

The Status of the Human Soul Between the Distinctness from the Body (*Mugāyeret*) and the Abstractness from the Body (*Tajarrud*): The Case of Ali Qūshjī

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Abstract: The nature of the soul and its relationship to the body has been a subject of debate throughout history. In ancient Hellenistic times and the Middle Ages, the discussion revolved around whether the soul could be reduced to the body and bodily elements. This debate evolved into a consideration of whether the mind could be reduced to the body in the modern and contemporary periods. This ongoing debate can be observed in the classical and post-classical periods of Islamic philosophy and theology. Islamic philosophers largely upheld substance dualism, distinguishing the soul as an immaterial and incorporeal abstracted substance, and the body as a material and corporeal concrete substance. They argued for the distinctness of the soul and the body, presenting the soul as an abstracted substance. However, some theologians, particularly in the post-classical period, agreed on the distinctness of the soul from the body but diverged from the philosophers on the abstractness of the soul from the body. They criticized the philosophical proofs that the soul is an abstracted substance. Ali Qūshjī played a significant role in this debate by emphasizing the soul's distinction from the body and challenging the arguments for the soul being an abstracted substance. This study aims to analyze the difference between the distinctness of the soul from the body and the abstractness of the soul from the body through the example of Ali Qūshjī. It seeks to determine Ali Qūshjī's position in this enduring debate, which has spanned from the ancient Hellenistic period to the modern and contemporary period.

Keywords: Ali Qūshjī, Ibn Sīnā, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Human soul, Mind, Body, *Mugāyeret*, *Tajarrud*.

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"If we consider the soul in itself, then we agree with Plato; but if we consider it according to the form which it gives to the body and animates it, then we agree with Aristotle."

Albertus Magnus

Introduction

Throughout the history of philosophy, there has been ongoing debate about the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body, or, as it was famously put by Descartes, the mind-body relationship. The classical view presents two extreme approaches to this problem. One is the monist approach, which includes theories of harmony advocated by Simmias in Plato's *Phaidon* dialogue and the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory. The other approach involves philosophers who argue that the soul and the body are distinct entities, such as Democritus, Philolaus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Lucretius, and the Stoics, as well as dualist philosophers who posit that the soul and the body are separate substances, with the soul being immaterial and the body being material. Examples of dualist philosophers include Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, and Ibn Sīnā.¹

The classical and post-classical periods of Islamic philosophy and theology present different approaches to the soul-body relationship. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's work, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, illustrates the divergence in these periods. On one hand, there's an approach that reduces the truth of the human being to

1 For detailed information on both the two-pronged approaches pointed out here in general and the discussions by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and even Dante on how the soul as an immaterial substance can form a unity with a material body in the Ancient-Hellenistic period and in the Middle Ages, see J. E. Sisko, "Introduction Volume 1", *Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity*, ed. J. E. Sisko (London & New York: Routledge, 2019), 6-8. On the appearance of the problem of the soul-body relationship in the Antiquity-Hellenistic period and the Middle Ages, see also P. S. MacDonald, *History of the Concept of Mind: Speculations About Soul, Mind, and Spirit from Homer to Hume* (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 37-87, 161-204; R. Martin-J. Barresi, *The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self – An Intellectual History of Personal Identity* (New York: Columbia UP, 2006), 9-108; H. Lagerlund, "Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul," *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. H. Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 1-12; M. Cameron, "Introduction to Volume 2", *Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages*, ed. M. Cameron (London & New York: Routledge, 2019), 1-18.

the body and bodily parts. On the other hand, there's an approach that views the truth of the human being as an abstract substance separate from the body.²

In contemporary discourse, various perspectives on the mind-body relationship exist. Materialism and physicalism, exemplified by behaviorism, psycho-neural identity theory, functionalism, computational theory of mind, eliminative materialism, reductive materialism, and emergentism, reduce the human mind, mental states, consciousness, and conscious experiences to the body or specifically to the brain. Conversely, substance dualism, which emerged after Descartes, posits that the human mind, self, mental states, and consciousness extend beyond the corporeal and material. Additionally, perspectives such as property dualism, anti-reductive physicalism, neutral monism, neurophenomenology, biological naturalism, naturalistic dualism, double aspect theory, and neutral monism offer alternative positions between materialism and substance dualism.³

In contemporary literature, numerous studies have sought to comparatively analyze theologians' perspectives on the relationship between the soul and body, as well as their stances regarding the philosophers' theory of the abstracted soul. Notable figures in this discourse include Hisham b. Hakam (d. 179/795), Darar b. 'Amr (d. 200/815), Abū Bakr al-Asam (d. 200/816), Sumāma b. Ashraf (d. 213/828), Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād (d. 215/830), Abu al-Husayn al-Allāf (d. 235/849), Bishr b. al-Mutamir (d. 210/825), al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), al-Jāhīz (d. 255/869), Abū 'Alī al-Jubba'ī (d. 303/915), Abū Hāshim al-Jubba'ī (d. 321/933), Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (d. 672/1274), Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī (d. 749/1349), Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d.

2 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye mine al-ilmi al-ilāhī*, thk. Muhammad 'Abd al-Salām Shāhin (Beirut: Dāru al-Kutubi al-Ilmiyya, 1999), VII, 21-25.

3 For some general descriptions of the mind-body relationship in the contemporary period, see. A. Kind, "Introduction to Volume 6: Philosophy of Mind: Themes, Problems, and Scientific Context", *Philosophy of Mind in The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries*, ed. A. Kind (London & New York: Routledge, 2019), 1-9; A. Kind, "The Mind-Body Problem in 20th-Century Philosophy", *Philosophy of Mind in The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries*, ed. A. Kind (London & New York: Routledge, 2019), 52-78; T. Crane, "A Short History of Philosophical Theories of Consciousness in The 20th Century", *Philosophy of Mind in The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries*, ed. A. Kind (London & New York: Routledge, 2019), 78-103.

792/1390), and Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), who stand out for their focus on these issues.⁴ Ali Qūshjī (d. 879/1474), one of the most significant thinkers of the post-classical period, addresses this problem in his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, engaging with theologians such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, and Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī. While theologians, like philosophers, present arguments for distinguishing the soul from temperament, the physical body, and its parts (*mugāyerat*), they criticise the notion of the soul as a substance abstracted from the body (*tajarrud*), contrary to philosophical views.⁵ Significant studies have been conducted

- 4 Especially in the early theology, there are many approaches to the soul-body relationship that are nondualist but adopt a physicalist attitude. Examples include the monistic approach of Darar b. Amr (d. 200/815) and Abū Bakr al-Asam (d. 200/816), the monistic approach of Abu al-Husayn al-Allāf (d. 235/849) and Bishr b. al-Mutamir (d. 210/825), who, although stating that human beings are composed of body and soul, do not accept the soul as a material or spiritual substance, which can be seen as a kind of property dualism, and al-Nazzām (d. 231/845) and al-Jāhiz (d. 255/869), who believe that the soul is a subtle body. In this sense, the only exception among the early theologians seems to be the dualist approach of Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād (d. 215/830). In the process that began with the Jubbaites, however, in Ash'arism and Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the above-mentioned early ideas were "fused into the idea of human unity". The debate on the essence of the soul evolved into the view of the subtle body with al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) tried to unify the view of the subtle body with the view of the abstracted soul, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) criticized the view of the abstracted soul. Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), on the other hand, appears to be a late theologian who defended the view of the abstracted soul in line with Ibn Sīnā. In relation to the approaches presented here, see. M. Kaş, "Seyyid Şerif Cürcani'ye Göre İnsani Nefs", *İnsan Nedir? İslâm Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 201-212.
- 5 On the background of the debates on the theory of the abstracted soul in Islamic thought, the different attitudes towards the theory of the abstracted soul, and their justifications, see Ö. Türker, "İslâm Düşüncesinin Soyut Nefs Teorisiyle İmtihanı", *İnsan Nedir? İslâm Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 19-57. For the negative attitude of some theologians towards the philosophers' views that the soul is an abstracted substance, see. Y. Cengiz, "Mutezile'nin İnsan Düşüncesinde Rakip İki Tasavvur: Ebu'l-Huzeyl ve Nazzam Gelenekleri", *İnsan Nedir? İslâm Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer, (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 59-85; A. Shihadeh, "Classical Ash'ari Anthropology: Body, Life and Spirit", *The Muslim World, Special Issue: The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought* 102/3-4 (2012): 433-77; Ş. Hakkı, "Eş'arî ve Cüveynî'nin İnsan Anlayışı", *İnsan Nedir? İslâm Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 87-102; A. Shihadeh, "Al-Ghazali and Kalam: The Conundrum of His Body-Soul Dualism", *Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazālī. Papers Collected on His 900th Anniversary* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 113-41; J. Janssens, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Soul: A Critical Approach to Ibn Sīnā", *The Muslim World* 102/3-4 (2012): 562-79; E. Altaş, "Fahreddin er-Rāzī'ye Göre İnsanın Mahiyeti ve Hakikati –Mücerred Nefs Görüşünün Eleştirisi–", *İnsan Nedir? İslâm Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer, (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 139-42, 167-78; Z. Erdinç, "Teftâzânî'de Bilen Özne Olarak

on Ali Qūshjī's perspectives across various disciplines, including linguistics, theology, mathematics, geometry, and astronomy. However, his views on the relationship between the soul and the body, as well as his positioning in the divergence between philosophers and theologians, have not received as much attention as his contributions in the above fields.

