; Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif: Mevâkıf Şerhi*, Trans. Ömer Türker (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015), II, 18–21.

58 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 259–262. Ibn Kammūna thinks differently than the majority, and he does not call God a substance. Then, by the statement of the majority that says "There is no essence for Him beyond His existence (*inniyya*)," reveals that God cannot be a substance. Indeed, the principle that says "When it exists, it is not on a subject" becomes true only when the existence of something is added to its essence, because they consider the form that settles in a subject and the matter which is the subject to be substances. Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 256, 260.

stated the two terminologies to be the same in the classification of accidents, his classification resembles Suhrawardī's more because they both classify accidents such as time, possession, position, active, and passive under the category of relativity. While the Peripatetics counted nine accidents, Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna decreased this number to four.[59] Therefore, when Ibn Kammūna emphasized "the terminology of this book" on the problem of substances and accidents, he can be observed to have opposed the majority and to differ from the Peripatetics. Ibn Kammūna's division of substance into space-occupying (*mutaḥayyiz*) and non-space-occupying (*ghayr mutaḥayyiz*)[60] is also similar to the Ishrāqī classification. Indeed, Hasan Çelebi, who wrote a *ḥāshiya* [gloss] on Jurjānī's *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, stated that the Ishrāqis classified substance in this way and did not consider matter and form as something separate from the body. They didn't call the substances that settle somewhere else forms or substances that are a substrate for another substance as matter. Therefore, because matter can receive accidents that constitute the body, it is a name given to the body, while form is considered the name for these accidents.[61] On the testimony of Ibn Kammūna, Suhrawardī considered the species' properties of the body to not be substance but accidents. For the species' forms is not what diversifies the bodies but rather the elemental qualities such as moistness, dryness, hotness, and coldness or the celestial structures.[62]

According to Ibn Kammūna, matter and form exist through each other rather than existing together, and this is the reason of their inseparable relation.[63] Hence, as matter is potential, the body cannot be mere matter. As form has no active effect on the body's existence, it cannot be merely form either.[64] There is a relation (*alāqatun-mā*) between them, in which one cannot be separated from the other. In this relationship, because none is the other's cause, mediator, or instrument, neither a vicious circle exists nor superiority between them. Because the intellect cannot know individual matter without form nor the individual form without matter, one of the two necessarily exists through the other.[65] Matter cannot exist without form, and form cannot exist without matter.[66]

59 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 259–262.

60 Ibn Kammūna, "Taqrīb al-maḥajja", 203; Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 259.

61 Bekir Karlığa, "Cisim", *DİA*, VIII, 31; Hasan Çelebi, *Hāshiya alā Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* (near Jurjānī's Sharḥ al-Mawāqif) (İstanbul, 1292), II, 190.

62 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 170a.

63 For the proofs that demonstrate the impossibility of the matter and form's separation, see Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 40–54.

64 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd fī l-ḥikma*, 483.

65 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 55–58.

66 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 40, 50.

Meanwhile, the mere form of the body is not enough for the existence of matter because the existence of the absolute body is not possible. Watery, earthy, airy bodies and other bodies are the species that exist under the category of absolute body. Bodies differ only by their form of species. The body becomes a distinct species through its special form that is unlike the corporeal form, which is a space-occupying continuity. Due to the existence of an absolute body being impossible, all bodies have a special form.[67] In that case, matter does not separate from the corporeal form, nor does it separate from the special form that makes the body a particular species. Because bodies differ in the shapes they take (e.g., moist bodies are shaped easily, dry bodies are shaped with difficulty) and celestial bodies don't receive shapes at all, they also vary in their concomitants. These concomitants depend on the special form, not on the common body form. Therefore, Ibn Kammūna explained the special forms based on their different qualities or places, as did Ibn Sīnā. In line with this, celestial and elemental bodies, although common in having a corporeity form, don't have the same position or place.[68]

