Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and His Use of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyyya (or another work closely related to it) in the Logical Part of His Kitāb al-Muʿtabar*

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Abstract: The last four sections of the first book of Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s summa, entitled Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, deal with dialectics, sophistical refutations, rhetoric, and poetics in full line with Aristotle’s Organon. However, they are not so much based on Aristotle’s works, but on a work of the young Ibn Sinā, namely al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyyya. Both texts have much in common not only in their structure, but also in their very wording. The article presents a basic survey of the correspondences for all four sections and also highlights the most significant differences. However, important part of these differences has a counterpart in an (incomplete) logical text, which is present in the manuscript Nuruosmaniye 4894 and which is, in turn, very close to, albeit not identical, with Ibn Sinā’s al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyyya as conserved in the unique manuscript Uppsala 364. Therefore, it is obvious that Abū al-Barakāt takes over many formulations and, at once, many ideas from Ibn Sinā. However, he adds clearly personal elements that often seem to have been religiously inspired and, on occasion, consciously returns to Aristotle’s wording.

Key words: Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Ibn Sīnā, logic, Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyyya, ms. Nuruosmaniye 4984.

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Introduction

Already in 1991, Renate Würsch pointed out that in the rhetorical part of his Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī makes substantial use of the corresponding section in Ibn Sinā’s al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīyya. In 2008, Geert Jan van Gelder and Marlé Hammond insisted that he is clearly more dependent upon the poetical part of al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīyya than of the Shifaʾ. However, none of these publications offers a detailed list of comparison or indicates the precise way in which Abū al-Barakāt deals with this early work of the young Ibn Sinā. Moreover, based on a further inspection of the logical book of his Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, it is obvious that the sections on sophistical refutations (safsata) and topics (jadal) are also largely based on the very same work of Ibn Sinā.

In the following sections, I will indicate the major correspondences between the two works for all the four parts (i.e., topics, sophistical refutations, poetics, and rhetoric) and point to major omissions and/or modifications that one detects in Abū al-Barakāt’s exposition when one compares it with Ibn Sinā’s. Due to the lack of critical editions, I will not discuss the presence of variants or minor modifications because they might be the results of editorial mistakes.

Jadal

Regarding the topics, the title of the fifth maqāla of the Kitāb al-Muʿtabar’s first book (I, 233,3), namely, Fi Ṭūbiqā wa-huwa ʿilm al-jadal, is almost identical with that of al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīyya, namely, Fi maʿānī Kitāb Ṭūbiqā ayy al-Jadal (4719). The presence in both cases of the term Ṭūbiqā is striking. However, if it is not so surprising at the time that the young Ibn Sinā wrote his work (ca. 1000), it is clear-

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3 In what follows our references will be to Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, anonymous edition, 3 vol. in 1 (2. ed. Isfahan: Isfahan Press, 1995; in fact, reprint of the Hayderabad, 1357 H. edition) and to Şālīḥ’s edition (unless otherwise indicated) of Ibn Sinā’s al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīyya (see previous note).
ly unusual at the time of Abû al-Barakât (d. ca. 1164-65), since by then the Arabic term jadal had clearly replaced the transliterated form of the Greek word topoi. 4

Abû al-Barakât (I, 233-63) divides the maqâla into seven chapters. This division might be his, for this is not the case with the actual edition of Ibn Sînâ’s text (47-79).

The first chapter in the Mu’tabar (I, 233-37) is explicitly devoted to the ‘dialectical syllogism’. It first presents (I, 233,6-21) a general, preliminary remark on the Aristotelian conception of syllogism and ‘demonstration’ (burhân), while, at the same time, it clarifies that the proper objective of the dialectical syllogism does not consist in searching for the truth in itself. To put it briefly, it specifies the proper object of the topics based on a comparison with the Organon’s two immediately preceding parts, the Prior and Posterior Analytics. This introductory remark has no counterpart in Ibn Sînâ’s Hikma. On the contrary, the major part of the chapter (I, 234,1-237,8), which discusses the nature and the function of the dialectical syllogism, has much in common with Ibn Sînâ’s text (47,20-50,6=Nur., f. 46v34-47,34), even if modifications are only now and then present, especially when one limits oneself to comparing with the text of the Hikma. 5 Most illustrative of such a modification is Abû al-Barakât’s distinction (I, 234,23-235,2) between three kinds of

4 The transliterated form Ûð biqa’û is used in the enumeration of Aristotle’s works in Ibn al-Nâdim’s Fihrist, ed. Sha’bân Khalîfa and Muhammad al-’Awza (Beirut: al-’Arabî, 1991), I, 507-08. However, al-Fârâbi, Ibn Sînà’s predecessor, already seems to have preferred the term jadal, and so does Ibn Sînà in his major encyclopaedia al-Shiﬁ’â.

5 The abbreviation Nur. refers to the manuscript Nuruosmaniye 4894 (I sincerely thank Dimitri Gutas for his kindness to have provided me with a copy of this manuscript). Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 439, notes that this part is copied from the Hikma Before him, Georges C. Anawati, “Le manuscrit Nour Osmaniyye 4894,” MIDEO 3 (1956): 382, already noted that the manuscript from this section on, although in an ‘incomplete way’ (without any further specification) has the same text as the one present in Ibn Sînà’s Hikma. However, there exist important differences between both versions, as will become evident. In our view, the two most likely hypotheses regarding the relationship between both texts are: (1) either one is close to Ibn Sînà’s original (in all likelihood, the text of the Nuruosmaniye, since it appears to be more extensive) and the other is defective (maybe due to losses during the transmission -Gutas, ibid., 88, has already insisted that the scribe of the Uppsala manuscript was not directly copying from Ibn Sînà’s holograph), or (2) we have to do with two different texts of Ibn Sînà - and then the later, i.e., the Nuruosmaniye text, has been largely inspired by the earlier, i.e. the Hikma. But further research is needed to settle this question. Regarding the dating of Nuruosmaniye manuscript, M. Geoffroy (whom I kindly thank) send me the following note written by J. Jabbour and T. Morel and which is present in the (not publicly available) database Abjad (http://abjad.phic-project.org) : ‘La littérature secondaire a considéré, dans son ensemble, ce manuscrit comme étant tardif et datant du XVIIème siècle (cf. D. Reisman, The Making of the Avicennan Tradition. Leiden-Boston-Köln : Brill, 2002, p. 17, 44). Elle s’appuie, pour cela, sur le cachet de possession carré apparaissant au f. 1r. Il s’agit du cachet de Haci Beşir Ağa, daté de 1158 A.H. (1745-1746). Or, nous voyons apparaître à la fin du manuscrit, au f. 597, un cachet de possession de Bayazid II. Le manuscrit est donc antérieur à la fin du règne de celui-ci : 1512. Le manuscrit est d’ailleurs copié sur du papier oriental’. So, as with the Uppsala manuscript, its dating has not yet been determined in a decisive way. In what follows, I will mainly refer to this manuscript in cases where it confirms readings present in the Mu’tabar, which are absent in the Hikma. Note that the sign = does not indicate here, or in what follows, a complete identity, but only a degree of sufficiently significant similarity

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problems (masā’il)/premises (muqaddimāt) – moral, natural and logical – instead of two – moral and theoretical (naẓariyya) – in Ibn Sinā’s Ḥikma (48,14-16), even if he accepts, with the latter, that the number of questions in dialectics equals that of the premises. In fact, Abū al-Barakāt copies almost verbatim Ibn Sinā’s wording as present in manuscript Nuruosmaniye 4894, f. 47r9-11, including the formulation of one concrete example for each of the three cases.  