Some recent studies have argued that theologians like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī unequivocally embraced substance dualism, in line with Ibn Sīnā's perspectives on the soul-body connection. This assertion is based on their compelling critiques of the early theological notion that the soul is merely a material body. However, it's important to note that this claim overlooks Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's forceful criticisms of the concept of the soul as an abstracted substance, which significantly complicates the assertion of a straightforward alignment with Ibn Sīnā's dualism.⁶ The comprehensive examination of similar problems is beyond the scope of this study, given its direct focus on Ali Qūshjī's ideas regarding the relationship between the soul and the body. Criticizing the notion that the soul consists of the body does not inherently imply an endorsement of a position positing the soul as a substance abstracted from the body, such as Ibn Sīnā's advocacy of substance dualism. It would be an inadequate interpretation to conclude that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and like-minded theologians advocate substance dualism akin to Ibn Sīnā. When elucidating the soul-body or mind-body relationship, it may be unnecessary to favour eliminative and reductive materialist positions or substance dualism. Within this context, it may be feasible to interpret the views of theologians from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to 'Ali Qūshjī

İnsan", *İnsan Nedir? İslâm Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 245-55.

- 6 For a study that focuses on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *al-Matālib al-ʿālīyya*, but mostly focuses on al-Rāzī's criticisms of the soul as not consisting of a body and the ontological, epistemological, and agency of body-based arguments he uses to oppose this view but ignores al-Rāzī's criticisms of the soul as an abstracted substance in the same work, see. A. A. Awad, "Al-Rāzī On the Theologians' Materialism", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 33 (2023): 83-111. For an emphasis on the fact that no conclusion can be drawn from *al-Matālib al-ʿālīyye* that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī thought that the soul is an abstracted substance, see E. Altaş, "Fahredden er-Rāzī'ye Göre İnsanın Mahiyeti ve Hakikati –Mücerred Nefs Görüşünün Eleştirisi–", 189-90. There are also recent studies that reach the opposite conclusion from the one claimed in the above-mentioned study. Bk. P. Fatoorchi, "Self-Knowledge and a Refutation of the Immateriality of Human Nature", *International Philosophical Quarterly* 60/2 (2020): 189-99; P. Fatoorchi, "Soul-Switching and the Immateriality of Human Nature: On an Argument Reported by al-Rāzī", *Theoria* 87/5 (2021): 1067-82.

in the context of other intermediate positions on the mind-body relationship, such as property dualism or anti-reductive physicalism. These theologians do not perceive the soul as consisting of a body, yet they also do not accept that the soul is an abstracted substance. A transformation in Islamic philosophy of mind emerged from the IV/XIth and V/XIIth centuries, resulting from the convergence of the physicalist attitudes of early theology with Avicenna's dualist position or the third-person perspective with the first-person perspective. This transformation is discernible through the perspectives of theologians such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Abu al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 547/1152), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) on the relationship between the soul and the body, represents a critical juncture in the discourse on the nature of the soul and its relationship with the body. It is reasonable to emphasise this transformation without hastily equating the positions of theologians like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī with Ibn Sīnā's substance dualism.⁷

Is there a fundamental difference between the concept of the soul being distinct from the body and the idea of the soul being abstracted from the body? Are these two claims truly distinct? When stating that the soul is distinct from the body and its parts, does this distinction prevent the reduction of the soul to the body and its parts, while simultaneously affirming that the soul is an abstract entity entirely separate from the body and its components? Alternatively, could it be that even when the soul is acknowledged as distinct from the body and its parts, the concept of the soul being abstracted from the body is not asserted? Can the disagreements among philosophers and theologians regarding the human being, the soul-body relationship, and related sub-problems be interpreted through the contrast between the distinction of the soul from the body (*mugāyeret*) and the abstraction of the soul from the body (*tajarrud*)? Is it tenable to posit that the soul is distinct from the body while simultaneously rejecting the abstraction of the soul from the body and taking a stance that encompasses neither reducing the human being, the

7 F. Benevich, "First-Person and Third – Person Views in Arabic Philosophy of Mind", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 90/1 (2023): 1-47. The same author's thesis that sense perception cannot be reduced to sense organs, based on some early theologians, also provides clues to the theologians' anti-reductive position on the soul-body relationship; see F. Benevich, "Nonreductive Theories of Sense-Perception in The Philosophy of Kalam", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 34 (2024): 95-117.

human soul, the mind, mental states, consciousness, and conscious experiences to the body nor considering them in an abstracted space entirely independent of the body? This study aims to address these questions by exploring the opposition between *mugāyeret* and *tajarruḍ*, as evidenced in Ali Qūshjī's commentary on *Tajrīd al-akā'id*. Furthermore, this exploration will serve to elucidate the disparities between philosophers' and theologians' perspectives on the relationship between the soul and the body through this distinction. The study will posit that such an intermediate standpoint is plausible and rational. Consequently, the first part of the study will present the issues related to the soul in Ali Qūshjī's commentary, progressively moving from the general to the specific to reveal the main problem. Subsequently, it will delve into the arguments supporting the distinction of the soul from the temperament, the body, and parts. Finally, the study will examine the arguments for abstracting the soul from the body and the criticisms directed at them.

The Appearance of the Problem and Conceptual Framework in Sharh *Tajrīd al-akā'id*

A framework akin to the tradition of critiquing philosophers' ideas on the relationship between the soul and the body, particularly after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, is evident in the works of Ali Qūshjī. Ali Qūshjī's connection with his predecessors can also be discerned through the fact that the framework of another commentator of *Tajrīd al-akā'id*, Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī's commentary, is predominantly preserved in Ali Qūshjī's commentary.⁸ Ali Qūshjī's perspectives on the soul-body relationship are expounded in the section on abstracted substances (*al-jawāhir al-mujarrahada*) in his commentary on Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-akā'id*. The chapter comprises two primary parts, consistent with the theological tradition before him: [I] Intellect. [II] The soul. The first part on the intellect presents the philosophers' arguments for the existence of the intellect as an immaterial, incorporeal, and separate substance, followed by criticisms of these arguments. The second part on the

8 For comparisons indicating that Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī and 'Ali Qūshjī address the issues related to the soul-body relationship along similar lines in their commentaries on *Tajrīd al-Aqā'id*, see Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, *Tesdid al-qawā'id fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, thk. Eşref Altaş et al. (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2020), III, 172-31.

soul encompasses the following topics: [1] The distinction of the soul from the temperament (*mugāyeret*) and the related arguments, [2] the distinction of the soul from the body (*mugāyeret*), [3] the arguments for the abstraction of the soul (*tajarruḍ*) and the criticism of these arguments, [4] the unity of the soul in terms of species (*wahdat*), [5] the subsequent creation of the soul (*hudūth*), [6] the equality of the number of souls and bodies and the invalidity of reincarnation, [7] the soul's continued existence after its relationship with the body is severed (*baqā*), [8] the intellection (*taʿaqqul*) of the soul and cognition (*idrāk*), [9] the faculties of the soul.

Under the title of intellect, Ali Qūshjī presents philosophers' arguments for the existence of the intellect as an immaterial, incorporeal, and separate substance, in other words, for the existence of separate intellects in the supra-lunar realm. He also presents the standard criticisms of theologians for the separate intellects and, thus, for the emanation theory.⁹ The criticism of the separate intellects falls outside the specific problem this article aims to examine.

In his chapter on the soul, Ali Qūshjī analyses its absolute definition and scope. According to the standard definition, the soul is "the first perfection of a natural organic body with potential life." The debates surrounding the terms 'first', 'body', 'organic', 'potential', and 'having life' in this definition can be set aside. It's important to note that philosophers use the term 'soul' not only for abstracted essence but also for material things, such as vegetable and animal souls, which are the source of various actions. The definition of the soul as "the first perfection of a natural organic body with potential life" pertains not to the essence and substance of the soul but to its relationship with the body it inhabits.¹⁰ The use of the term 'soul' to refer to both an abstracted substance separated from matter and to material bodies and bodily acts raises certain issues regarding the relationship between the immaterial and incorporeal nature of the soul and the material and corporeal nature of the body. In this study, we will delve into these problems and explore the criticisms of theologians in the section on the abstraction of the soul from the body.

9 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 190-205.

10 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 205, 207-208. For the emphasis on this in Ibn Sīnā, see. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā: Nafs*, ed. M. Z. Tiryaki (Ankara: TÜBA, 2021), 38-73, 88-95; M. Z. Tiryaki, "İbn Sīnā'nın Kitābū'n-Nefs'inde Beden ve Bedensellik", *İnsan Nedir? İslām Düşüncesinde İnsan Tasavvurları*, ed. Ö. Türker ve İ. H. Üçer (İstanbul: İlem Yayınları, 2022), 383-404.

We now shift from the general to the specific to examine Ali Qūshjī's views on the nature of the soul. We will see how he narrows the focus from the definition of the absolute soul, which encompasses all the vegetable, animal, human, and celestial souls, and the problems related to this definition, to the problems associated with the human soul. In the section on the distinction of the soul from the temperament, Ali Qūshjī makes the following statement at the outset:

Since the most important of the issues related to the soul is to know the human soul - because knowing the human soul is a ladder to the most important of the essential things, that is, to know the Sānī with His supreme attributes, which is why the saying "he who knows himself knows his Lord" [became] famous among those who demand certain knowledge (*yakīn*) - [at-Tūsī] began to explain the states of the human soul after the absolute definition of the soul. [The states of the human soul are] the distinction of the soul from the temperament, the body, and the parts of the body (*mugāyeret*), the soul's being one in essence in human individuals (*muttāhid*), its being an abstracted substance (*mujarred*), and the soul's being something that does not disappear with the extinction of the body (*fanā*) but is something that comes into being (*hādīs*), The soul's not being transferred to bodies, the intellection (*ta'qqul*) of the soul to be realised by the soul itself and its perception (*ihsās*) realised by the organs, the soul's commonality with plants in the faculties of nutrition, growth and reproduction, and with other animals in the faculties of external and internal perception; and its faculties of external and internal cognition with other animals."¹¹

In this passage, 'Ali Qūshjī outlines the various states of the human soul and the topics discussed in the soul section of the *Tajrīd* commentary. This sheds light on the fundamental issues that reveal both similarities and differences between the perspectives of philosophers and theologians on the soul and the body. While philosophers and theologians largely share similar views on specific aspects such as the distinction of the soul from the temperament, body, and parts of the body (*mugāyeret*), the unity of the soul as a species (*wahdat*), the soul's subsequent generation (*hudūs*), the equality of the number of souls and bodies, and the invalidity of reincarnation, they differ in their views on the soul's abstracted substance (*tajarruḍ*), the soul's continuity despite the body's disappearance after its connection with the body is severed, the intellect (*ta'qqul*) of the soul and its cognition, and the faculties of the soul. These differences can be observed through the distinction between the

11 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 208.

soul's separation from the body (*mugāyeret*) and the abstraction of the soul from the body (*tajarruḍ*).