According to Ibn Kammūna, the source of the body, whose constituent elements are matter and form, is neither the necessary being, the body, nor the soul; it is the intellect. As mentioned before, the relation between the First Intellect's relations and that which is caused (*maʿlūlāt*) is pursuant to the principle of the most noble's contingency. In other words, if the weak one on the ontological hierarchy is actualized, the superior one must already exist. In this context, the intellect in the emanation doctrine is the place of origin (*maṣdar*) for the existence of bodies that comes after the necessary being. The quality of this place of origin is that it overflows the hyle not in terms of being a distinct form with the form's help but in terms of having any form. After receiving the form of corporeity, the First Matter becomes distinctive by accepting another form to diversify. Then the forms come from the separate principle in succession. And the particular forms conjoin with particular matters. In this process, although form seems to help matter emanate from the Active Intellect, it cannot be matter's cause or intermediary. The relation of inseparability between matter and form stems from their dependence on each other. To continue its existence and to be determined, matter needs form. To exist, to take on a shape, and to be determined, form needs matter. The elements are the first simple bodies that emerge through the absolute body's particularization by

67 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 73.

68 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 340–341; Uluç, *Sühreverdî'nin İbn Sînâ Eleştirisi*, 92. For evidence explaining the body's need for an external agent in its existence and particularization, see Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 75–78.

taking on the form of species. In brief, the necessary existent does not create (*ibdāʿ*) the bodies *ex nihilo* without intermediaries (*wājib al-wujūd fa lā yabdaʿu al-ajsām bi-ghayri wāsiṭatin*), and the separate intellect must be a mediator for them to come into being (*ījād*). Here, the cause that gives existence to the body is revealed to be the Active Intellect (*wāhib al-ṣuwar*).[69]

As is understood, while Ibn Sīnā's tradition explains diversification and multiplication of the body through terms such as matter, form, intellect, soul, potential, active, predisposition, and capacity, Suhrawardī opposed expressing the sensible body through abstract concepts such as matter and form; he considered the qualities and structures to diversify the bodies. In addition to this, he made his focal point magnitude, bodies' common concept in the physical world, and he solved this issue by using the category of perfection and imperfection. He also turned the concept of temperature into an identifiable quantitative category.[70] On the other hand, Ibn Kammūna held the same opinions as Ibn Sīnā on the diversification of bodies and on the fact that matter and form are the constituent elements of the body. Yet he had different thoughts about the substantial nature of matter and form. Although Ibn Kammūna did not explain how substances were established through accidents, he seems to have accepted Suhrawardī's claims about the accidents being the constituents of substances. Meanwhile, on the issue of measure, he attempted to understand Suhrawardī in the Peripatetic framework by drawing attention to the differences in the use of concepts rather

69 In *al-Jadīd* (pp. 501, 506), Ibn Kammūna explains the origin of bodies as follows: *Bodies must differ from each other through their structures. These structures that conjoin the body cannot be the body's cause. Contrarily, as they are equal in their bodily form, all bodies must be equal in terms of structure, measure, and shape. If it did not require merely corporeal structures, then corpses would not either (Whereas bodies have no existence without their structures due to the impossibility of their existence without the one that establishes the things that generate). Hence, corpses must exist with something other than the body. Since all bodies are common in their nature of corporeality, if some bodies do not require these properties in terms of being as such, another body wouldn't require them either. If this establisher is accident, the body that is a substance would not exist. He avoids saying "It has no subsistence by itself" (lā qiwāma lahu bi-nafsihi) because if the existence of the one that exists by itself is an accident, it is not the necessary existent. This is because compounds do not emanate from it without an intermediary. On the contrary, firstly, the first of the two parts exists and the rest come into being through it. However, the existence of the body does not occur in this way. Because one of its parts is matter and the other is form.* According to Ibn Kammūna, matter and form are not the causes of each other, and the cause of the body is not the soul, but rather the intellect. Indeed, in the emanation system, matter emanates from the separate principle (Active Intellect) with the help of form. It is not a specific form but may be any form. The separate principle maintains the existence of matter through successive forms. As matter accepts being finite and being shaped through forms and becomes a particular substance, forms also become particular through matter. Hyle is particular in terms of being absolute form. See Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 501–503.