Generally speaking, Abū al-Barakāt’s exposition appears to be somewhat more detailed than Ibn Sinā’s. Above all he recognizes, more than Ibn Sinā does, Aristotle as the ultimate source of inspiration, as is most evident in the fact that he explicitly mentions his name twice (I, 234, 19; 236,2) and refers to him by his honorific title ‘Ṣāhib al-mantiq’ (I, 236,19). Of course, this does not come as any real surprise, insofar as Abū al-Barakāt is adhering to what one may label a ‘Baghdadian Peripateticism’ and thus opposing a ‘genuine Avicennism’.  

Nevertheless the chapter’s overall structure is identical with that of the Ḥikma, as opposed to Aristotle’s text.

There is a great similarity between the very wording of the beginning (if one excepts Abū al-Barakāt’s preliminary remark) and the end of Abū al-Barakāt’s chapter and the corresponding wording in Ibn Sinā’s exposition as becomes clear in the following parallel presentation of both wordings. For Ibn Sinā, I quote both the Ḥikma and the manuscript Nuruosmaniye 4894 version, for they are not completely identical:

**Example 1 (beginning of the chapter)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>القياس الجدلي قياس مؤولف من مقدمات ذائعة على الاطلاق وهو التي يراه جمهور الناس من غير اختلاف. وإما داعية بالإضاافة إلخ.</td>
<td>والقياس الجدلي هو قياس مؤولف من مقدمات ذائعة مشهورة والمقدمات المتصلة إما داعية على الاطلاق وهي التي يراه جمهور الناس من غير اختلاف. وإما داعية بالإضاافة إلخ.</td>
<td>وتأكيد القياسات الجدلية يكون من مقدمات ذائعة مشهورة كا قيل وتلك إما داعية على الاطلاق وهي التي يقال بها جمهور الناس ويوافقون عليها من غير اختلاف. وإما داعية بالإضاافة إلخ.</td>
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Example 2 (end of the chapter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ḥikma (50,4-6)</th>
<th>Nur. (vr. 47(^{31-33}))</th>
<th>Mu’tabar (I, 237,6-8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>وليس من شرط الجدلي ان يأتي بقياس لا عندن له البينة وان يلزم كل خصم بل يبذل في مسألة وسعه على حسب احتمال الذوائع واحتمال نفس المسألة هذه منفعة القياس الجدلي.</td>
<td>وليس من شرط الجدلي ان يأتي بقياس لا عندن له البينة وان يلزم كل خصم بل يبذل في مسألة وسعه على حسب احتمال الذوائع واحتمال نفس المسألة هذه منفعة القياس الجدلي.</td>
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The similarities are so striking that no special comment is necessary. Much of the wording is common or even identical between the two texts, even if at the end Abū al-Barakāt adds a comparison with the physician that is only present in ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 47r33-34.\(^8\) Regarding the whole chapter, the following basic table of comparison can be established:

M. 234,1-18=Ḥ. 47,20-48,10 (two types of widespread premises in dialectical syllogism).

M. 234,19-235,2=Ḥ. 48,10-16 (the number of questions equals the number of premises).

M. 235,3-9=Ḥ. 48,16-19 (a problem as related to questioner himself or as being in view of acquiring knowledge of something else).

M. 235,10-236,4=Ḥ. 48,19-49,3 (the dialectical problem).

M. 236,4-18=Ḥ. 49,3-16 (since topics is a logical science, it deals with universals; it is, moreover, based either on induction or syllogistic reasoning).

M. 236,19-237,8=Ḥ. 49,16-50,6 (utility of the science of topics).\(^9\)

In the second chapter (I, 237,9-240,24), Abū al-Barakāt, in line with Ibn Sinā (50,6-53,8=Nur., f. 47r34-47v32 – but, in fact, much closer to the letter of the latter) affirms the existence of four instruments that permit one to discover the different topoi, commonplaces (mawāḍī): (1) a power in man to distinguish between synon-

\(^8\) Aristotle, Topica, I, 3, might have ultimately inspired this additional comparison.

\(^9\) A detailed survey of all the similarities and dissimilarities, which exist between Abū al-Barakāt’s and Ibn Sinā’s formulations of the present issue, would require an extensive study in itself and therefore exceeds the limits of the present paper.
ymous and equivocal words (I, 237,14-238,17=2 in IS, i.e. 50,10-17+50,23-52,17, but, more appropriately, Nur., f. 47r34-v22); (2) an ability to distinguish between strongly related things (I, 238,18-21=4 in IS, i.e. 50, 19+52,17-20, but, more specifically, Nur., f. 47v22-24); (3) an ability to discover similarities between very different things (I, 238,22-239,7=3 in IS, i.e. 50,17-18+52,21-53,4[8], but, above all, Nur., 47v24-28); and (4) the (critical) use of widespread propositions (I, 239,8-13=1 in IS, i.e., 50,8-9+18-23, but, as usual, for a closer correspondence see Nur., f. 47v28-32).

As one detects only a few (minor) modifications in all four cases, the overall impression is one of a very close relationship between the two wordings. However, the final part (I, 239,14-240,24), which positively values dialectics as an important tool for truth in matters of religion and morals, is obviously a fundamental reworking of Ibn Sinā’s final remark (53,4-8, without any correspondence in Nur.), which briefly expressed the role of dialectics in terms of the possibility of ‘disputation’.10

The third chapter (I, 241,2-246,6) details the *topoi* that are related in an absolute way to affirmation and refutation.11 It largely corresponds to Ibn Sinā’s account (53,9-58,7=Nur., f. 47v32-48v36), although Abū al-Barakāt does not take over Ibn Sinā’s opening line, in which he unambiguously states that what follows is largely indebted to Themistius.12 The presentation of these *topoi* starts with a basic distinction: What follows (1) from the very two terms of the *quaesitum* (i.e., the subject and the predicate), or (2) from what is exterior to both of them, or (3) from what is exterior to one of them (M. I, 241,4-7=H. 53,11-14). With respect to the former, a further division presents itself: what is discovered from their substances or from what follows them (I, 241,7-8=H.53,14-15). The first case is related to the two terms’ definition, or of one of them (I, 241,8-11=H.53, 15-18).