In the following section of the study, we will delve into Ali Qūshjī's assessments of the arguments concerning the distinction of the soul from the body (*mugāyeret*) and the abstraction of the soul from the body (*tajarruḍ*). We aim to explore whether the theologians' justifications for the soul's distinction from the temperament, body, and body parts ensure its abstraction from the body. It's important to note that the arguments under Ali Qūshjī's scrutiny are not of his own making, but rather the commonly used proofs in the discussions of *mugāyeret* and *tajarruḍ* by philosophers and theologians. This is particularly evident in his presentation and critique of the proofs related to the abstraction of the soul from the body. Hence, while it's plausible that the arguments for the soul's distinction from the body are accepted by al-'Ali Qūshjī, the same cannot be assumed for the arguments regarding the abstraction of the soul from the body. We will revisit this point in the evaluation section after analyzing the arguments.

The Distinctness of the Soul from the Temperament and the Body (*Mugāyeret*)

The distinction of the soul from the temperament and the body is examined under separate headings, but Ali Qūshjī also discusses the distinction of the soul from the temperament, the body, and the parts of the body together. Therefore, this section will explore the arguments and evaluations regarding the soul's distinction from the temperament and then from the body. These arguments are primarily based on Ibn Sīnā's views that the soul is an immaterial, incorporeal, and abstract substance independent of the body. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later theologians considered and critiqued these as the most important arguments for the soul being an abstract substance independent of the temperament and the body.¹² Ali Qūshjī also examines four arguments for distinguishing the soul from temperament.

12 For the appearance of these arguments in Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifa: Nafs*, 368-87; M. Z. Tiryaki, "İbn Sīnā: Maddi Olmayan Bir Cevher Olarak Nefs", *Ruhun Felsefesi-Psykhe ve Nous Etrafında On Bir Tartışma*, ed. İhsan Berk Özcangiller (İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınları, 2023), 127-40; al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, VII, 35-75; E. Altaş, "Fahreddin er-Rāzī'ye Göre İnsanın Mahiyeti ve Hakikati –Mücerred Nefs Görüşünün Eleştirisi–", 166-78.

First Argument: The Vicious Cycle Argument

The initial argument presented by the philosophers to differentiate the soul from the temperament highlights the cause-and-effect relationship between the soul and the temperament. This argument seeks to justify the distinction of the soul from the temperament based on this relationship. The argument is as follows:

The rational soul serves as a necessary condition for the formation of temperament. This is because temperament arises from the interaction of opposing elements in conflict (*muṭanāzia*) and diverge from each other (*infiqāq*). The soul compels these opposing elements to unite (*ijtimā'*) and achieve harmony (*ta'alif*). Therefore, the emergence of temperament relies on the integration (*iltiyām*) and harmony facilitated by the soul. If the soul were not distinct from the temperament, it would necessitate a vicious circle of explanation.¹³

The argument presented aligns with what al-Rāzī, in his commentary on al-Ishārāt, refers to as the second of Ibn Sīnā's two grounds for explaining that voluntary movement and cognition are not due to the dispositions.¹⁴ The first ground asserts that the soul's properties are incompatible with the temperament. In contrast, the second ground argues that the temperament's properties are incompatible with the soul. According to this argument, the conflict and dissociation between opposites, the primary characteristics of the temperaments, necessitate something that enables their harmonious union. Ali Qūshjī raises an objection that denies the distinction between the soul and temperament.¹⁵

This objection is based on the contradiction between the philosophers' understanding of temperament and what is claimed in the argument regarding the distinct nature of the soul. It posits that composite things, due to their different temperaments, have the willingness to accept the first perfections from the principles. Therefore, temperaments are necessary to emerge the

¹³ Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 208.

¹⁴ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 210, 212. For the appearance of the argument in Ibn Sīnā see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa't-tanbihāt* (together with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa't-tanbihāt*), ed. Ali Reza Najafzade (Tehran: Encümen-i Asar ve Mefahir-i Ferhengi, 2005), II, 210. See also Isfahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 178-79.

¹⁵ Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 208-209.

first perfections of composite things. The objection further argues that if the soul becomes a condition for the emergence of the temperament, a vicious circle is necessary.

In response to this objection, 'Ali Qūshjī provides an answer that theologians before him had also mentioned.¹⁶ He begins by examining the relationship between the temperament between the parts of the zygote and the soul of the parents. By tracing the causes of the temperaments backwards from the dependence of the temperament in the womb of the mother on the soul of the mother, it is observed that each temperament is based on a soul that does not depend on any other temperament before it and whose existence precedes the temperament.

Therefore, the objection is invalidated, and this argument that the soul is distinct from the temperament is accepted as a valid argument by Ali Qūshjī.

Second Argument: The Motion Argument

According to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, this argument elucidates Ibn Sīnā's primary rationale for distinguishing the soul from the temperament. Essentially, the argument asserts that the nature and capacity for motion of the soul preclude its identification with the temperament. Al-Rāzī further elaborates that this argument can be examined from two perspectives. First, the temperament impedes voluntary motion in terms of the direction of movement. Second, the temperament constrains the soul's inherent motion.¹⁷ The argument, as Ali Qūshjī cites it, is as follows:

The soul and temperament exhibit opposing inclinations regarding necessity (*iktizā*). This is evident in cases where the soul seeks motion in one direction while at the same time, the temperament impedes it by necessitating either rest, as in the case of walking on flat ground, or motion in a different direction, as in ascending to a higher place. Such a conflict in necessity indicates that the respective inclinations of the soul and temperament are distinct.¹⁸

16 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, II, 209; for the appearance and response of this objection in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see. Al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 212.

17 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 210-11.

18 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*, II, 210.

In this argument, Ali Qūshjī discusses an example that aligns with a point made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, focusing on the concept of lameness. When the soul endeavors to move an organ in a specific direction, the temperament impedes this movement, causing a delay in the intended direction. Likewise, when attempting to climb a high place, the temperament pulls the body downward, obstructing the upward movement desired by the soul. An objection to this argument proposes that it is not the temperament but the body parts that hinder the soul's movement. According to this objection, the body parts or elemental natures naturally tend downward due to their weight, impeding the soul's motion above ground and in climbing to a high place. However, the temperament, in terms of heat and coldness, does not pose any hindrance. Ali Qūshjī does not respond to this objection.¹⁹

This objection is addressed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who argues that the qualities specific to a person's temperament are already part of the qualities of the simple natures associated with the elements mentioned in the objection. Therefore, it is impossible for something contrary to these superficial qualities to emerge from the qualities specific to a person's temperament. By establishing an opposition between the temperament and the parts of the body, the objection that the temperament does not hinder the soul's desire to move is invalidated.²⁰ From this perspective, it can be asserted that, in line with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 'Alī al-Qūshjī acknowledged the validity of the argument for distinguishing between the soul and the temperament, based on the principle of motion.

Third Argument: The Argument from the Persistence of the Soul

Another argument supporting the distinction between the soul and temperament is founded on the opposition between the soul's continuous and permanent existence and the temperament's impermanence. The argument proceeds as follows:

19 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 210.

20 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 211.

The soul persists (*baqā*) even when the temperament undergoes dissolution. For instance, Zayd possessed a particular temperament in his childhood, yet that specific temperament did not persist into his youth. It follows that which endures must necessarily be distinct from that which perishes.²¹

The argument begins with the premise that the soul persists even after the dissolution of the temperament. If the soul were identical with the temperament, it would necessarily cease to exist upon the destruction of the temperament. Ali Qūshjī does not raise any objection to this argument.

Fourth Argument: The Argument from Cognition

This argument demonstrates the distinction of the soul from the temperament through the example of touch:

If the principle of cognition, namely the soul, were identical with temperament, then cognition would not be possible through tactile sensation. This is because temperament itself is a tangible quality. If the soul were a tangible quality like temperament, it would not be influenced by or perceive other tangible qualities. Moreover, if the soul were a quality in opposition to temperament, it would be nullified by the tangible quality, raising the question of how it could perceive it.²²

Upon the acceptance of the third and fourth arguments without objection, it was concluded that 'Alī al-Qūshjī upheld a position that did not reduce the soul to any physical or corporeal element, such as temperament. After examining the arguments asserting the distinction of the soul from temperament, 'Alī al-Qūshjī proceeded to evaluate the arguments for the distinction of the soul from the body, its parts, and its faculties.²³ Based on 'Alī al-Qūshjī's

21 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 210.

22 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 211. Al-Rāzī says that this argument is an argument that the soul is not a temperament based on the faculty of cognition. See al-Rāzī, *Sharh al-Ishārāt*, II, 211-12.