70 Arslan, "Fiziksel Evrenin Bütünleştirilmesi İçin Erken Bir Teşebbüs," 60.

than focusing on the contradictions between the Ishrāqī and Peripatetic discourses; he also developed some kind of a reconciling method.[71]

D. Attachments of the Natural Body

The body, which is dealt with in metaphysics in terms of its constituent elements, is subject to the science of nature in terms of its mobility and stillness. The essential attributes of the natural body in terms of being are finiteness, taking on a shape, and having a natural place (*ḥayyiza*). Motion and the distance and time that are associated with motion are things attached to the body in terms of its mobility.[72] As explained before, because the dimensions are finite, bodies have shape, and simple bodies are spherical. Due to its dimensions and shape, the body has magnitude and takes up space. Each body must have just one natural space. However, things such as directions, limits, void, motion, rest, time, and space that attach to the body and cause change, transformation, and stability are accidents.

Ibn Kammūna regarded relativity, quantity, quality, and motion as accidents. As far as he was concerned, these kinds of accidents are mental and conceptual; they do not exist in the external world. Extents such as length, depth, and volume that are added to the body cannot be found in the outside world by themselves alone. Magnitude is quantity, and quantity occurs in things that consist of parts. If these parts meet at a common end, they are called *muttaṣil* (continuous) quantity; otherwise, they are called *munfaṣil* (discontinuous) quantity. The quantity is divided as follows:

i. Muttaṣil (Continuous)

- Stable: Magnitude
- Changeable: Time

ii. Munfaṣil (Discontinuous): Numbers[73]

71 Aristotle's presentation of form as substance in *Metaphysics* and as an accident in *Categories*, as well as the problem of explaining the difference between the residence of forms in matter and the presence of accidents in a subject have been problematic. Aristoteles, *Kategoriler*, Trans. Y. Gurur Sev (İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2019), 15, 49. Aristotle's commentators wanted to establish a textual and a doctrinal agreement between *Categories* and *Metaphysics,* and they discussed various opinions on how to define the form that settles in a matter, as substance. For detailed information, see İbrahim Halil Üçer, *İbn Sînâ Felsefesinde Sûret Cevher ve Varlık* (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2017), 126, 155.

72 Ibn Kammūna, "Taqrīb al-maḥajja," 204; Baga, "İbn Sînâ Sonrası İslâm Felsefesinde Cisim Teorisi," 251, 271.

73 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 261, 265; "Taqrīb al-maḥajja", 202.

According to Ibn Kammūna, time is the magnitude of motion based on its state of being before and after.[74] On the other hand, motion is "a structure that is not stable necessarily, nor is it the actualization of a potential thing in time."[75] Natural/forced and cyclical/linear motions occur. As for bodily motion, it has a connection with six things: that being moved, the mover, the one with internal motion, the point where motion begins, where the motion is directed towards, and time. The problem of bodies' transformation is related to motion's categories of quantity, quality, place, and position. Thus, if something moves towards a magnitude that is more than itself in quantity and shows an increase, it is growing (*numuww*) or expanding (*takhalkhul*). If it is directed towards a smaller magnitude and shows a decrease, it is fading away (*dhubūl*) or condensing (*takāsuf*). Transformations such as the body changing from black to white or the fruit gradually transforming from being unripe to ripe occur in quality.[76] Accidents such as place, time, position, and possession are also relations. Rest is the absence of motion. Sublunar bodies move linearly and have directions such as up, down, right, left, back, and front. The directions are limited due to the ends, this limitation is understood from the finitude of dimensions.[77]

According to Ibn Kammūna, place is the inner surface of the surrounding body that touches the outer surface of the included body. Pursuant to this, a thing without ipseity has no place.[78] Simple and compound bodies must have a place, quantity, and shape. The positions of the bodies are determinate, for they are unable to exist in all places, magnitudes, shapes, and positions or exist free of these. This determinate position is natural for the body because having two natural places is impossible for the body.[79] As Ibn Kammūna stated, no void (*khalāʾ*) exists, neither outside nor between bodies. The void is the complete dimension that is self-subsisting, and is not found in matter. Also, no void can exist due to the impossibility of intertwining the dimensions, because if voids existed outside the bodies, a finite body would not be possible and the corporeal world would come into existence in a corporeal place.[80] Instances such as heavy bodies floating on water (buoyancy), stones falling to the

74 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 193.

75 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 171.

76 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 318–321; Under the influence of Suhrawardī, Ibn Kammūna discussed motion in categories, and considered the changes in the quality and quantity categories to be mental. For detailed information, see Pattabanoğlu, *İbn Kemmûne ve Felsefesi,* 165–169.

