

From Faculties to Functions: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Critique of Internal Senses

M. Zahit Tiryaki*

Abstract: One of the basic questions of the classical theory of soul is the theory of internal senses, which received its most elaborate form under Avicenna. While he effectively revised this theory, which he inherited as it was laid out, he expounded upon it according to his own philosophical inclinations, thereby making significant additions on intricate matters like the number and appellation of the internal senses by introducing new distinctions and classifications. Over time, Avicenna's novel framework concerning the theory drew several criticisms by his successors. An important critique was leveled by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The first point of al-Rāzī's contestation was his critique of the arguments for the existence of each internal sense as a separate faculty. Al-Rāzī supposed that the soul could perceive all objects of perception without recourse to independent faculties, each of which was designed for a separate function. Second, he criticized the narrative that plotted the brain for internal senses. While this critique comprises the main subject of this study, it will also try to clarify those of its aspects that are related to greater epistemological and psychological questions, like the nature of the soul, the character of the soul-body relation and interaction, the nature of perception, the degrees of abstraction, the relation of the soul with the particulars, and its bearing on them.

Keywords: *Avicenna, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, perception, abstraction, the critique of internal senses, internal sensations, the soul-body relation.*

* Assist. Prof., Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of Philosophy. Correspondence: tiryakizahid@gmail.com

“Nothing that perceives the particular is abstract, [and] nothing that perceives the universal is corporeal.”

Ibn Sînâ, Kitâbü'n-Necât, 210.

“The soul is the percept for all sensations by all perceptions.”

Fahreddin Râzî, Şerhu'l-Işârât, 264-265.

Introduction

Internal senses, simply put, refer to those faculties that run the functions between the sensation of exterior objects by the human mind and the comprehension of perceived objects by intellection. Threading the ground of distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity, specificity and generality, particularity and universality, sensibility and intelligibility at this juncture, the theory of internal senses has a long history that was prefigured in the primary remarks of Plato and Aristotle, continued by Plotinus and Hellenistic commentators, and culminated in Avicenna.¹ This theory, as a subset of the Avicennian theory of soul² that was influential during the Middle Ages, retained its importance through modifications

- 1 For an overview of the problematique concerning the theory of internal senses and its long history, cf. Mehmet Zahit Tiryaki, “Tahayyül Kavramında İbn Sînâcî Dönüşümler,” in *Kavram Geliştirme: Sosyal Bilimlerde Yeni İmkânlar*, ed. Kübra Bilgin Tiryaki and Lütfi Sunar (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2016), 199-213. For more extensive expositions on its historical development in Antiquity and afterward, also see M. Wright Bundy, *The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1927), 11-83, 117-46, 177-99; Henry A. Wolfson, “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts,” *The Harvard Theological Review* 28/2 (April 1935): 69-133; E. Ruth Harvey, *Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and The Renaissance* (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975), 4-30, 39-61; Gerard Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought* (Galway: Galway University Press, 1988), 1-38, 59-134; Simon Kemp and Garth J. O Fletcher, “The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses,” *The American Journal of Psychology* 106/4 (Winter, 1993): 559-76; Dominik Perler, “Intentionality and Action Medieval Discussions on the Cognitive Capacities of Animals,” in *Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 73-98; Katherine H. Tachau, “Approaching Medieval Scholars’ Treatment of Cognition,” in *Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 1-34.
- 2 Avicenna was influential not only particularly as regards the theory of internal senses, but generally in the theory of soul throughout the Middle Ages. Lagerlund supposes that the mind-body problem generally discussed in relation to Descartes can, in fact, be traced back to the time of Aristotelian and Islamic philosophy’s transmission into Latin. In addition, he points out the significance of Aristotle’s *Peri Psychês*, Avicenna’s *Kitâb al-nafs*, and Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle in this context. In this historical frame, Avicenna emerges as a key figure of the debates on the mind-body problem that will reach Descartes. Henrik Lagerlund, “Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul,” in *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, ed. H. Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 1-5. For another study that demonstrates the influence of Avicenna’s *Kitâb al-nafs* throughout the Latin Middle Ages by means of both historical figures and specific doctrines, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), V-X, 1-12, especially 127-53.