23 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, thk. Muhammad Husayn al-Zarī al-Razā'i (Qom: Neṣr-i Raid, 2021), II, 190-262. The problems listed here regarding the relationship between the soul and the body are discussed mainly in a line for which Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī sets the basic framework. Al-Rāzī's topics and detailed evaluations and criticisms of Ibn Sīnā's views on the soul-body relationship, especially in his commentary on *al-Ishārāt*, were primarily preserved in the texts of theologians who analysed these issues in the following period. In this sense, we can say that the later texts do not discuss the problems in as much detail as does Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and that the basic framework set by al-Rāzī primarily overshadows the discussions of the soul-body in these

discussion regarding the distinction of the soul from the body, it can be observed that he presents three different arguments on this matter. Let us now analyse these arguments.

First Argument: The Flying Man Argument

The argument in question is the flying man, a thought experiment employed by Ibn Sīnā to highlight the separation of the soul from the body as an immaterial substance. Subsequently, theologians interpreted this experiment as one of the philosophers' arguments regarding the abstract nature of the soul. According to Ali Qūshjī, the assertion presented in the flying man thought experiment is as follows:

The soul is distinct from the thing [the body] from which unawareness occurs. That is, man is not unaware of his essence. That is to say: In all cases, man does not lack a conception of his essence and an affirmation of its certainty (*subūt*). This is pointed out as follows. If a person has a proper intellect and turns to his own soul in this state, he has no doubt that he has realized his own essence and made his own essence certain. Even when his external and internal senses are not functioning due to intoxication, his essence does not remain unaware of his essence. The fact that the sleeper and the drunkard think of their own essence in sleep and drunkenness does not necessitate that they think of their own essence in the absence of that which attaches to them [sleep and drunkenness] and that they are unaware of their own bodies, external and internal organs, faculties and senses. It follows that if a person imagines that he was created with a proper mind and

texts. For the sake of comparison, it would be appropriate to point out the topics related to the soul-body relationship in al-Rāzī's commentary on *al-Ishārāt*: 1. That the soul does not consist of the body and temperament, the unity of the soul, and the nature of the soul's being affected by the body (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa't-tanbīhāt*, nşr. Ali Rezā Najafzāda, (Tehran: Encümen-i Asār wa Mefāhir-i Farhengī, 2005), II, 201-16). 2. The judgements of cognition, the nature of cognition, the explanation of the degrees of cognition in abstraction, the internal senses, the degrees of the human soul, the differences between intuition (*hads*) and thinking (*fikr*), the proof of the divine faculty, that the natural soul is not a body or corporeal thing, and that every abstracted thing is intellect, the one who realises the thinking (*ʿāqil*) and intelligible (al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 216-15). 3. The judgements of the motive faculty, the parts of the vegetative faculty, the voluntary motive faculty, the proof that the celestial spheres move by will, and the proof of the celestial souls (al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 315-34). When we compare al-Rāzī's detailed discussions on the soul-body relationship with the less detailed description of the soul-body relationship in Ali Qūshjī's commentary, at least in the context of this study, we can say that there is a regression in the depth of discussions on the soul-body relationship.

temperament at the time of his original creation, such that he could not see any of the parts [of his body], that his organs could not touch each other, and that he was suspended in an empty air in which there was neither heat nor cold, then he would be ignorant of the outside of the body - because the outside of the body is perceived only through the senses - and he would also be ignorant of the inside of the body - because the inside of the body is perceived only through surgery. Thus, he is ignorant of his body, faculties, and senses, yet he realises his essence and existence (*inniya*) despite all this. In this case, one's essence does not consist of these things [from which one is ignorant].²⁴

Ali Qūshjī points to an objection to this argument by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ḥillī al-Kāshī (d. 755/1354), the author of the first annotation to the commentary on *Tajrīd al-akā'id*, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*. According to al-Ḥillī, the essence of the human being is the essential corporeal parts of the human being, which are the parts of the body. Therefore, one cannot be ignorant of these original parts. Still, one does not have to take the residual parts and the accidents and faculties that have entered these parts into consideration.²⁵ In response to this objection, 'Ali Qūshjī states that if one is not ignorant of the essential parts, one must know them as they are so that one can distinguish them from other organs and other things. However, most people do not know the essential parts of their bodies in this way, even though they know themselves in a way that distinguishes them from other people.²⁶ In this respect, people's unawareness of the essential parts of their bodies does not prevent them from knowing that their essence is different from those of others. Hence, the primary claim in this argument that the soul is distinct from the body and bodily parts is true.²⁷

24 For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's evaluations on the flying man, see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 211. al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 202-205.

25 For the attribution of this objection to al-Ḥillī, see Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 211. On Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ḥillī and his annotation on *al-Tasdīd al-qawā'id*, see also Isfahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 181. Muhammed Yetim, "Tecdidi'l-akaid Literatürünün Az Bilinen Muhaşşilerinden Nasîrüddin el-Hillî el-Kâşî'nin Hayatı, İlmi Silsilesi ve Eserleri", *Nazariyat* 5/1 (2019): 191-204.

26 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 211-12.

27 . For evaluations that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī agrees with Ibn Sinā on the points emphasized in the flying man thought experiment in the context of the distinction of the essence or self from the body and bodily organs, but that this is not enough to defend the abstraction of the soul from the body, which will be examined in the next section, see M. Z. Tiryaki, "The Flightless Man: Self Awareness in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī". *Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Science* 6/1 (2020): 25-33.

Second Argument: The Commonality Argument

Another argument that 'Ali Qūshjī cites in the context of the distinction of the soul from the body, again following the theologians before him, is based on the difference between the rational soul and corporeality. Thus, while human beings share commonalities with others regarding corporeality, they differ from them in terms of their rational souls.²⁸ Therefore:

The soul is distinct from that by which commonality is realised.²⁹

According to 'Ali Qūshjī, what is meant to be explained here is that the soul is distinct from the corporeality spread in various directions. While this corporeality is shared among the bodies, the soul of each of these bodies is something that cannot be shared by anything else. However, according to Ali Qūshjī, a problematic situation here needs to be examined. If by corporeality here is meant a universal nature in the sense that the soul of each of them does not have a universal nature of corporeality, then this is something about which there is no confusion even for someone with the lowest level of apprehension. Therefore, this possibility does not pose a problem. If the individuated (*mashahhas*) body is meant, then it is the body itself, and the body is not something in which commonality is realised.³⁰

Third Argument: The Argument from Change

Ali Qūshjī presents the argument, which is also widely expressed in the *Tajrīd al-akā'id* tradition, that the soul is ultimately distinct from the corporeality and therefore distinct from the body and everything corporeal, as follows:

The soul is distinct from that in which change takes place. Things like the temperament, the body, the parts of the body, the faculties of the body, and corporeality are changeable. For example, the temperament becomes hotter and colder, wetter and drier. The body and its corporeal organs grow and disappear. The faculties of the body likewise increase and decrease. Nevertheless, the rational soul remains in its state from the beginning to the end of its life, as is clearly ruled. The unchanging is distinct from the changing.³¹

28 Isfahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 181.

29 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 212.

30 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 212.

31 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 212.

According to 'Ali Qūshjī, this argument is an all-encompassing argument that explains the distinction of the soul from all things such as temperament, body, parts of the body, faculties of the body, and corporeality. However, in an objection raised against this argument by al-Nasīr al-Dīn al-Hillī, it is stated that the change takes place in the residual parts and accidents, not in the original parts that are the soul itself.³²

It appears that al-Hillī's objection is raised by those who argue that the essence of a human being lies in the physical and bodily original parts, as discussed in the first argument regarding the distinction of the soul from the body. Consequently, the third argument, which seeks to differentiate between the soul and the body by associating change with the body and excluding the soul from change, is not valid for those who uphold this perspective. This is because they perceive change in the residual parts, rather than in the bodily and corporeal essential parts, which they consider as the essence of a human being. Thus, if remaining unchanged is sufficient to establish the existence of the soul as something distinct from the body, then the bodily and corporeal essential parts that remain unchanged can also be considered in the same light. 'Ali Qūshjī does not provide an evaluation that can address this objection. However, he mentions that the third argument is also refuted based on animals and plants. This can be viewed as an objection that supports the objection regarding the justification of the distinction of the soul from the body through the contrast of permanence and change. Therefore, the essence of a specific (*mahsus*) horse is nothing distinct from its physical structure or body perceived from that horse. Although we instinctively know that the essence of the horse continues to exist if it is alive, the horse is constantly changing due to factors such as the breakdown of what it consumes in its body, nutrition, and growth. According to Ali Kuşçu, the mystery associated with this subject is probably that the essence of the horse consists of some of the things we observe from the statue of the horse, together with individualisers (*mashahhāt*) that the intellect is incapable of enumerating. Some of the things together with those individualisers do not change or transform throughout the horse's life, except for the accidents that do not harm the horse's individuality. The

32 For the attribution of this objection to al-Hillī, see Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 212. Is-fahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 181.

essential parts of the human body are also like this, and they do not change from the beginning to the end of human life, except for accidents that do not harm their individuality.³³ Ali Qūshjī thus objected to this argument, which is based on the fact that the soul does not change even though the body and bodily parts change, by saying that some parts of the human body are essential and remain unchanged throughout life. Even at the stage of justifying the distinction of the soul from the body, 'Ali Qūshjī draws an image that wants to oppose the claim that the soul is an essence abstracted from the body. In this case, we can say that Ali Qūshjī's objections and criticisms against philosophers regarding the nature of the soul began at the stage of the justification of the distinction of the soul from the body.