As to the latter, a further division comes to the fore as regards constitutive and non-constitutive cases. The constitutive case is related to genus, difference, matter, form, or some combinations among them (I, 241,13-23=H. 53, 19-54,2), whereas

10 The present formulation is somewhat simplified but, unless I am mistaken, reflects well the difference between both texts.
11 A critical translation into French of this chapter is available in AhmadHasnawi, “Boèce, Averroës et Abū al-Barakāt al- Баğdādī, témoins des écrits de Thémistius sur les *Topiques* d’Aristote,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 17 (2007): 252-65. In the accompanying doctrinal analysis (ibid., 228-32), Hasnawi shows that Abū al-Barakāt was clearly inspired by Themistius, in a way that resembles (without being identical with) this latter’s influence on Boethius. Hasnawi’s thesis of a strong Themistian influence is confirmed by the fact that Ibn Sinā, in his *Hikma* (53,11= Nur. f. 47v32) explicitly affirms that he takes Themistius as model for his development of this kind of *topoi*. Unfortunately, Abū al-Barakāt omitted this precise reference. Hasnawi, who clearly was not aware of the *Hikma* as direct source for Abū al-Barakāt’s exposition, nevertheless did not miss this Themistian background. .
12 See previous note.
in the case of the non-constitutive case a list of ten possible occurrences is offered (I, 242,1-3=Ḫ. 54,8-11). However, only seven are presented in a (somewhat) more detailed way: (1) totality/part, either (a) according to predication (I, 242,3-12=Ḫ. 54,11-21+54,3-7 – only lines 10-12 have a correspondence in Nur., i.e., f. 48r15-16), (b) temporal (I, 242,12-15=Ḫ. 54,21-24), (c) quantitative (I, 242,15-19=Ḫ. 55,1-4) or (d) existential (I, 242,19-243,4=Ḫ. 55,4-14, but more closely in line with Nur., f. 48r19-24); (2) active and final causes (I, 243,4-8=Ḫ. 55,15-18); (3) generation and corruption (I, 243,8-10=Ḫ. 55,18-20); (4) actions (I, 243,11-12=Ḫ. 55,20-22); (5) things that are additional one to another or that imply each other (I, 243,13-244,2 – only the basic idea is expressed in Ḥ. 55,22-23, but Abū al-Barakāt’s exposition is almost identical with Nur., f. 48v29-36); (6) accidents (I, 244,2-4=Ḫ.55,23-56,1); and (7) time (I, 244, 4-6=Ḫ. 56,1-3).

Concerning the second major division, namely, what follows from that which is exterior to both terms of the quaesitum, mention is first made of testimonies, resemblance of conditions, or a transfer in aim (I, 244,6-15=Ḫ. 56,3-6+11-14). However, Abū al-Barakāt’s particular remark that the last case resembles the case of tamthil, ‘analogy’, is not present in the Ḥikma but only in the version of the ms. Nuruosmaniye (f. 48v6-9). Moreover the Mu’tabar does not mention the topos of tanāsub, ‘proportional relation’, together with its two modalities of fașl (separation) and wašl (connection), in sharp contrast with both Ḥikma and ms. Nuruosmaniye (Ḫ. 56,7-11=Nur., f. 48v4-6).

Abū al-Barakāt then busies himself with describing the topoi related to opposition according to a fourfold subdivision: (1) contradiction (I, 244,16-18=Ḫ. 56,15-18); (2) contrariety (I, 244,18-245,6=Ḫ. 56,18-57,2); (3) privation and possession (I, 245,7-8=Ḫ. 57,2-6); and (4) relativity (I, 245,8-9=Ḫ. 57,6-8). After this, he presents two modes related to ‘more and less’, the first of which is qualified as ‘absolute’ (I, 245,10-13=Ḫ. 57,8-11). As for the second, specified as ‘relative’ (I, 245,13-19), it is absent in the Ḥikma, as is the last subdivision inside this category, which is related to ‘equality’ (I, 245,19-22). However, both fragments are worded in very similar terms in ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 48v24-30. Finally, a short presentation is given of the last major category, although articulated in terms of what is intermediary between the exterior and the interior with respect to reality, rather than in terms of what is exterior to one of the terms of the quaesitum (I, 245,23-246,6=Ḫ. 57,11-20).

The last case that Abū al-Barakāt mentions with respect to the utility of the species is clearly inspired by what in Ibn Sinā’s exposition is the very last topos related to the ‘constitutive case’. The present displacement is rather puzzling and is clearly in need of an in-depth analysis, which unfortunately exceeds the limits of our present investigation.
The fourth chapter deals with three types of topoi: (1) related to accident (I, 246,9-15=H. 57,21-58,7=Nur., 48v37-49r4); (2) what is more worthy of choice or better (I, 246,16-248,8=H. 70,10-72,2=Nur., f. 49r5-30); and (3) related to genus (I, 248,9-250,15=H. 58,9-60,24=Nur., f. 49r30-v33). This order of presentation is the same as that in the Nuruosmaniye manuscript, but is completely different from the Hikma’s, where ‘what is more worthy of choice or better’ is discussed as the very last of all possible kinds of types. The formulations in all three texts are always very close to each other. Certainly, every now and then one is confronted with minor modifications, but significant ones only happen in the section concerning the genus. There, Abū al-Barakāt, as compared to Ibn Sinā, omits a few cases, namely, those of the acquired property or ‘state’ (qunya, Greek hexis), both with regard to fīl, activity, and quwwa, capacity (H. 59,18-23=Nur., f. 49v17-20); of what is common to the concomitants of the genus (H. 60,1-2, but lacks in Nur); and of disgusting/compelling (mustakriḥāt) things that are present in one’s capacity (H. 60,3-4=Nur., f. 49v20-21). Moreover, in comparison with the Hikma, he adds the case of al-ārid fi al-ma’rūd, ‘the accidental in its substrate’ according to genus (I, 250,8-10). However, this addition is in full accordance with ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 49v29-31.

The fifth chapter surveys the topoi related to the specific difference, al-faṣl (I, 250,18-253,15=H. 61,1-66,22=Nur., f. 49v33-51r3) and the proper, al-khāṣṣa (I, 253,16-254,1=H. 66,23-67,5=Nur., f. 51r3-8). One notes that Abū al-Barakāt’s exposition of two subdivisions (related to the composed expression and the replacement of its parts [p. I, 252,11-18]) is only vaguely related to the Hikma, 65,4-9, whereas it corresponds literally to ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 50v15-20 and that, generally speaking, other small additions or rewordings usually conform with the wording found in this manuscript.