and improvements due to the criticism and intervention of several figures. It was finally laid to rest thanks to new breakthroughs in the study of the brain's anatomy.³ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is integral to this historical course because of his criticisms of the theory of internal senses. In this respect, he stands at a threshold between the medieval psychology of faculties that reached its peak with Avicenna and the debunking of this theory, which held that different faculties were located in a separate sector of the brain.

This study suggests that al-Rāzī's role figures in the context of his acceptance that internal sensations emerge from internal senses, as Avicenna argued, while attributing the internal sensations to the soul instead of to different faculties, and thus his presumption of internal sensations as the attributes or functions of the soul. Thus while standing at a juncture between speculative theology and philosophy with respect to his intellectual profile, he also stands at a similar cross-point vis-à-vis the specific theory that forms the subject matter of this study.⁴ It appears that his views on fields like metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, and physics at the aforementioned juncture have drawn the attention of researchers for quite some time now. We could also mention an initial interest at the level of preliminary introduction and illustration with regard to the changes in his epistemology and psychology, as well as his critique of the theory of internal senses.⁵

- 3 Kemp and Fletcher, "The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses," 565-68.
- 4 On al-Rāzī's method and role at the intersection of theology and philosophy, cf. Şaban Hakkı, "Müteahhirûn Döneminde Felsefe-Kelâm İlişkisi: Fahrüddin er-Râzî Örneği" (Unpublished PhD diss., Marmara University, 2002), IX-XXVI; Ağıl Şirinov, "Fahrüddin Râzî ve Nasreddin Tûsî'nin İbn Sînâcılığı," in *Uluslararası İbn Sînâ Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, 22-24 Mayıs 2008, ed. Mehmet Mazak and Kâmil Engin (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür A. Ş. Yayınları, 2008), 275- 77; Eşref Altaş, "İbn Sînâ Felsefesi ve Eşarîyye Kelâmı Arasında Fahrüddin er-Râzî'nin Yöntemi," *M. Ü. İlahiyât Fakültesi Dergisi* 36 (2009/1): 140-48, 149-50; İsmail Hanoğlu, "Kitâbü'l-Mülâhhas fi'l-Mantık ve'l-Hikme Bağlamında Fahrüddin er-Râzî ve İslâm Felsefesi," *Hitit Üniversitesi İlahiyât Fakültesi Dergisi* 10/20 (2011/2): 172-74, 179-84; Ömer Türker, "Kelâm ve Felsefe Tarihinde Fahrüddin er-Râzî," in *İslâm Düşüncesinin Dönüşüm Çağında Fahrüddin er-Râzî*, ed. Ö. Türker and O. Demir (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 17-40; Eşref Altaş, "Fahrüddin er-Râzî'nin 13. Yüzyıldaki Mirası," in *Uluslararası 13. Yüzyılda Felsefe Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, ed. Murat Demirkol and M. Enes Kala (Ankara: Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi Yayınları, 2014), 319-26, 329-31; Bilal İbrahim, "Fahr ad-Din ar-Râzî, İbn al-Haytâm and Aristotelian Science: Essentialism versus Phenomenalism in Post-Classical Islamic Thought," *Oriens* 41 (2013): 386-402.
- 5 Mustafa Bozkurt, "Fahrüddin Râzî'de Bilgi Teorisi" (Unpublished PhD diss., Ankara University, 2006), 108-13, 119-20; Şaban Hakkı, "Fahrüddin er-Râzî'nin Bilgi Teorisi," in *İslâm Düşüncesinin Dönüşüm Çağında Fahrüddin er-Râzî*, ed. Ö. Türker and O. Demir (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 432-38; Asiye Aykut, "Nefis Nazariyesi Çerçevesinde Fahrüddin er-Râzî'nin Ahlâk Düşüncesi," *C. Ü. İlahiyât Fakültesi Dergisi* 18. no. 1 (2014): 210-11; Yunus Cengiz, "Nefs Çözümlemesi Açısından Fahrüddin er-Râzî'nin İbn Sînâ ile İlişkisi," in *Uluslararası İmam Eşarî ve Eşarîlik Sempozyumu Bildirileri-Siirt Üniversitesi İlahiyât Fakültesi (21-23 Eylül 2014)*, ed. Cemalettin Erdemci and Fadıl Aygan (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2015), 429-53.