The Abstractness of the Soul from the Body (Tajarrud)

The central claim about the abstraction of the soul from the body is that it is not a thing (*muttaḥayyiz*) that occupies a place neither in itself nor subject to anything but an abstracted substance. At this point, there is an objection that it is already certain that the soul is an abstracted substance based on the arguments mentioned in the previous heading as if the primary claim here is, in some sense, redundant. According to the objection, when it became clear that the soul is distinct from the body and its parts, it also becomes clear that the soul is not a body. Otherwise, the soul would be the body itself or a part of the body due to the necessity of the soul not being a body separate from the body (*munfasil*) and outside the body. When it becomes clear that the soul is not the temperament, faculties, and senses, it also becomes clear that the soul is not corporeal. In this case, based on the things mentioned, it is known that the soul is abstracted in the sense mentioned. Nevertheless, what shows that there is still a need for arguments for the soul to be an abstracted substance is the possibility that the estimation may fall into the view that the soul is a body adjacent to the body or an accident that has entered the body other than the aforementioned accidents.³⁴ In view of this possibility, further arguments for the abstraction of the soul from the body were introduced. There exist seven

33 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīdī al-akā'id*, II, 212-13.

34 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 213.

arguments primarily formulated by philosophers in defense of the abstracted soul. Ali Qūshjī scrutinizes these arguments, which were extensively assessed and critiqued within the theological tradition preceding his work.

First Argument: The Argument from Intelligible Form

The debate over whether the soul is abstract or not, and its nature, arose initially from an ontological standpoint. However, the discussion between philosophers and theologians took on an epistemological character at a certain point, evolving into a debate about whether knowledge or the intelligible form can be abstracted. Within this context, philosophers developed an argument aiming to conclude that the soul is abstracted, based on the abstract nature of knowledge or the intelligible form:

[The soul] is an abstract substance because that to which it is attached is abstracted. That which is attached to the rational soul—the intelligible form imprinted in the rational soul—is abstracted. In this case, that which is connected to the intelligible form, the rational soul, must also be abstracted.³⁵

This argument, often considered one of the most compelling among philosophers, asserts that the abstractness of the intelligible form necessitates the abstraction of the locus to which it will be attached, and consequently, the soul. This argument is vehemently opposed by theologians who diverge from the philosophers on the issue of the abstract nature of the soul. There are two explanations for this argument. The first explanation is: “The intelligible form can be common among multiple entities, as in the universals we conceive. Anything that is common among multiple entities is also abstract. If it were not abstract, it would be confined by material attributes such as a specific quantity, place, quality, or position. In such a case, that which lacks such material attributes would not be suitable for the intelligible form and would not be common among many.” The second explanation is: The specification of the

35 For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s analysis of this issue, see *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 284–98. This argument is like a combined version of Ibn Sīnā’s first and second arguments for the soul’s subsistence without being imprinted in a corporeal substance. Bk. Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā: Nafs*, 368–75. For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s criticisms of these arguments, see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Matātāʾ. Al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, VII, 42–45.

locus (*mahal*) with particular attributes such as quantity, place, and location necessitate the specification of the entity that occupies the locus.³⁶

An objection raised by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Khillī, which Ali Qūshjī analyses in the line of criticisms against this argument, naturally starts from the difference between philosophers and theologians on how to understand knowledge. According to this objection, it is possible that knowledge does not mean that the form of the known is realized in the knower (*irtisām*), but only that things become clear to the soul (*inkishāf*). Therefore, the form may not be pictured (*irtisām*) in the soul but in another abstracted thing, for example, in the intellect. Thus, the soul can perceive the form in the intellect in the same way as it perceives what is imprinted from particulars in its corporeal organs.

An objection raised by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Khillī, which Ali Qūshjī examines as part of the criticisms against this argument, begins with the distinction between how philosophers and theologians conceive of knowledge. According to this objection, it is conceivable that knowledge does not necessarily entail the realization of the form of the known in the knower (*irtisām*), but rather that things become evident to the soul (*inkishāf*). Therefore, the form may not be imprinted (*irtisām*) in the soul, but in another abstract entity, such as the intellect. Consequently, the soul can perceive the form in the intellect in the same manner as it perceives what is imprinted from particulars in its corporeal organs.³⁷

Ali Qūshjī examines al-Ḥillī's objection in accordance with al-Jurjānī. First, even if one were to accept al-Ḥillī's objection, it is conceivable that the intelligible form, purported to be abstracted, does not wholly correspond to the entire quiddity, but rather resembles an embroidered image of a horse on a wall. This analogy necessitates a differentiation between the abstract nature of the form itself and the function of the form. In this scenario, the form itself may not be abstracted, but what the form represents can still possess abstract qualities. Thus the fact that the form becomes non-abstract due to its association with material conditions does not imply that the object harboring

36 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 213.

37 For the attribution of this objection to al-Ḥillī, see Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 213-14. Isfahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 182-83.

the form is similarly subject to those material conditions, nor does it signify that it ceases to be abstract. Secondly, even if one were to acknowledge this objection, it is erroneous to deduce that the rational soul's entanglement with material attachments inevitably implies that the intelligible forms within it are likewise characterized by those material attachments. The attribution of a certain attribute to the locus (*maḥall*) does not indicate that what enters that locus is equivalently qualified. For instance, an object may be defined by its whiteness, but the motion that enters the object is not necessarily characterized by whiteness. Similarly, the intelligible form entering the rational soul does not lose its abstract nature due to the soul's material associations. In essence, the form entering the soul remains abstract, even if it becomes linked to the accidents associated with the soul by virtue of its locus. In the context of the issue revolving around the problem of mental existence, 'Alī Qūshjī, following al-Jurjānī, asserts that the first two aspects of al-Ḥillī's objection (the prohibition of the form being depicted, and the prohibition of the absolute form being depicted) can be resolved by substantiating the existence of mental forms. However, 'Alī Qūshjī points out that this argument remains incomplete because mental existence does not necessarily entail that the form is depicted or exists within the mind in a concrete sense.³⁸

Al-Jurjānī's emphasis may suggest support for the philosophers' argument that since the intelligible form is abstracted, the rational soul, which is connected to this form, must also be abstracted. However, according to 'Alī Qūshjī, the fact that the intelligible form can acquire material qualities does not imply that the object or purpose for which the form exists can also take on material qualities and lose its abstract nature. Consequently, the intelligible form does not necessarily need to be abstract, nor does the soul that perceives the form need to be abstract. The argument put forth by the philosophers asserts that because the intelligible form is abstracted, the soul, as the locus to which the form is attached, must also be abstracted. However, 'Alī Qūshjī finds this reasoning insufficient. He argues that the assumption that the rational soul must be abstract simply because the intelligible form requires a locus is incomplete and does not conclusively prove that the rational soul itself is abstracted.

38 'Alī Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 213-14. Jurjānī, *Hāshiyet al-Tajrīd*, III, 182-83.

Second Argument: The Argument from Indivisibility

Another argument developed by philosophers who defend the abstracted soul to justify this view is that the soul is indivisible. The argument is as follows:

The soul is abstract because it is not divided. This argument is expressed as follows: The rational soul is indivisible; anything material is not indivisible.³⁹

Ali Qūshjī elucidates that the supporting premise of the argument is rooted in the soul's capacity to comprehend indivisible simples. The rational soul ('aql), capable of grasping these simples, must itself be indivisible. If the soul were divisible, then the indivisible intelligible object would also need to be divided, as the division of the soul would necessitate the division of the object it comprehends. The rational soul's ability to contemplate simple concepts, such as the point or unity, arises from its contemplation of these indivisible entities. Furthermore, the rational soul also ponders certain truths. If these truths are simple, then they remain so in the mind. If they are not simple, they are composed of simpler elements. This is because every multiplicity, regardless of its complexity, must ultimately stem from a single, actual unity, as the "one" is the principle that gives rise to multiplicity. Thus, the act of contemplating the whole follows the act of contemplating its constituent parts, with the rational soul's contemplation commencing with the simple and advancing to the composite.⁴⁰

One central debate about the indivisibility of the soul revolves around whether this indivisibility should be seen as actual or absolute. 'Ali Qūshjī examines this discussion, drawing on the ideas of al-Jurjānī and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ḥillī. The argument in favor of actual indivisibility is widely accepted, while the concept of absolute indivisibility, which includes both actual and potential indivisibility, is controversial. Qūshjī mentions a disagreement by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Khilī, who proposes that something indivisible could potentially be divisi-

39 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 214. For the appearance of this argument in Ibn Sinā, which proceeds from the indivisibility of the intelligible form that the rational soul as the locus of the intelligible form must also be indivisible, see Ibn Sinā, *Kitāb al-shifa*. Ibn Sinā, *Kitāb al-Shifa: Naḥṣ*, 368-74, 376-77. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī says that this argument is Ibn Sinā's main argument for the abstractness of the soul. For evaluations and criticisms of this argument, see, Al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, VII, 35-41.

40 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 214.

ble. Qūshjī also cites al-Jurjānī's initial response to this disagreement: it is unlikely for something singular to be potentially divisible into distinct parts in essence, as this would imply the pre-existence of the parts in some form. Additionally, it is also unlikely for something singular to be divided into parts that are identical in essence, as this would result in the intelligible form mirroring its parts in their entire essence. Each of these parts would emerge in the intellect alongside the whole. The emergence of quiddity occurs when one part comes into existence, as intellection (*taaqul*) of a thing signifies the presence of the essence of that thing in the intellect. The presence of sufficient parts in one part is adequate for it to be intelligible. Consequently, variations in quantity, whether excess or deficiency, would adhere to the intelligible form, rendering it non-abstract from material accidents. In response to this, a distinction is made between two types of abstraction: the abstraction of the intelligible form from the substances and accidents of its sensible parts, and the abstraction of the intelligible form from all material accidents. It is argued that while the intelligible form must be abstracted from the materials of its sensible parts, it is not necessary for it to be abstracted from all material accidents.⁴¹ Hence, the minor premise of the argument, which seeks to uphold the indivisibility of the rational soul by citing the abstractness and indivisibility of the things perceived by the rational soul, is called into question by the idea that the intelligible form cannot be entirely separated from material attributes.