Among the Mu’tabar’s (minor) omissions of topoi that Ibn Sinā mentions in this context, the following (all related to the specification of the specific difference) figure: looking at the coupling of two things in view of increasing their commonness whilst the coupling is not making something common, or at the repetition (in potency) twice of a single thing (H. 63,7-11[lines 7-9=Nur., f. 50r28-29])

14 Ms. Nuruosmaniye contains several (small) additions, which have no counterpart in the Hikma, nor in the Mu’tabar, as e.g., the remark that being a pair is accidental, not essential.
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subjects (H. 66,2-5=[lines2-3=Nur., f. 50v29-30]); and also to the issue as to whether what is admitted absolutely is correct in a given time (H. 66,6-9, absent in Nur.). The most significant omission is perhaps that of Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the case of the perfect utterance (qawl) as paralleling, or not, a name (ism) (H. 63,2-6=Nur., f. 50r22-25). But despite these omissions, no fundamental rupture with Ibn Sīnā’s treatment is ever involved.

Finally, one notes that Abū al-Barakāt (I, 252,23-253,4) analyses a topos related to the parts of a statement (with concrete reference to a case where someone would [unjustly] claim that a negative proposition, taken as premise, would give rise to either an affirmation or a negation). This topos is not mentioned in the Ḥikma, and therefore one could imagine that it is original with Abū al-Barakāt. But this is not the case at all, for the discussion of the same topos (in almost identical terms) is present in ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 50v27-29.

Chapter 6 is devoted to topoi based on the definition (al-khāṣṣa bi-l-ḥadd) (I, 254,2-256,10=H. 67,6-70,9=Nur., f. 51r9-51v25). Once again, Abū al-Barakāt closely follows Ibn Sīnā’s exposition. As usual, a few minor omissions are present, especially when compared to the Ḥikma: the mentioning of a topos that deals with what exactly defines the perfection of a power (H. 68,2-4=Nur., f. 51r25-26) and another one that concerns the distinction between absolute and particular privation (H. 68,10-12), as well as four topoi, which consider, in several respects, the relation between totality and parts (H. 69,1-8). It is striking that the ms. Nuruosmaniye, only with regard to the first case, has the same addition as the Ḥikma. However, in full accordance with the Mu’tabar, it omits the other ones.

Compared to the Ḥikma, the present chapter also contains two additions. The first (I, 254,16-18) deals with the topos of believing that one has used a specific difference, whereas this is not the case. One looks in vain for it in the Ḥikma; however, it is referred to in ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 51r19-21, although in a somewhat different way from Abū al-Barakāt’s Mu’tabar. The topos, as articulated in the Mu’tabar, is clearly based on Aristotle’s Topica, VI, 6, 435 a12 sqq., as evidenced by the common example of defining a line as ‘length without breadth’.

15 In the actual state of affairs, it is difficult to know whether the differences between the three texts result from a conscious choice, or whether they are due to copyists’ mistakes. It has to be noted that ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 50v31-33, deals with a topic, neither mentioned in the Ḥikma, nor in the Mu’tabar, namely related to the positing in saying of something that is impossible in reality, or the positing of something as required in itself according to its being toward something else.

16 This passage is inspired by Aristotle, Topica, VI, 7, 146a13-18.

17 Note, however, that Aristotle presents the topos as primarily dealing with the consideration whether
The other *topos* appears to be a further elaboration of the *topos* related to the idea that the definition of the contrary (*didd*) of a thing must be based on the contrary of the definition of that thing. Abū al-Barakāt (I, 254,23-255,4) states that in the case of opposite and derivative things (*mutaqābalāt wa-mushtaqqāt*), what is contrary (*al-muṭāyyāmā*) to the thing is part of the thing’s genus, not its specific difference; or, inversely, of its specific difference, not its genus; or of both of them together. Moreover, he insists that when a thing partakes in two different *genera*, it necessarily cannot forsake one of them. But once more one finds a similar wording in *ms*. Nuruosmaniye (f. 51v. 29-30).

The seventh and last chapter offers councils for disputation. Having noticed (I, 256,13-14) the existence of three major types, namely, those related to the questioner, to the opponent, or to both, Abū al-Barakāt first (I, 255,14-259,5=Ḥ. 72,3-74,24=Nur., f. 51v25-52v1) presents those that deal with the questioner. In terms that are almost identical to those of Ibn Sīnā’s, he points *inter alia* to the ultimate goal of the questioner as consisting of showing the truth of what is the opposite of the opponent’s position, of how he has to use premises or induction, or how he has to deal with words. But one must note that Abū al-Barakāt omits the last lines of Ibn Sīnā’s exposition, in which the latter insists that a dialectical premise, which is universal with respect to its subject, necessarily requires a yes/no answer; hence, it only answers the question ‘whether the thing exists?’ (*hal*), but cannot deal with the universal questions ‘what?’ (*mā huwa*), ‘how?’ (*kayfa*) and ‘which?’ (*ayy*), since several factors make the formulation of a syllogism with regard to them difficult (Ḥ. 75,1-10=Nur., f. 52r32-v1).18

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The second part, which discusses the councils for the opponent, remains extremely close to its counterpart in the *Hikma* (I, 259,6-262,15=Ḥ. 75,11-78,14=Nur., f. 52v1-53r19), for it contains only a few minor rewordings. In both texts, special attention is paid to the notions of ‘widely known’ (*mashhūr*) and ‘repulsive’ (*shani’*), as well as to the different ways in which one may oppose either the speaker (i.e., in showing his lack of discernment between what is essential and what is accidental, or his incapacity to develop a correct syllogism and to resolve doubts included in the premises) or the utterance under discussion (i.e., by pointing to the use of fallacious premises or defective syllogisms). Finally, the section dealing with both the questioner and the opponent shows anew great parallels with Ibn Sīnā’s text (I, 262,16-263,24=Ḥ. 78,15-79,18=Nur., f. 53r19-37). In this respect, one must stress that Abū al-Barakāt (I, 263,12-15=Ḥ. 79,8-10=Nur., f. 53r30-32) maintains the (brief) reference of the *Hikma* to the dispute between Thrasymachus and Socrates.

The preceding comparison between the section of dialectics in both the *Hikma* and the *Mu’tabar* clearly shows that the latter is largely inspired by the former, even if the version of the *Mu’tabar*, compared to that of the *Hikma*, testifies now and then of (small) additions and (minor) omissions. However, they in no way hide the overwhelming similarities between both expositions, especially given the possibility that some of the actual differences may be due to editorial errors in the existing (uncritical) editions, or possibly had already been introduced into the earlier (handwritten) transmission of the two respective texts. Moreover, many of the passages in which Abū al-Barakāt deviates from the *Hikma* largely correspond, as has been shown, with the *Jadal*-section present in the *ms.* Nuruosmaniye 4894, ff. 46v-53r. However, given that the relation between this latter and the *Hikma* is unclear, it is hard to explain the differences in wording between both. Are they due to scribal errors, or do they testify to a new redaction by Ibn Sīnā’s own hand, or does one have to look for yet another explanation? Based on the present section alone, a clear answer is impossible. However, the remaining section might well include elements that can contribute to a more decisive judgment.