77 Pattabanoğlu, *İbn Kemmûne ve Felsefesi,* 154–165, 205–206.

78 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Tanqīḥāt: al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*, 99; *al-Jadīd*, 343, 507.

79 Ibn Kammūna, "Taqrīb al-maḥajja", 204.

80 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 344–346; Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 92; Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl*, 108b–109a.

ground (gravity), and having infinite dimensions being impossible are also due to the impossibility of the void.[81]

As Ibn Kammūna maintained, qualities are examined in three parts: those specific to quantities, those perceived by the five senses, and those not perceived by the five senses. Those specific to quantities represent the body's properties (e.g, unity, duality, and shape). Among the five senses, the sense of touch perceives the body through properties such as hotness-coldness, moistness-dryness, lightness-density, solidity-fluidity, hardness-softness, heaviness-lightness, while other senses perceive its properties such as color, taste, smell, and sound. Those that are not perceived by the senses are not known exactly. This is called *ḥāll* and concerns the part of epistemological discussions on the subject of perception and the problem of the soul.[82] Although the bodies of living beings are considered to be in the category of body, these bodies have souls, which is "the first perfection of the organic body" that enable them to be alive.[83] As mentioned before, the soul as an incorporeal substance governs and disposes the body, which is a corporeal substance. In this context, the soul acts as a bridge between the natural sciences and metaphysics.

Conclusion

1. In the definition of the body; Ibn Kammūna prioritized the principles of being indicated (being a concrete body), having a natural place (*mutaḥayyiz*), and being divisible. He claimed that the body was not just composed of substance but rather should be known as the sum of the accident and the substance.

2. He examined the mathematical body in the category of accidents and the natural body in the category of substance.

3. Ibn Kammūna considered the existence of the contingents, which metaphysically have essences, to have emanated from an external principle. The occurrence of the body is explained in compliance with the same emanation theory, and the intellect is considered to be the cause of its emanation.

4. As being body is not due to having dimensions but due to having the form of body, the constituent elements of the body are matter and body form. As Suhrawardī

81 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 346.
82 Ibn Kammūna, *al-Jadīd*, 285.
83 Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Najāt*, 137.

claimed, the body is not merely magnitude. In this respect, Ibn Kammūna adopted the Peripatetic school, exceeding the Ishrāqī line.

5. He held the same position with the Peripatetics and the Ishrāqīs on not accepting atoms and the void.

6. Matter is what accepts the conjunction and separation in the body, which is actual through its form and potential through its matter. Continuous unity is a form. While the body form is common to all bodies, special forms are those that enable bodies to be diversified. Matter needs form for the continuation of its existence and particularization, and form needs matter for existing, taking on a shape, and particularizing. Because this relationship is not causal, instrumental, or intermediary, no superiority exists among them.

7. Ibn Kammūna adopted the Ishrāqī school's definition and classification of substances-accidents. Although he admitted the body to consist of matter and form, he did not include them in the substance category because the form of conjunction (i.e., bodily form) is not a substance because it subsists through matter, not through its essence. Ibn Kammūna does not provide evidence to prove that the accidents can be the constituents of the substances. But his conclusions show that he accepted this.

8. Although the body theories of Suhrawardī in *al-Talwīḥāt* and *al-Ishrāq* differed from each other, Ibn Kammūna did not see this as a contradiction. He tried to portray Suhrawardī in the Peripatetic tradition. Similar considerations were repeated by Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī.

As a result of the above determinations, Ibn Kammūna can be said to have revised the thoughts of both traditions, included the teachings that he found accurate in his system, and to have tried to develop a specific body theory by presenting an eclectic method. Although the methodological dissimilarities and different thoughts of Suhrawardī in *al-Talwīhāt* and *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* seem to be a problem in understanding the subject of the body, Ibn Kammūna tried to resolve this issue. While he went beyond the thoughts of Ibn Sīnā's school, he attempted to bring Suhrawardī closer to Peripatetism. In conclusion, the body subject has extensive content, and this article has been presented in the framework of the main issues as a reference for detailed studies that can be carried out later. Continuity of the contributions to the field will be provided through the comparative studies with narrower titles on philosophers who had influenced Ibn Kammūna such as Shirāzī, Dawwānī, Mīr Dāmād, and Molla Ṣadrā.

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