Ali Qūshjī scrutinizes the principal premise of the argument, positing that anything material is either a body or an inherent component of a body, and both are divisible. Qūshjī raises several objections to this premise, akin to those articulated in earlier discussions. Initially, he challenges the premise based on the disparity between the perspectives of philosophers and theologians regarding the nature of knowledge. He refutes the notion that knowledge arises through a process of "picturing" (*irtisām*) in alignment with theological viewpoints. Subsequently, Qūshjī contests the assertion that form is identical to the known in its entirety. Moreover, he rebuffs the idea that form and essence must be identical in terms of divisibility or indivisibility, contending that divisibility pertains to external existence, not to quiddity. Consequently, parity in quiddity does not mandate parity in external existence. Furthermore, Qūshjī discredits

41 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 215; al-Jurjānī, *Hāshiyet al-Tajrīd*, III, 183-84.

the notion that the division of a locus necessarily implies the division of its contents. Finally, he dismisses the claim that all material entities are divisible by highlighting that a point is material yet indivisible.

In this context, Qūshjī addresses an objection aimed at the philosophers' arguments, pointing out that, according to their logic, the rational soul would be divisible while anything abstracted would be indivisible. Hence, the argument seeking to establish the indivisibility of the rational soul, which apprehends abstracted entities, by invoking the indivisibility of abstracted entities, is invalidated once again. This is because, as previously mentioned, Qūshjī refutes the idea that the division of a locus necessitates the division of its contents. Qūshjī postulates that the rationale for the divisibility of the rational soul lies in its capacity to contemplate compound quiddities, which are divisible. Therefore, the divisibility of these compound quiddities necessitates the divisibility of the locus (i.e., the rational soul). In essence, the rational soul does not need to be indivisible to contemplate (*taaḡul*) divisible composite essences, as composite essences are inherently divisible. Similarly, compound essences do not need to be divisible for the rational soul to contemplate them. Qūshjī concludes that the division of an entity only necessitates the division of the locus when it involves measurable parts (*al-ajzā' al-miqdāriyya*). However, he rejects the notion that the compound quiddities contemplated by the rational soul are divisible into measurable parts. Therefore, the divisibility of compound essences does not imply that their locus, the rational soul, must also be divisible.⁴²

Ali Qūshjī refutes the philosophers' argument attempting to prove the abstraction of the rational soul as invalid. The argument proposes a common point of indivisibility between the rational soul and composite quiddities, suggesting that only a rational soul that is indivisible and abstracted like them can comprehend indivisible composite essences. However, Ali Qūshjī's criticisms of the argument reject the necessary relation between the rational soul and composite essences, contending that both should be indivisible and abstract, and that the rational soul's perception justifies its abstract nature.

42 See also Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 215. Isfahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 184-85.

Third Argument: Infinite Intelligibles Argument

The other argument of the philosophers for the abstractness of the soul concerns the difference between the rational soul and the material faculties in terms of whether they can perceive many things. Accordingly, the argument is as follows:

The rational soul is capable of infinite intelligibles. As mentioned earlier, the acts of material things are finite.⁴³

One of the philosophers' answers to this argument starts from the claim that thinking (*taaqqul*) consists of the soul's acceptance of the intelligible form, which is not an effect (*fi'l*) but that which is affected (*infiāl*). Since the argument considers the effects (*acts*) of material things, not those affected (*infiāl*), and the argument claims that material things are incapable of many acts. In contrast, the soul is capable of many acts. Therefore, if thinking is not an act but an effect (*infiāl*), then infinite effects are possible not only in the thinking of the intelligible, as claimed in this argument, but also in corporeal things, such as the impressed celestial souls and the Hyles (*heyûla*) of elemental bodies. According to Ali Qūshjī, even if it is accepted that thinking of intelligibles is not an affection (*infiāl*) but an action (*fi'l*), the claim that the soul is capable of infinite intelligibles is problematic. If this claim means that the soul cannot cease to think one intelligible unless it can think another intelligible (*taaqqul*), this also applies to the corporeal faculties. For example, the imaginative faculty does not cease to conceive of shapes after the first shape to the point where it can conceive another shape. If this claim means that the soul can conceive infinite intelligibles at once, this is forbidden. According to 'Ali Qūshjī, what is claimed in this argument is only possible if what is meant is that "the rational soul conceives a universal concept (*meḥmūm*), and it conceives the infinite individuals of that universal concept in the implication of that universal concept, but the corporeal faculties are incapable of thinking this". According to 'Ali Qūshjī, this is only because corporeal faculties are inca-

43 For the appearance of the argument in Ibn Sinā, see Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīdī al-akā'id*, II, 216. Ibn Sinā, *Kitāb al-Shifā: Naḥs*, 378. For this argument and its criticism, see also Al-Rāzī, *al-Matālīb al-āliye*, VII, 45-48.

pable of thinking universally, and this issue returns to the first point.⁴⁴ What 'Ali Qūshjī means by the first aspect is the first argument mentioned above regarding the abstractness of the soul. There, the necessity of the abstractness of both the intelligible form and the soul as the locus of the intelligible form was invalidated. Consequently, 'Ali Qūshjī does not agree with the idea that the rational soul must be abstracted because of its ability to perceive infinite intelligibles as claimed in this argument.

Another argument Ali Qūshjī mentions here claims that the soul perceives its essence, organ, and perceptions, while corporeal faculties of cognition such as the eye, ear, estimation, and imagination cannot perceive themselves and their organs. This is because the corporeal faculties of cognition think only through an organ, and an organ can't mediate between a thing and its essence, organ, and cognitions. On the other hand, it is stated that some corporeal faculties can perceive themselves and their cognitions without an organ, and that what is an organ for some corporeal faculties can be an organ for other faculties in other cognitions.⁴⁵

Fourth Argument: Intermittent Locus Argument

Another argument of the philosophers regarding the abstractness of the soul is related to the indwelling of the soul into an object or body that can be its locus, and how the soul can have knowledge of that body. The argument is as follows:

The soul is not in a body, such as the heart, the brain, and [organs] other than these two. This is because [in the case of the soul's being absorbed in a body] *what is attached to* the rational soul occurs concerning the thinking of an intermittent (*munkati'*) locus for the rational soul. Namely, knowledge [in the case of the soul's being absorbed in a body] does not occur continuously for the rational soul, but only occasionally, concerning the assumption of an intermittent locus for the rational soul.⁴⁶

44 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 216.

45 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 216.

46 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 217: For an argument close to this argument in Ibn Sinā, see Ibn Sinā, *Kitāb al-Shifa: Nafs*, 378-81. For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's criticisms of the argument, see, Al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, VII, 48-51.

What is being tried to be explained in this argument, which discusses the situation regarding the thinking of the soul about its possible locus, that is, its body, is the following: "The rational soul's thinking (*taaql*) of its own body and each organ of its body is occasional. If the soul had penetrated the body or one of its organs, the soul would either think of the body continuously, or the soul would never think of the body. This is because, for the rational soul to think of its locus [body], the actual presence (*huzūr*) of the locus [body] with the soul is either sufficient or it is not. Still, rather it depends on the occurrence of another form similar to the locus [body]. This is also the case in the cognition of external things. If it is the former [i.e., the soul is constantly thinking about the body], then the former [i.e., the body's mere existence alongside the soul is sufficient] is necessary because the existence of the effect (*malul*) is necessary during the entire cause (*illa*). If it is the latter [i.e., if the soul never thinks of the body], the latter [i.e., another form similar to its locus/body] is necessary. And this is impossible since the appearance of another form similar to its locus [i.e., its body] requires the coming together of two similar forms in a single substance."⁴⁷

Ali Qūshjī, on the contrary, mentions the possibility of different situations in which the conditions mentioned do not exist. Accordingly, the following options may be possible in the case of the thinking of the rational soul of its possible locus, i.e. its body: (i) the soul's existence is not sufficient (ii) the soul's thinking of its locus does not depend on the emergence of another form like itself, but on something else, such as the soul's orientation (*tawajjuh*) and other conditions. Another problem pointed out by Ali Kuşçu is the following: In the case where the thinking thing (*muttaqqil*) is a body, which is the locus of the rational soul, what is necessary is not those two forms similar to each other should not be implanted in a single substance, but that an intelligible form similar to itself should be implanted in that body. In the case of the thinking thing being the substance of the body, which is the locus of the rational soul, it is necessary that not two forms equal in the whole essence should be implanted in it, but one form equal to itself in the whole essence should be implanted in that substance.⁴⁸

47 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 217.

48 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 217.

An objection to whether the soul can have a material and corporeal locus is that the thinker (*muttaqqil*) is the form of corporeality or species immanent in the corporeal substance that is the locus of the rational soul. In such a case, the rational soul is certainly entering into that matter. If an intelligible form similar to that form of corporeality or speciation is pictured in the rational soul, it also enters that matter. In this case, two similar forms of corporeality or species, come together in the rational soul: (i) pertaining to what is real or essential (*aynī*) (ii) *rational*. In his response, ‘Ali Qūshjī starts from the relation of indwelling (*hulūl*) between two things. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for one thing to come to the locus of the other thing because of its indwelling (*hulūl*) to another. This is because what is meant by indwelling (*hulūl*) is the specialization of one thing with the thing that qualifies it (*al-ihtisās al-nāit*). In this condition, it is possible for something to qualify as something else but not its locus. For example, this is the case with speed that comes into motion. This is because speed does not come to the locus of motion, that is, the object. Since motion is characterised by speed, but the object is not characterised by speed. Even if this were accepted, the coming together of two similar things would be impossible only because of the necessity for it to eliminate the distinction between the two things. Here, however, the separation continues. This is because one of the two forms entered the matter without an intermediary and the other had an intermediary. This is sufficient for their separation. In addition to this, ‘Ali Qūshjī also states that the two forms differ in another way: one of them exists with external existence and the other with rational existence.⁴⁹

It is argued that it is impossible (*muhāl*) for two similar forms to exist in a single locus because there is no distinction between them in terms of their essence, necessities, or accidents. However, ‘Ali Qūshjī refutes this idea by explaining that a thing’s relationship to a locus is one of adjacency (*mukārenet*), while the relationship between two things that enter a locus is the adjacency between the two entities themselves. By distinguishing between the relationship types, similar forms can coexist (*hulūl*) in the same locus without violating logical constraints.⁵⁰

49 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā’id*, II, 218.