**Safsata**

Before comparing the sections of the *Hikma* and the *Mu’tabar*, one must note that a version very similar to that of the *Hikma* is present not only in the *ms.* Nuru-
osmaniye 4894, ff. 53r-54r, but also in the last chapter of the Najât’s logical part.19 These two latter texts have several wordings in common that are not present in the Ḥikma, but are nevertheless in substantial agreement with the Mu’tabar. However, each of them also has a significant passage that clearly influenced Abū al-Barakāt but is absent in the other as well as in the Ḥikma.

The beginning of the title of the section in the Mu’tabar (I, 264,2), Fi al-aqwā’īl al-sūfīstāqiyya, is almost identical with that of the section in the Najât, as given in the Rome, 1593 print. 20 The opening paragraph (I, 264,6-13), which points to a basic distinction between the Sophists’ use or non-use of syllogisms, has much in common with the Ḥikma, 81,4-10 (=Nur., f. 53v1-4 and Najât, 175,3-8). The following (short) paragraph in the Mu’tabar (I, 264,14-16), presents a remark proper to Abū al-Barakāt, according to which the formal structure of syllogisms was a well-known matter in Ibn Sinā’s time. One has the strong impression that this remark is related to the latter’s affirmation at the end of the preceding section, namely, that he does not need to discuss those cases that fall outside the syllogism.

After two brief general remarks, one on what produces error and another on which syllogistic structure implies a true conclusion (I, 264,18-23=Ḥ. 81,12-82,1), Abū al-Barakāt (I, 264,23-264,3) distinguishes between five major cases (with an internal distinction inside the first) that make a syllogism sophistic and therefore does not lead to truth. As for the Ḥikma, 82,1-3 (even if it later deals with all five), it mentions only the first two, whereas the ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 53v9-11 as well as Najât, 176,1-5 offer all five. Moreover both, as is the case in the Mu’tabar but contrary to the Ḥikma, contain the absolutely required negation lā at the beginning, where it is explicitly stated that the reasons given afterward are related to statements from which the truth does not follow.

The first case, which is related to one of the forms or one of the concluding moods, is said to occur because of three reasons: (1) no composition of propositions in the syllogism, (2) the syllogism’s being composed of only one proposition or (3) of more than one proposition but without the required compositional overlap. Only the third case receives any further detailed attention, for a distinction is

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19 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 89. Regarding the Najât, we will refer to the Tehran, 1985 edition: Ibn Sinā, Al-Najât min al-gharq fî bahr al-dalîlât, ed. Muhammad Taqī Dânehpazhūh (Tehran: Intishârât-e Dânehgâh, 1346HS). For an English translation of the logical part of the Najât, see Asad Q. Ahmed, Avicenna’s Deliverance: Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). We have taken great profit of this translation for both our understanding and structuring of this chapter.

20 Ibn Sinā, Al-Najât, 175, note 1. There, one finds in fact sūfistānīyya, which is probably a deformation of sūfistā’īyya, see Ahmed, Avicenna’s Deliverance: Logic, 140, note 72.
made between what fails to exist both in reality and overtly, and what exists overtly but not in reality. Once again, further attention is paid only to the latter, whereby a further distinction is made between errors related to a simple utterance – which is, in turn, divided into homonymous (mushtarāk), analogous (mutashābih), transferred (manqūl), metaphor (musta‘ār) and figurative (majāz) – and composed utterance. This complete section (I, 265,4-266,4) corresponds largely to the Ḥikma, 82,3-83,11.

However, as regards the description of the case in which a compositional overlap exists overtly, the Mu’tabar (I, 265,8-9) has an additional remark with regard to a difference between the two premises, or between the two premises and the conclusion regarding the overlap. The very same remark is attested to in the ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 53v13-14, but is absent in both the Najāt and the Ḥikma. As for the Ḥikma, 82,20-23 (=Nur., f. 53v23-25=Najāt, 178,6-10), which introduces a further distinction regarding the homonymous utterance, one looks in vain for any trace of it in the Mu’tabar. Finally, the fact that Abū al-Barakāt seems to articulate in terms of ‘confused’ (mushtabīh) that which Ibn Sīnā (in all three texts) has designated as ‘related to complexity’ (bi-hasabi al-tarkīb) is not devoid of interest.

The lack of distinction in the parts of a syllogistic statement, which characterizes the second case, is discussed (I, 266,5-15) in almost identical terms with the Ḥikma, 83,11-22 (=Nur., f. 53v32-54r2=Najāt, 179,11-180,9). As for the third case, that of falsities in the premises causing an error, its treatment (I, 266,16-268,7) is more extensive than it is in the Ḥikma (and the Najāt). There exists only a correspondence with regard to its second part, which offers a detailed survey of the reasons why one grants the claims of false statements, these reasons being basically based on either utterance or meaning (I, 267,11-268,9=Ḥ. 84,1-23=Nur., f. 54r11-22=Najāt, 180,10-183,2), as well as with the first part’s very first lines (I, 266,16-18=Ḥ. 83,23-84,1=Nur., f. 54r2-3=Najāt, 180,10-12).

This later beginning stresses that falsity sometimes has a relation to truth. In accordance with the ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 54r3-11, Abū al-Barakāt (I, 266,16-267,10) adds that this relation is related either to something possible or to something existing. (He illustrates the former by a mathematical example related to the sides of a triangle in comparison with two half circles). 21 Both texts, moreover, relate the distinction between utterance and meaning exclusively to that case in which the relation is existential.

21 It is worthwhile to note that the same example is present in Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Imkānat al-Mughliṭa, ed. Rafiq al-A’jam, Al-ma’nīq ‘inda l-Fārābī, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Mašiq, 1986), 161-163.
The fourth case concerns the fact that the premises are nothing other than the conclusion. This is summarily explained in terms that are almost identical with Ibn Sīnā’s (I, 268,8-9=Ḥ. 84,23-85,2=Nur., f. 54v22-23=Najāt, 183,3-6). The fifth and final case deals with the fact that the premises are not better known than the conclusion. Here, Abū al-Barakāt simply repeats what Ibn Sīnā had said about this topic (I, 268,10-12=Ḥ. 85,2-6=Nur., f. 54v24-26=Najāt, 183,7-10).

Both the Ḥikma and the ms. Nuruosmaniye conclude that what has been said on the issue of sophistic reasoning is sufficient. However the Mu’tabar (I, 268,13-23), in line with the Najāt (183,11-184,4), stipulates in a final remark that the reasons for the sophisms in a syllogism always have to do either with utterance or with meaning (and briefly enumerates the different reasons for their occurrence). Special attention deserves to be paid the fact that with regard to sophisms related to meaning, the first given reason in both texts is articulated in terms of ‘that which is accidental’. Still, Abū al-Barakāt offers further specifications that are not present in the Najāt, namely, one’s taking the accidental in place of the essential or the potential in place of the actual. However, Ibn Sīnā mentions both cases explicitly in the tenth method of his Ishārāt, which is devoted to the issue of fallacious syllogisms.22

Khatāba

This section, in the title of which Abū al-Barakāt (I, 269,7) specifies that the Greeks call this logical part ‘rītūrqā’ (in line with Ḥikma, 87,2 [=Nur., f. 54r26-27], but there the transliteration of the Greek word is given before the Arabic term), is divided into two major parts.