Another issue that needs to be considered is whether there is a relation between al-Rāzī's positions on the theories of the soul and knowledge and his critique of internal sense and, if so, what its nature is. First of all, he finds the soul's immateriality open to discussion and objects to the philosophers' presumptions concerning its immateriality. He also denies the contrariety that Avicenna posed between intelligibility and corporeality by refuting the distinction between the intellect, which comprehends the universals, and the sensory faculties, which perceive the particulars. Al-Rāzī establishes the soul as the only seat related to the particulars and impinging on them by turning the soul into a single faculty that responds to all perceptions, whether universal or particular, sensory or conceptual. In this sense, he suggests a more intimate soul-body relation than does Avicenna's dualist position.

In addition, he criticizes the philosophers' thought of abstraction for turning away from the conception of knowledge that involves *the forms obtained from external objects to be realized in the perceiver by being abstracted from their corporeal features* to a conception of perception that involves an *attribution and attachment between the perceiver and the perceived*. The aforementioned studies on his work also include certain depictions concerning the epistemological questions and changes expressed here. Therefore, another aim of this study is to trace more emphatically the relations between the questions pointed out herein and the critique of internal senses.

Despite the certain historical import of all similar studies that discuss questions pertinent to a period, it would probably lend its primary import by setting the relation between the classical questions and the new ones, regardless of acceptance or refutation. Hence, al-Rāzī's just noted views in the context of changes in the conception of the soul and knowledge in general, as well as those in the context of the critique of internal senses in particular, have such a dimension. Thus, the perspectives of both Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī have common ground with various questions debated in the contemporary philosophy of the mind, like dualism, materialism, physicalism, the mind-body relation, mental causation, mental content, relations between mental states and properties as well as physical states and properties, and the mind's relations with behavior and action, consciousness, and self-consciousness. While drawing the connections between their views and the aforementioned questions without losing sight of the changing scientific paradigm is beyond the scope of this study, it must be pointed out that an assessment that clarifies the descriptions of their thoughts on the said issues would lay a stepping stone for further in-depth studies.

Thus, this study will first elaborate on and deepen the narrative of al-Rāzī's criticisms of Avicenna as regards the internal senses vis-à-vis the changes in the conception of self and knowledge, and demonstrate the *internal sensations as*

manifold functions of the soul rather than the *internal senses as disparate faculties of the soul* prevailed in al-Rāzī's thought, even though he offered his philosophical contribution when the established scheme of internal senses was still in circulation. Moreover, the relation between the certain changes in his conception of the soul and knowledge and his critique of internal senses will be considered a backdrop. A number of questions noted above concerning his critique of internal senses, like the nature of the soul, the character of the soul-body relation and interaction, the soul's relation with sensory and conceptual comprehension, and the proper nature of the functionality of internal sensations in his epistemology, deserve more extensive treatment than the present space constraints permit.