50 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā’id*, II, 218.

At this point, Ali Qūshjī reminds us of the previous point that the main divergence in all these discussions and the central premise of this argument is about how knowledge should be understood. If this argument were complete, the soul would either know its attributes continuously or never know them. Both are invalid. Most of the soul's attributes are known to the soul; they are not constantly brought to the soul (*istihzār*).⁵¹

One response to this issue is rooted in the qualities and essential properties of the soul, which are divided into two categories. The first category comprises qualities and necessities that are essential in themselves, without reference to anything external, as exemplified by the soul's inherent cognitive capacity. The second category consists of qualities and necessities that become essential only concerning something external, such as being abstracted from matter or not existing within a subject. The soul continuously perceives the first category, as evidenced by its constant cognition of its essence. However, the soul's cognition of the second category arises only through comparison, as the relevant condition ceases to be present without such comparison.⁵²

Another objection posits that if the soul's cognition of its essence originates from the first part, then the cognition of its essence is akin to the first part, necessitating infinite knowledge. Ali Qūshjī counters this by explaining that the soul's cognition of its essence does not stem from the first part, as this cognition only occurs for the soul in comparison to something else, namely, in contrast to the cognition of its essence. According to him, the soul's perception of its essence differs from its essence; therefore, it must be contemplated.⁵³

One last issue Ali Qūshjī examines here is this: Although the cognition of the soul of its essence is something other than its essence, this cognition exists in the soul as its essence's presence (*huzūr*). Likewise, the attributes that necessitate its essence compared to itself are perceived continuously due to the realization of presence (*huzūr*). The assumption is sufficient for

51 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 218.

52 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 219.

53 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 219.

cognition. Ali Qūshjī does not consider the following response as an important answer. “Knowing knowledge is not something that belongs to the soul. For, if the knowledge of the intelligible form had been through another form equal to it, it would have been necessary for two similar (*mutamāsil*) forms to come together in the soul. In this case, infinite knowledge would not be necessary.” Even if knowledge of knowledge does not depend on the occurrence of another form that is extracted from it (*munteza*’), it is certainly other than knowledge. This situation creates a problem (*mahzur*). Ali Qūshjī says that this is answered as follows:

We necessarily know that our knowledge of most of the attributes that are inherent in the soul, such as power, generosity, knowledge, courage, and so on, is not permanent.⁵⁴

The debate was about whether the rational soul could exist in a material body, considering its abstract nature and knowledge. The main concern was the potential contradictions that might arise if the soul were confined to a physical location. The soul’s abstract nature and capacity for immaterial knowledge made reconciling its existence within a material body challenging. Ali Qūshjī suggested alternative scenarios in which the abstracted soul and its knowledge could avoid the challenges posed by its material dwelling. He proposed that the mere existence of the soul within the body may not be enough to fully explain the situation when the rational soul considers its location within the body. Additionally, he suggested that other factors, such as the soul’s orientation or relationship to its body, might play a role. Ali Qūshjī also emphasised that the debate stemmed from long-standing disagreements between philosophers and theologians regarding the nature of knowledge. This difference in understanding affected how one approached the relationship between the soul and the body. Ultimately, Ali Qūshjī concluded that the argument attempting to prove the soul’s non-material existence through its abstract knowledge was not entirely conclusive. He argued that the soul knows most of its attributes, but this awareness is not necessarily continuous, suggesting a more nuanced relationship between the soul and its knowledge.

54 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharh Tajrīd al-aqā’id*, II, 219.

Fifth Argument: To be Free from Matter Argument

The first argument concerning the abstract nature of the soul sought to establish that the soul is also abstract, drawing on the abstractness of the intelligible form. Conversely, the abstract nature of the soul is also being justified based on the intelligible form's independence from matter. The argument that follows a similar line of reasoning to the first argument about the intelligible form is as follows:

That which is attached to the soul, that is, the intelligible form, is free from matter. The fact that that which is attached [to the soul] [i.e., the intelligible form] is free of [matter] necessitates that that which is attached [i.e., the soul] is also free of [matter]. For the need of the thing attached [i.e., the soul] for something necessitates the need of the thing attached [i.e., the intelligible form] for that thing. It is not hidden that this aspect is the same as the first aspect.⁵⁵

Ali Qūshjī does not offer any evaluation or criticism of this argument, probably because he sees it as similar to the first argument for the abstraction of the soul from the body, which he has already evaluated and criticised. However, based on his criticisms of the argument for the intelligible form, we can conclude that his attitude towards this argument is also negative.

Sixth Argument: The Argument from the Weakness and Fatigue of the Bodily Organs

The arguments mentioned so far were the main arguments mentioned by the philosophers, especially Ibn Sīnā, regarding the abstractness of the soul, which were considered and criticized by later theologians. The sixth and seventh arguments are the arguments that Ibn Sīnā mentioned as complementary arguments. The sixth argument is as follows:

The rational soul is not imprinted in the body. This is because the faculty (*kuwwa*) that is implanted in the body is subject to the body in weakness and fatigue. Because it [the faculty] can only act through the body. In this case, the body becomes its organ (*instrument*). If fatigue is not attached to the faculty, fatigue is not attached to the organ. This is because, as is seen in the faculties of sense and movement that have entered the body,

55 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-aqā'id*, II, 219-20.

the violation of the condition (*ihtilāl*) entails the violation of the conditional (*mashrūt*). For these two faculties [sense and movement] weaken with the weakening of the body. The rational soul, on the other hand, is not subject to the body in weakness and fatigue. For in the age of decline (*inhitāt*), even though the bodily organ is deficient and in decline, the thinking of the human being is strengthened and increased.⁵⁶

One objection to this argument is that at the end of old age, one may become senile and one's intellect will be diminished; therefore, the faculty of thought (*taaqul*) will also be impaired by the deterioration of the organ, and in this case, the rational soul will be said to have penetrated the body. In response to this, 'Ali Qūshjī says that the deterioration of the intellect through the deterioration of the organ does not indicate that the faculty of thought has penetrated the body, nor that the faculty of thought that penetrates the body thinks with an organ. What prevents a person from thinking at the end of life may be due to the intellect's preoccupation with the management of the body and its total absorption in this task, rather than the increase of thought during the fatigue of the body, even though it has not penetrated the body. This indicates that the thinking (*taaqul*) of the thinking faculty is not with a bodily organ, but with itself."⁵⁷

According to another objection, it is possible that what is expressed as the weakening of the body and the weakening of the senses and the faculties of motion, but the increase in thinking, may be due to the combination of much knowledge in the faculty of thought, and to reasons such as practice and habit. For good agency can be due to practice and training as well as strength. Old people who are passionate about an act can do similar things that the young and strong cannot do. At the end of old age, weakness can spread to the body and the faculty of thought. There is nothing to rely on for practice and habituation, and thus, dementia sets in. Likewise, it is also possible that the temperament that occurs in middle age is more suitable for the faculty of thought than other temperaments, and this strengthens the faculty of thought.⁵⁸ Therefore, according to 'Ali Qūshjī, this argument, which claims that the rational soul is an abstracted faculty that does not imprint in the body, based on the fact that

56 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīdī al-akāid*, II, 220. For the appearance of the argument in Ibn Sīnā, see Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā: Naḥṣ*, 382. For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's criticism of the argument, see. Al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, VII, 54-56.

57 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīdī al-aqā'id*, II, 220.

58 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīdī al-aqā'id*, II, 220.

the rational soul does not weaken despite the weakening of the bodily and corporeal faculties, is not sufficient to justify the abstractness of the soul. This is because the soul may have weakened for reasons other than the fatigue of the physical and corporeal powers.

Seventh Argument: The Argument from Weakness and Fatigue in Relation to Intense and Acute Actions

Similar to the sixth argument, this argument, which explores the potential for weakness and fatigue associated with corporeal organs and the soul, attributes such fatigue not to the corporeal nature of the organs or faculties but to the intrinsic nature of the acts they perform. The argument is outlined as follows:

[The soul] is abstracted because of the occurrence of the opposite. This argument is expressed as follows: The faculties that are imprinted in bodies become tired and weakened in the moment of the repetition (*tawārūd*) of actions, especially strong and sharp actions. Experience and syllogism bear witness to this. The case of experience bearing witness to this is clear. We even say: The weakness (*wahn*) of the faculty reaches such a point that it cannot perform its action. For the eye cannot perceive a weak light after looking at the round of the sun for a long time. The ear cannot hear a weak sound after loud thunder. The nose cannot perceive a weak odor after a strong smell. So is the organ of taste and touch. Thus, the senses are impaired by weakness and fatigue. The syllogism in this matter is as follows: The actions of these faculties arise from the faculties only when the subjects of these faculties are affected (*infiāl*). For example, the locus of the senses is affected by sensible things during perception (*ihsās*). Influence (*infiāl*) can only be caused by something superior (*kāhīr*) that overcomes the nature of the affected thing (*munfai*) and prevents the resistance of the affected thing and weakens it. The act, on the other hand, although it is a necessity of the nature of the faculty, it is not a necessity of the natures of the elements of which the subjects of those powers are composed. Thus, those natures are forced by resisting those faculties in their actions. Resistance and conflict (*tenāzu'*) require weakness in both. The opposite of this weakness and fatigue can occur for the rational soul. For the rational soul may not be tired during the succession of ideas that lead to knowledge. It is strengthened by them because of the increase in its competencies. We said that the soul may not get tired, but we did not say that it never gets tired, because when the thinking of the thinker is through the help of the reasoning faculty, the thinking power may weaken in its thinking due to the weakening of the one who helps it [i.e., the reasoning faculty], even if it is not due to an inherent weakness.⁵⁹

59 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīdī al-akā'id*, II, 221. For the appearance of the argument in Ibn Sīnā, see Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā: Naḥṣ*, 382. For Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's criticism of the argument, see, Al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib al-āliye*, VII, 57.