The first part (I, 269,8-273,25) deals with ‘general things’ (al-umūr al-kulliyāt). Abū al-Barakāt starts (I, 269,10-270,11) his discussion by presenting rhetoric in genuinely Aristotelian terms as the art of persuasion. He underlines that the rhetorical art, contrary to the dialectical method does not deal with universal things insofar as they are praiseworthy in reality, but only insofar as they are useful for particular things. It is therefore more useful in political matters than are dialectics or demonstration. Finally, he observes that Aristotle, referred to as šāḥīb al-kitāb, blamed his predecessors for not having dealt properly with how rhetoric achieves its goals.23

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23 See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354a11 sqq.
Despite several differences in the wording, one easily recognizes a direct inspiration from the Ḥikma, 87,3-88,4. Moreover, one finds direct support for two of the differences in the ms. Nuruosmaniye, namely, (1) the additional remark about what causes an opinion to become victorious in the soul in the case of persuasion (I, 269,12-13=Nur., f. 54r29) and (2) another one that states that in rhetoric, it suffices that the premises are deemed praiseworthy in opinion, and hence must not be so in reality (I, 269, 18-21=Nur., f. 54r33-35). Hereafter, Abū al-Barakāt (I, 270,12-21) mentions five domains for which rhetoric may be helpful: metaphysics, natural sciences, morals, passions of the soul and disputable things (al-mukhāṣimāt). The disputable things are further subdivided into discordant (munāfariyya), deliberative (mushawariyya), and controversial (mushājariyya) things.24 The whole section corresponds to Ḥikma, 88,5-16 (=Nur., f. 54v4-11).

Abū al-Barakāt (I, 270,22 -23=Ḥ. 88,17-18=Nur., f. 54v11-12) then observes that the rhetoric scope concerns three things: (1) the statement, (2) what the statement is about, and (3) the listeners, who are, in turn, subdivided into opponent, judge and disputant. Furthermore, he concentrates on what brings about consent through ‘art’, paying particular attention to the rhetorician’s specific characteristics (I, 271,2-13=Ḥ. 88,23-89,8=Nur., f. 54v15-20), and also to specific factors that contribute to persuade the listeners (I, 271,14-18=Ḥ. 89,9-13=Nur., f. 54v20-23). Eventually, a large section examines how rhetorical speech can engender assent (taṣdīq). In this context, special emphasis is placed on enthymeme (ḏamīr), example (tamthīl), signs (dalā’il), and indications (ʿalāmāt), as well as on each one’s specific significance in the context of rhetoric (I, 271,19-273,24=Ḥ. 89,14-92,2=Nur., f. 54v23-55r21).

Generally speaking, the wording in all three texts is very similar. But in a few cases, the wording of the Mu‘tabar does not correspond at all to what is in the Ḥikma. Nevertheless, as we have already seen several times, part of the Mu‘tabar’s additions are also present in the ms. Nuruosmaniye. By way of example, I refer to one case, namely, the addition of the specification bi-l-amthala wa-l-ḏamīr after ta‘limāt (I, 270,20=Nur., f. 54v24).

The second part (I, 274,1-276,13), “On the particular kinds among rhetoric things”, details each of the disputable affairs’ three subdivisions. Compared to the brief essential outline given in the first part, the first two are now presented in

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24 Actually, the Mu‘tabar (I, 270,17) uses the term mukhāṣimīyya, disputable, but this is highly problematic, given that one has to do with a subdivision of the ‘disputable’. In view of the fact that in the second part of the exposition on rhetoric, in a detailed description of the three subdivisions distinguished here, one finds (I, 275,10) the expression ‘mukhāṣimīyyat allatī yatanāfara al-nāṣ fihā’, as well as in view of the fact that both Ḥikma, 88,11 and ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 54,8 mention ‘munāfariyya’, it is almost certain that one has to do with a copyist’s (or editor’s) error.
an inversed order. Hence, Abū al-Barakāt (I, 274,3-275,9) first expounds the deliberative case, then (I, 275,10-24) concentrates on the issue of discordance, and finally (I, 276,1-13) focuses on matters of controversy. Even if there are similarities with the Ḥikma, as, for example, regarding the section’s overall structuring, substantial modifications and/or additions also appear. This is already evident in the discussion related to the ‘deliberative cases’. Its very beginning (I, 274,3-17) remains rather close to that of the Ḥikma, 92,4-20 (=Nur., f. 55r21-31), despite minor reformulations compared to Ibn Sīnā’s presentation, the most important of which is a particular emphasis on the involvement of ‘practical’ insight (I, 274,14-15).

But this is no longer the case when Abū al-Barakāt (I, 274,16-275,9) later underlines that it is more trustworthy to take the Prophet’s testimony as the premise instead of someone else’s, or of a ‘group of knowers’ than that of a single knower, because one deals in these matters with particulars. Ibn Sīnā (Ḥikma, 92,20-97,8=Nur., f. 55r31- 56r26), on the contrary, points to the existence of five issues on which one has to ‘deliberate’ with regard to the city (i.e., means to preserve its wealth, war, protection, import-export, and legislation – inside the discussion of which he refers to the existence of four political regimes: democracy, the vileness of leadership [oligarchy], the oneness of leadership [monarchy], and the aristocracy) and, in addition, details those ‘deliberative’ acts regarding the individual. Hence, Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical approach seems to have been replaced in the Mu’tabar by a more religious-legal approach.

With regard to issues of discordance (I, 275,10-24), one finds, compared to the Ḥikma, a small addition at the beginning (I, 275,11-14) in which Abū al-Barakāt points out that the dialectician, in sharp contrast with the rhetorician, is not interested in whether what he says in implemented or not. In conformity with the Ḥikma, 97,11-98,6 (97,11-98,4=Nur., f. 55r37-v10), he then notes (I, 275,14-24) that the rhetorician praises the beautiful insofar as it is praiseworthy and good, and enumerates several virtues (and their contrary vices). But he omits the final

25 It is undoubtedly worthwhile to note that the addition (present at I, 274,10-11) of the couple ‘beauty and ugly’ as well as of the remark that the rhetorician needs to possess premises in order to make things greater or smaller, corresponds with ms. Nuruosmaniye, f. 55r27-28, whereas it totally lacks in Ḥikma.

26 Perhaps not devoid of significance is Abū al-Barakāt’s use of what seems to be a ‘terminus technicus’, namely ‘al-muqaddimāt al-khabariyya’. As far as I know, Ibn Sīnā never uses it. If it is really a technical expression, it would be interesting to identify its precise historical source (I must confess that I was unable to do so).