Given the facts, certain aspects of the changes in his conception of the theory of knowledge that act as a backdrop to his critique of the internal senses will first be briefly sketched. After this, the many facets of his critique of the internal senses will be presented. Last, his alternative perspective of internal sensations will be analyzed. While *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* forms the main reference text used in this study to analyze his criticisms, sections from his other works that convey similar expressions⁶ will also be cited where relevant.⁷

The Psychological and Epistemological Backdrop of al-Rāzī's Critique of the Internal Senses

Al-Rāzī's critique of the internal senses exhibits certain aspects related to his general stance on subjects like the soul's nature, perception-sensation, and the perception of the universals and the particulars. In this section, particular changes

6 The chronological list of major texts consulted for this study is: 1. *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya* 2. *al-Mulakḥḥaṣ* 3. *Sharḥ al-ishārāt* 4. *Sharḥ al-'uyūn al-ḥikma* 5. *al-Matālib al-'āliya*. See, Eşref Altaş, "Fahredden er-Rāzī'nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi," *İslām Düşüncesinin Dönüşüm Çağında Fahreddin er-Rāzī*, ed. Ö. Türker and O. Demir (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 109-10, 112-13, 115, 136-40. At a glance, *Sharḥ al-ishārāt* may be classified under philosophical works vis-à-vis its method, works of criticism vis-à-vis its content, and commentaries as a second step vis-à-vis the period. Nevertheless, the variability of the positions he took in treating topics requires a keener take of the classification of his works based on method and periods. Cf. Eşref Altaş, "İbn Sinâ Felsefesi ve Eşariyye Kelâmı Arasında Fahreddin er-Rāzī'nin Yöntemi," *M. Ü. İlahiyât Fakültesi Dergisi* 36 (2009/1): 136-40.

7 For *Sharḥ al-ishārāt*, which Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī composed in 576/1180, and some remarks on and depictions of his "exegetical practice" in this work, cf. Altaş, "Fahredden er-Rāzī'nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi," 115; Robert Wisnovsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Isharat," *Oriens* 41/3-4 (2013): 357-58, 366-68, 373; Agil Şirinov, "İşârât Geleneği Bağlamında Fahreddin Râzî," in *İslām Düşüncesinin Dönüşüm Çağında Fahreddin er-Râzî*, ed. Ö. Türker and O. Demir (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları 2013), 208-21; Hakan Coşar, "İslām Düşüncesinde Günümüzde Az Bilinen Bir Gelenek: İşârât (Şerhleri) Geleneği," *Dini Araştırmalar* 16/43 (July-December 2013): 51-54.

in his conception of the theory of soul and knowledge, in contradistinction with Avicenna, will be briefly illustrated as a background for his critique of the internal senses.

According to Avicenna, the soul is an immaterial and incorporeal substance.⁸ Al-Rāzī, who holds the same view, notes that Avicenna's argument that the soul is an immaterial body does not necessitate that it be incorporeal.⁹

In line with this, Avicenna envisions the soul as having disparate faculties as well as separate branches, a conviction he forms by the following presumptions: The soul is a single thing, and the impossibility of a single thing like the soul being is immaterial and incorporeal is the principle of animate things' various actions. While contrariety may occur in animate actions, different faculties may attend

8 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt* (including *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt*), ed. 'Alī Riḍā Najafzādāh (Tehran: Anjuman-i Āṣār wa Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 2005), 202, 205-207, 210, 214 (hereafter *al-Ishārāt*); Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā: al-Nafs*, ed. Fazlur Rahman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 27-33, 209-21 (hereafter *al-Nafs*).