‘Alī Qūshjī asserts that both experience and syllogism, as methods of argument, are weak. The weakness of the argument based on experience aligns with what Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī has also articulated. While it is acknowledged that all faculties, whether sensory or intellectual, are corporeal, it remains conceivable that the rational faculty differs in kind from other faculties. In such a case, it is not implausible that certain faculties may be subject to fatigue in a specialized manner. As for the weakness in syllogism, Qūshjī highlights the issue of not accepting that the actions of corporeal faculties necessarily arise from corporeal faculties only when the subject matter is affected.⁶⁰

Evaluation

Philosophers define the intellect as an abstract substance that does not have a direct relationship with the management or operational functions of physical bodies. When they refer to “corporeal substance,” they are discussing an aspect of absolute substance, such as matter and form, or a specific characteristic of any physical entity, like the species-forms of bodies. On the other hand, a “substance related to bodies” is a substance that governs or manages the body, such as the rational soul. In these two senses, any part of the body is considered corporeal, while the rational soul aligns with what is characterized as an abstract substance - specifically the intellect, which philosophers consider to be abstract. Two clarifications arise from this: First, although the rational soul is related to the body through its managing function, it remains, in essence, an abstract substance, equivalent to the intellect. Second, theologians reject the existence of such an abstract substance. They challenge the philosophers’ claim that the soul or intellect is non-physical and ultimately identical to the abstract intellect. Theologians’ primary objection is rooted in the theological risk of positing an abstract intellect or soul that, by its essence,

60 Ali Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-akā'id*, II, 221. Ali Qūshjī’s criticism here, as he himself points out, is consistent with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s idea that all sensory and corporeal powers can be corporeal. In addition, it is important to emphasize that theologians do not explain the actions of corporeal faculties in terms of affect (*infīāl*). For an evaluation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s emphasis on the realization of all perceptions, whether sensory or intellectual, by the soul, see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ṭabr al-Rāzī*. Al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, II, 214-15. M. Z. Tiryaki, “From Faculties to Functions: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Critique of the Internal Senses”, *Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Science* 4/2 (2018): 78-79, 82-84.

neither occupies space nor inheres in anything material. This could blur the distinction between abstract entities and divine attributes, raising theological concerns.⁶¹ Therefore, the rejection of such an abstract soul or intellect is largely grounded in theological concerns. Philosophically, the difficulty revolves around explaining how an immaterial and incorporeal substance could engage with a material and corporeal body, even via governance or operation. This raises critical questions about how such a relationship could function.

Upon examining the relevant arguments within the philosophical-theological debates, one may ponder Ali Qūshjī's position. Does he endorse the existence of an abstract intellect and soul, as proposed by philosophers? Or does he lean more towards the criticisms of predecessors like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who challenge the idea of an abstract intellect or soul on both philosophical and theological grounds? These questions are crucial for understanding Qūshjī's stance within this intricate discourse.

'Alī Qūshjī wholeheartedly supported the four arguments for the distinction of the soul from the temperament, as well as the three arguments for the distinction of the soul from the body, without raising any significant objections. The only exception was a minor addition he made to the third argument concerning the distinction of the soul from the body. Instead of critiquing, Qūshjī addressed potential objections that might undermine these arguments, thus reinforcing the position that the soul is distinct from both the temperament and the body.

However, it cannot be asserted with the same ease that 'Alī Qūshjī's stance toward the philosophers' arguments for the distinction of the soul from the temperament and the body, mirrors his attitude toward their arguments concerning the abstractness of the soul from the body. At this juncture, Qūshjī, adhering to the theological tradition reflected in his commentary on *Tajrīd al-akā'id*, adopted a position that both repudiated the philosophers' arguments for the existence of an abstracted intellect and critically engaged with the arguments for the abstracted soul, which are familiar from the theological tradition. Qūshjī systematically criticized all seven arguments for the abstractness of the soul, pointing out potential contradictions in their claims. These cri-

61 Isfahānī, *Tesdīd al-qawā'id*, III, 151.

tiques demonstrate his acceptance of the prior theological objections to the theory of the abstracted soul and indicate that he did not find the philosophical defenses of this theory to be persuasive.

Conclusion

This study, which investigates the issue of whether the soul's nature can be abstracted—an issue that was intensely debated during the classical and post-classical periods of Islamic philosophy and theology, as well as in the early history of philosophy—within the framework of a late theological text such as 'Alī Qūshjī's *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-'Aqā'id*, yields two conclusions: one historical and the other theoretical.

Regarding the historical conclusion, it is essential to recall the differing positions adopted by philosophers and theologians from various periods, as introduced in this study, on whether the soul is abstract. Islamic philosophers, under the influence of the Aristotelian framework, define the soul as 'the first perfection of the natural organic body', which may give the impression that they advocate a more closely related soul-body thought. However, ultimately, they appear to adopt a form of substance dualism under the influence of Platonic and Plotinian thought. Although some interpretations suggest that the psyche-body distinction in the pre-Hellenistic period or the soul-body distinction in the medieval period does not reflect a mind-body dualism as radical as Cartesian dualism, it can be argued that the nous-body or intellect-body distinction in these periods implies a separation as radical as mind-body dualism.

A commonly held view regarding the debate in late theology on whether the soul is abstracted from the body is that, during this period, the notion of the soul as an abstract entity was reconciled with earlier theological views that described the soul as a subtle body. However, it would be inaccurate to assert that late theologians, particularly figures such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, universally adopted the position that the soul is an abstract substance. 'Alī Qūshjī's acceptance of the claims regarding the distinction of the soul from the body, combined with his critical stance toward the view that the soul is entirely abstracted from the body, places him among the theologians who, like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and others, critiqued the doctrine of the abstract soul in late theology.

At this juncture, the second, more theoretical conclusion can be articulated as follows: As demonstrated in the case of ‘Alī Qūshjī, theologians who were critical of the concept of an abstracted soul differentiated between two distinct issues: the distinction of the soul from the body (*mugāyeret*) and the abstraction of the soul from the body (*tajarrud*). According to the position ‘Alī Qūshjī adopted in alignment with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the arguments supporting the distinction of the soul from the body merely establish that the soul is distinct from, and irreducible to, material, concrete, physical, and bodily elements. Theologians, particularly those opposing reductive materialist views, can easily defend these arguments for the soul’s distinction from the body alongside philosophers. However, such arguments do not conclusively demonstrate that the soul is immaterial, abstract, mental, entirely independent of the body, separable, or immortal. The abstraction of the soul from the body demands additional reasoning and further arguments. Yet, theologians have critiqued the philosophers’ arguments for the abstraction of the soul, pointing out that the distinction between the soul and body does not automatically lead to the soul’s abstraction or complete independence from the corporeal realm.

The culmination of these historical and contentious findings necessitates a critical examination of the approaches to the mind-body or soul-body relationship. Broadly, two radical positions emerge in the discourse. On one hand, there exist eliminative and reductive materialist positions, prevalent across ancient-Hellenistic, medieval, and modern periods, which endeavor to reduce the soul, self, and human being to tangible, physical, and corporeal elements. These positions have been collectively scrutinized by Platonists, Neo-Platonists, philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā, theologians such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and ‘Alī Qūshjī, and Cartesian substance dualists. Conversely, substance dualism stands as an opposing viewpoint, positing the soul, self, and human being as distinct from physical and corporeal elements.

Approaches that diminish the soul or human being to the body are as philosophically problematic as the substance dualism espoused by philosophers like Plato, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, and Descartes, which posits that the soul is abstracted from the body. The challenge with classical or modern forms of substance dualism lies in its promotion of a radical differentiation between two fundamentally dissimilar substances—one immaterial, mental, and abstract, the other material, physical, and concrete. Furthermore, by asserting a

causal interaction between these two substances, one encounters the problem of how such an interaction can occur. Specifically, how can an immaterial, mental, and abstract entity causally influence a material, physical, and concrete entity, or vice versa, within the existing physical framework? This longstanding problem, which may have been addressed by intra-systemic references within the ontological frameworks of classical or post-classical periods, proves far more difficult to resolve within an ontological system that does not accommodate causal interaction between immaterial and material substances. Thus, advocating for substance dualism, whether in its classical or modern form, requires more than an adherence to traditional metaphysical structures and the pretense of solving the issue via internal, systemic references. Rather, it necessitates the development of a different understanding of causality within a novel ontological framework that can account for the interaction between fundamentally distinct substances.

The critical stance toward abstracting the soul from the body, while still affirming the distinction between the two, represents an intermediary approach. This stance does not align with the radical positions on the soul-body or mind-body relationship. Whether theologians succeeded in developing this alternative interpretation into a comprehensive and systematic theory comparable to those of philosophers and whether such a theory would be sufficiently explanatory remains an open question.

In considering the broader context of metaphysical debates, the most reasonable approach seems to lie in adopting intermediate positions. These positions offer a balanced perspective that allows for a nuanced understanding of the relationship between the soul and the body, while avoiding the extremes of reductive materialism and radical substance dualism.

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