27 As noted by Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 439, the text of manuscript Nuruosmaniye ends with the words bal bi-fa’lātiḥā, which occur at line 4 of page 98 of Šāliḥ’s edition. In view of this latter, it is clear that these words do not constitute the proper end of the discussion of rhetoric, nor even of the affirmation of which they are part. Hence, this ‘sudden’ end is due in all likelihood to an accidental cause (related to the manuscript on which our copyist worked).
part of Ibn Sinā’s exposition (*Hikma*, 98,6-99,8), in which further details are given about what is really praiseworthy.

Finally, he expresses (I, 276,1-13) a few basic ideas with regard to the topic of controversy, as, for example, its being based on accusations and defences (*i’tidhārat*), (concrete) kinds of apologies, the importance of threatening, and punishment and reward. One finds a far more developed treatment in the *Hikma* (99,9-103,24). Certainly, one can find passages in the *Mu’tabar* that might have influenced Abū al-Barakāt’s treatment, such as the affirmation of the existence of an essential link between accusations and defences (an affirmation that is, of course, in full compliance with Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1358b10-11 [see I, 276,1=Ḥ. 99,10]), or the existence of apologies, including some of its concrete expressions (I, 276,1-3=Ḥ. 101,17-21). But the overall impression is one of fundamental rewording, which puts a greater emphasis on the issue of reward and punishment, and, moreover, is limited to a few essential items. Also, in this case one may suspect a religious motive.

**Shi’r**

The last section of the *Mu’tabar*’s logical part, in accordance with the expanded view of Aristotle’s *Organon*, takes poetics as its object.28 Its title is as follows: “On Poetical Syllogisms and Utterances, which are called *niţūriqī* in Greek” (I, 276,15-16). Note that the term *niţūriqī* reappears immediately at the chapter’s beginning (I, 276, 19). At first sight, one might have the impression that it is a deformation of *buwiţīqi*, perhaps influenced by the transliteration of the Greek *poiētikē* as *riţūriqī*.29 But in view of the title as given in the *Hikma* (105,2), where one reads: “*Ma’āni kitāb fuwāyiţīqi wa-huwa kitāb biţūriqī fī l-shi’riyāt*”, one wonders whether Abū al-Barakāt had not been directly influenced by this reading *bitūriqī* (in absence of diacritical points, both *bitūriqī* and *niţūriqī* are possible), even if this was, in all likelihood, a misreading of the transliterated Greek word *poiētikē*.30

28 For a detailed presentation of this expanded view, both in the Middle Ages and in the later Greek commentary tradition, see Deborah Black, *Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden-New York-København-Köln: Brill, 1999), chapters 1 and 2. Following O.B. Hardison, Black calls this expanded view ‘the context theory’, but she avoids the negative overtones of Hardison’s presentation, see ibid., 1, note 2.


30 Moḥammed Silim Sālem, in his edition of Ibn Sinā, *Kitāb am-Mağmū‘ aw *Al-Ḥikmah al-’Arūdiyyah fī Ma’āni Kitāb al-Shīr*” (Cairo: Muṭba‘at Dār al-kutub, 1969), 15, note 1, clearly believes in a misreading. He moreover indicates that there is in the Uppsala manuscript no diacritical point on the beginning of the word.
In the first part of his exposition (I, 276,19-278,21), Abū al-Barakāt stresses the essential importance of the use of metre and rhyme in poetry for the Arabs. This stands in sharp contrast to the Greeks, for whom imaginary premises and imitation prevailed, as is evident in Aristotle’s treatment of poetry. According to Abū al-Barakāt, Aristotle saw eminent poetry as being composed, as far as its substance goes, in the diction of the elite (while disregarding whether it informs by means of assent or by means of the evocation of images and imitation) and, with respect to its form, in correct meters and rhyme. Most of this section has no counterpart in the Ḥikma. However, when speaking of poetic syllogism, one emphasises that the imaginary character of its effect on the soul is offered in almost identical words as in the Ḥikma (I, 277, 10-14=Ḥ. 105,3-6). The same happens somewhat later when Abū al-Barakāt stresses that these premises are not necessarily true or false, but imaginary (I, 277,21-278,1=Ḥ. 105,6-10).

The object of the second part of Abū al-Barakāt’s treatment of poetics (I, 277,22-278,21) concerns the issue of ‘imitations’ (muḥākiyāt), with special attention paid to its division into three types: simile (tashbih), metaphor (isti‘āra) and ‘of a widely-known kind’ (min bāb al-dhawā‘i’). It is almost verbatim the same as that found in the Ḥikma, 105,11-106,14. And this is also the case with respect to the third and final part, in which it is said that poetic speech is composed of imaginary premises, which sometimes are obtained by means of devices, basically related to wording or to meaning, and further subdivided into five types (I, 279,22-289,4=Ḥ. 106,15-109,6).

31 For an English translation of this section, see Van Gelder-Hammond, Takhīyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, 70-72. Note that this section is preceded surprisingly by the indication: “faṣıl 1, chapter 1”, since afterwards one looks in vain for the mentioning of a second chapter.

32 An English translation of these two (small) parts of the Ḥikma is present in Van Gelder-Hammond, Takhīyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, 26 (first paragraph of the translation). Unfortunately, in translating these passages no attention has been paid to the common elements. On several occasions, the common Arabic text has been rendered in two quite different ways. For example, al-takhayyul huwa infi‘āl min ta‘jib wa-ta‘Ûām... is rendered in the translation of the Ḥikma in this way: “Imagining is an affect of wonder, glorification, etc.”, but in that of the Mu’tabar as follows: “The evocation of images is affected by amazement, awe, etc.”. This could give the impression of the existence of only a similarity in wording, whereas one has in fact a strict identity.

33 For an English translation of this section, see Van Gelder-Hammond, Takhīyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, 26-27. The last type of imitation is there articulated in terms of ‘dead metaphor’, which is certainly not mistaken, but we have preferred to remain closer to the letter of the Arabic wording.

34 The beginning of this section (I, 279,22-280,11=Ḥ. 106,15-107,3) is, according to the wording in the Ḥikma, available once more in Van Gelder-Hammond, Takhīyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, 27-28. The rest of the chapter (I, 280,12-282,4=Ḥ. 107,4-109,6), which Ibn Sinā has copied from the Ḥikma almost verbatim in the Poetics of the Shifā‘ (excepted for the first two lines), is, according to this latter version, available in English translation in Ismail M. Dahiyat, Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 64-66.
However, the very last part of Ibn Sína’s exposition (Hikma, 109,6-110,4), in which he enumerates and discusses various Greek poetic themes (e.g., tragedy, dithyramb, and comedy), is not copied by Abū al-Barakāt. Everything indicates that this is due to a conscious decision, for he clearly found Greek poetry to be largely inferior to Arabic poetry, as is evidenced by his affirmation (at the beginning of his treatment) that the Greeks learned the appropriate use of metres from the Arabs (and the Persians).