9 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya fi 'ilm al-ilāhiyyat wa-al-ṭabī'iyyat*, ed. Muḥammad Mu'taṣim Billāh al-Baghdādī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabi, 1990), II, 238-39 (hereafter *Mabāḥith*). For more extended assessments and explanations of al-Rāzī against the philosophers who argued that the human soul is not corporeal, also see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 359-92, where he criticizes their evidence one by one and states: "This is all the evidence we found out for the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul. None of it convinced us for the aforementioned doubt. Who are capable of resolving these doubts may utilize them as evidence." *Ibid.*, 387. He also evaluates therein the justifications of those who deny the soul's immateriality (*ibid.*, 389-92). He follows this up with a little milder idiom against the justifications for the soul-body distinction in *Kitāb al-nafs wa-al-rūḥ wa-sharḥ quwāhumā* and assesses both the rational and the canonical argumentations. See, *Idem*, *Kitāb al-nafs wa-al-rūḥ wa-sharḥ quwāhumā*, ed. M. Şağhīr Ḥasan al-Ma'sūmī (Tehran: Ma'hād al-abḥāth al-Islāmiyya, 1985), 27-51 (hereafter *al-Nafs*). However, he also mentions his critical treatment of the issue in his works. In fact, he devoted the second chapter of the seventh book of his *al-Maṭālib al-'āliya* exclusively to this topic. See *idem*, *al-Maṭālib al-'āliya min al-'ilm al-ilāhī*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Salām Shāhin (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1999), VII, 21-81 (hereafter *al-Maṭālib*). For debates on whether the soul is an abstract substance à la al-Rāzī and his argument for it, see Hayri Kaplan, "Fahruddin er-Rāzī Düşüncesinde Ruh ve Ahlāk" (Unpublished PhD diss., Ankara University, 2001), 111-72; Muammer İskenderoğlu, "Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī on the immateriality of the human soul," *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* 14 (2005): 121-36; Jules Janssens, "Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī on the Soul: A Critical Approach to Ibn Sīnā," *The Muslim World* 102 (July/October 2012): 566-67, 570-79. On the study of al-Rāzī's critique of Avicennian psychology, mainly with specific reference to his *Mabāḥith*, and the emphasis on al-Rāzī's development of a psychological theory which states that soul is incorporeal, in the context of the interrelation of his metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological criticisms, see Muhammad Fariduddin Attar, "Faḥr al-Din al-Rāzī on the Human Soul: A Study of the Psychology Section of al-Mabāḥith al-ma'sriqiyya fi 'ilm al-ilāhiyyat wa-l-ṭabī'iyyat" (Unpublished MA thesis, McGill University, 2014), 13-52, 85. In a forthcoming study, Eşref Altaş argues that al-Rāzī claims that the justifications for the soul's incorporeality are insufficient to show that it is abstract and immaterial. See, "Fahredden Rāzī'de İnsanın Mahiyet ve Hakikati Üzerine." Before al-Rāzī, the issue of the soul's abstractness was reconciled with the main principles of theology by theologians like al-Ījī and became defensible once more. See Ömer Türker, "Kelām Geleneğinde Adudüddin el-İcī: Kelâmın Bilimsel Kimliği Sorunu," in *İslâm İlim ve Düşünce Geleneğinde Adudüddin el-İcī*, ed. Eşref Altaş (İstanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2018), 302-04.

to things that differ from the things with which they were involved. Therefore, there has to be both a unitary thing like the soul and the faculties that would act as the principle of its different actions. If each faculty had independent beings unencumbered by a single thing like soul, there would be no opposition between the faculties or counteraction among their actions. Thus, even though there may be independent faculties for the soul's myriad perceptions, they are imagined to be tied to a single thing like the soul. Avicenna viewed this condition as a prerequisite for the interaction, which al-Rāzī expressed as *the transmission of the affections of the soul to the faculties* and *the transmission of the affections of the faculties to the soul*.¹⁰ Hence, the narrative of a single soul and its various faculties in a sense forms, according to Avicenna, the prerequisite of the interaction that occurs from the soul to the body or vice versa. Al-Rāzī, however, concedes the soul's disparate actions and the function it engenders, even though he does not attribute it to independent faculties that exists by themselves while interacting with the soul, as Avicenna does. On the contrary, he views each of them as actions and functions of the soul.

The perception according to philosophers, particularly Avicenna, is the representation of a thing's truth or form by the perceiver. Al-Rāzī also criticizes the Avicennian conception of perception, just as he does the conception of internal senses in manifold faculties. Thus, one must ask whether his critique is related to that of internal senses or the former as a backdrop against the latter. While a comprehensive study of the changes in the conception of perception for al-Rāzī's epistemology here is impossible, some general thoughts that can shed light on his aforementioned critique may be mentioned.

Al-Rāzī picks up the relevant debates in two points: (1) The debate related to the presumption that the perception of a thing is achieved only if the truth of what is to be perceived is conceived (*huṣūl*) in the perceiver's self, (2) whether the perception is just that conception itself.¹¹ He approaches the first from two angles:

10 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 214; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-al-tanbihāt*, ed. 'Alī Riḍā Najafzādāh (Tehran: Anjuman-i Āgār va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 2005), 214-15 (hereafter *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*). For Avicenna's general assessments with respect to the soul's actions, faculties, and perceptions, as well as the relation of the soul to senses, also see, *al-Nafs*, 33-53, 58-67, 221-27. On the nature of the soul-body relation, al-Rāzī writes: "There is a single kind of relation of one thing to another such that it is deformed if detached from it. An instance of it is like the relation of material accidents and forms with their lot. The relation [between one thing to another external to it] may be weak and its detachment from the thing it was attached comes with ease for the slightest reason. The relation of the souls with bodies is neither as strong as the former nor as weak as the latter..." Idem, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 392.

11 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 217.

(1) The philosophers' justification does not sustain the theory that perception is the conception of the perceived thing by the perceiver itself, which would have meant the perceived thing's formation in the mind, and (2) He supposes that the justification does not hold that the perception is the formation of the forms of perceived things by some faculties, based on the perception particular to external senses, which is impossible to figure out unless the object of perception emerges in the exterior. His rationale here is the possibility of calling the perception the faculties' attachment (*ta'alluq*) to objects of perception. For example, in the case of sight, the perception particular to sight is a relative condition of the faculty with the external object without any impression of the form of what is seen by the faculty or its locus.

In al-Rāzī's opinion, this applies to all sensations like hearing, taste, smell, and touch.¹² He points out that some people, who deny that the formation of perception and the consciousness (*shu'ūr*) depends on the conception of the nature of what the perceiver perceives, justify it by both general arguments on conceptual and sensory perception and particular arguments unique to each of these perceptions. Suggesting that these arguments demonstrate the impossibility of the impression of the intelligible and imaginary on the intellect and the imagination, he criticizes the conception of perception as impression (*intibā'*) as much as he does conception (*huṣūl*)¹³ and notes that Avicenna's statements are conflicting (*muḍṭarib*) as to whether perception is the impression of the form.¹⁴ Furthermore, he argues that accepting either the impression of the form or the identity (*ittihād*) of intellect-intelligible necessitates the acceptance of both.

Avicenna defends the identity of intellect-intelligible in *al-Mabda' wa-al-ma'ād*, whereas he appears to forgo this view, although he retains the impression view in his theory of knowledge in *al-Ishārāt*. Al-Rāzī views him as troubled for his subscribing to the perspective of impression while renouncing the identity of intellect-intelligible.¹⁵ After these criticisms, he concludes that perception is not an impression, but must be a relative-relational condition,¹⁶ and responds to Avicenna's "*the perception of a thing is the representation of its truth in the perceiver*" by pointing out the inconsistencies in his system of thought.¹⁷ No doubt there are more

12 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 218.

13 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 219-21.

14 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 226.

15 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 228-29.

16 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 233.