**Conclusion**

From the preceding survey, there is overwhelming evidence that Abū al-Barakāt’s sections on dialectics, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetics, as contained within the Mu’tabar, are largely inspired by and indebted to Ibn Sína’s Hikma, or, at least, a text very close to it and of which the manuscript Nuruosmaniye 4894 offers the most valuable testimony. However, one could wonder whether the text in this manuscript was not based on, or at least partly inspired by, Abū al-Barakāt’s Mu’tabar. Of course, one must then suppose that the Mu’tabar, as far as the four discussed logical parts are concerned, is a kind of personal elaboration made by Abū al-Barakāt on Ibn Sína’s Ḥikma.

Ever since Shlomo Pines’ seminal studies on Abū al-Barakāt, there has been a large scholarly agreement that Abū al-Barakāt, despite his large-scale use of Avicennian texts, has either criticized or reworked in a very personal way many ideas of his great Arabic predecessor. This same attitude is also detectable in a few of his logical views, among them his doctrine of predication and his criticism of Ibn Sīna’s rejection of the ‘e-conversion’ of the absolute proposition. However, in the sections that we have examined, Abū al-Barakāt’s personal input appears to be limited. In those cases where it is clearly present, one has the impression that he was driven by religious motives and wanted to avoid a too exclusive valorisation of a purely rational-theoretical approach. Hence, they concern in all likelihood cases of

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35 Even if one accepts the earlier dating proposed by Jabbour and Morel (see supra, note ), the manuscript postdates clearly the Mu’tabar (written before 1165, which is the year that Abū al Barakāt died).


personal elaboration. But, one looks in vain for any explicit and/or strong criticism against that which is present in Ibn Sinā’s *Hikma*. On the contrary, Abū al-Barakāt, in these four sections on logic, remains largely faithful to their exposition in this latter work, or, at least, in its (or another, revised?) version as given in the *ms*. Nuruosmaniye.

Of course, the *ms*. Nuruosmaniye postdates the *Mu’tabar* and might therefore have taken elements form this latter. Could it be that the scribe of the Nuruosmaniye manuscript eliminated all of Abū al-Barakāt’s most personal elaborations and somehow ‘retained’ what was, in his view, only of clear Avicennian inspiration? This looks improbable for at least three reasons: (1) our survey shows that our manuscript has passages (e.g., the mentioning of some *topoi*) in common with the *Hikma* that are absent in the *Mu’tabar*, and this in the very same wording; (2) the explicit reference to Themistius in the opening lines of chapter 3 of the *Jadal*, both in the manuscript and the *Hikma*, but not in the *Mu’tabar*; and (3) the very fact that the last remark in the *safsata* section, which states that the sophisms in a syllogism have always either to do with utterance or with meaning, has no counterpart in the *ms*. Nuruosmaniye, despite its outspoken Avicennian content, as proven by its presence in the *Najāt* (and, for an additional element, in the *Ishārāt*). It seems, therefore, that at most there could be a source common to both the Nuruosmaniye manuscript and the *Mu’tabar*, and that this source then has to be a kind of revision of the *Hikma* done either by Ibn Sinā himself or one of his disciples.  

Whatever the case may be, we have an important testimony of large parts of one of Ibn Sinā’s earliest works for these four sections. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that a critical edition of the concerned logical sections of the *Hikma* would be impossible without taking a serious look at Abū al-Barakāt’s *Mu’tabar*. On the other hand, one wonders whether the other parts of the *Mu’tabar*’s logical section are not also based on the *Hikma*, especially since one easily detects many Avicennian ideas in them. Unfortunately, I could not find any evidence of the *Mu’tabar*’s

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38 I wish to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for having suggested this possibility.

39 See supra, note 5, where I indicated that a revision by one of Ibn Sinā’s disciples is unlikely.

40 Besides, another important testimony in view of a critical edition is undoubtedly Ghulam ‘Ali’s work *Miḥāk al-nāzar*, which apparently contains a paraphrase of the whole work, as discovered by Maroun Aouad in Ms. 4 arabe of Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg, n°. 4151 (see Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 87, note 3).

41 A quick survey showed me the existence of striking parallels between several passages of these logical parts of the *Mu’tabar* and logical expositions in Ibn Sinā’s works. By way of illustration, I may offer two examples: (1) when treating the notion of *’alāma* at in the last chapter of the section on *qiyyās*, Abū al-Barakāt’s wording (I, 202, 3-9) is almost identical with Ibn Sinā’s in the *Qiyās* of the *Shifā* (see Ibn Sinā, *al-Shifā’, al-Qiyās*, ed. Sa’id Zayed [Cairo: al-Hay’a al-‘āmma li-shu’ūn al-maṭābi’ al-amiriyya,
direct use of the preserved passages in the *Hikma* that are related to *Ibāra* and *Burhān* (based on the unique Uppsala manuscript).

But it is somewhat puzzling that in the *ms*. Nuruosmaniye, one finds at the bottom of f. 32r *Bāb al-burhān min al-Mūjaz li-l-Shaykh al-ra’is Abī Ali Ibn Sīnā* in red lettering and then immediately afterward, at the top of f. 32v, again in red, albeit small letters, *Fi uṣūl ‘ilm al-burhān wa-bayān anna kull ta’lim wa-ta’allum min ‘ilm sābiq*. Now, this latter wording had much in common with the opening line of the *Mu’tabar*’s section of the *Burhān*, which states (I, 203,11): “Kull ta’lim wa-kull ta’allum dhihnī hiya innamā yakān min ma’rīfa mutaqaddima wa-‘ilm sābiq”. But what follows is quite different in both texts. As Gutas has noted, the part on *burhān* in the *ms*. Nuruosmaniye is ‘original’ in the sense that is not copied from any of Ibn Sīnā’s known texts. It certainly did not function as a direct source of inspiration for Abū al-Barakāt’s treatment of the topic of demonstration. Is it too far-fetched to suppose that the ‘second’ title in the *ms*. Nuruosmaniye was, in fact, that of its section in the *Hikma*?

Of course, in the actual state of affairs nothing permits us to formulate any definite judgment on this issue. But one can note that no title for this section is present in the Uppsala manuscript and that Abū al-Barakāt makes extensive use of the *Hikma*, or at least of a text very close to it, in the following sections dealing with logic. In this sense, I think we cannot exclude the possibility that the *Mu’tabar*’s first three sections on logic might have been strongly inspired by Ibn Sīnā’s *Hikma*. If this is indeed the case, would it not prove immediately that the young Ibn Sīnā did not consider the *Maqālāt* as a proper part of logic? But for the moment, all of this has to be left at the level of hypothesis. I can only hope that new findings will permit scholars to further clarify this issue.

**Bibliography**


1964], 574,3-9; (2) the distinction between *burhān inna* and *burhān limā* (I, 210,23-211,10) has much in common with Ibn Sīnā’s in the *Burhān* of the *Shifā* (see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā*, *al-Burhān*, 79,13-20).