17 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 234-35. Bilal Ibrahim argues that al-Rāzī sketches a new epistemological framework in *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya* and *al-Mulakḥḥaṣ fi al-ḥikma wa-al-mantiq*, one that

intricate aspects of the changes in al-Rāzī's conception of perception that deserve more advanced discussion than is possible here; however, these changes appear to bear upon the internal senses thus: The general function Avicenna ascribed to each internal sense is to abstract meanings out of external sensory forms during the process of apprehension and their figuration in the perceiving subject. Turning of al-Rāzī's critique of internal senses from a definition of perception as "*the conception of the form of what is perceived in the perceiver (ḥuṣūl)*" to "*the relative state or attachment (ta'alluq) between the perceiving subject and the perceived object or between the former and the mental image of the latter*"¹⁸ may be interpreted as a differing perspective, one oriented to the internal senses' functionality as conceiving meanings (or mental images) in the perceiver's mind (*ḥuṣūl*) that are abstracted from external sensory forms. As a matter of fact, the criticisms of al-Rāzī in the next step against the process of abstraction and the thought of apprehension that Avicenna portrayed by means of internal senses, appear to be, in a sense, consequent upon the change in his own conception of perception.

In Avicennian epistemology, comprehension, which is based on faculties with independent beings yet attached to a single thing like a soul, occurs through a course of abstraction progressing after the manner of *sensory, imaginary*,

underwrites his reorganization of the traditional classification of sciences and criticisms of particular Avicennian doctrines and was developed in a phenomenalist frame against Avicenna's essentialist epistemology. See Bilal Ibrahim, "Freeing Philosophy from Metaphysics: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Philosophical Approach to the Study of Natural Phenomena" (Unpublished PhD diss., McGill University, 2012), 3-9, 197; for remarks with an emphasis on the epistemological changes between the two, also see idem, "Fakhr ad-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Hayṭam and Aristotelian Science," 379-402, 426-27. Another study sets up a link between al-Rāzī's epistemological and psychological views of by arguing that his critique of psychological doctrines like the soul's unitary nature or the faculties' multiplicity cannot be made sense of without considering this phenomenalist frame. It also questions whether his major critical assessments of various Avicennian psychological doctrines contained a deeper epistemological commitment that motivated his revisions of them. See Attar, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Human Soul," 5-6, 87. Cengiz argues that the difference between Avicenna and al-Rāzī in the context of perception lies at two points: 1. whether perception is just the inherence of the form of what is perceived in the relevant organ or faculty or 2. whether the human soul accompanies the mental states when experiencing sensation or imagination. He also sorts al-Rāzī's criticism of Avicenna in the context of perception and al-Rāzī's contrary opinions at 4 points: 1. Avicenna: faculties of the soul as the locus of forms, al-Rāzī: not the soul's faculties but the soul itself as the forms' locus; 2. Avicenna: acceptance of the possibility of the abstraction of forms from sensible objects, al-Rāzī: the abstraction of forms as a null proposition and the impossibility of its realization; 3. Avicenna: the perception of universals only by the human soul, al-Rāzī: the human soul's perception of both the universals and the particulars; 4. Avicenna: the argument for the intellect's non-accompaniment to activities like sensation and imagination, al-Rāzī: the accompaniment of sensory states to mental activity. One of al-Rāzī's accomplishments is the removal of Avicenna's hierarchical relation between faculties and locating the intellect and the senses on the same plane as the myriad functions (attributes) of a single soul. See Cengiz, "Nefs Çözümlemesi Açısından Fahreddin er-Rāzī'nin İbn Sīnâ ile İlişkisi," 442-43, 447.

18 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 218, 226.

estimative, and *intellectual* perceptions. The perceptions prior to the stage of intellectual perception are linked to essence only insofar as they are attached to certain matter or singular accidents. Therefore, despite the presence of a relation with the essence at the *sensory*, *imaginary*, and *estimative* stages, this only occurs due to these perceptions' contiguity to a certain matter or singular accidents with no relation to the essence in itself. If they had been attached to the essence without extra registers, there would have been no obstacle to the unity of apperception. In contrast, however, we both detect singular states of these perceptions that obstruct such a unity and comprehend a full abstraction freed from any matter and singular accidents only in *intellectual perception*. Thus, a perception that is fully abstracted from all attachments and accidents happens only at the stage of *intellectual perception*.¹⁹ Al-Rāzī, however, thinks that the form present in the intellect cannot be abstracted from all alien attachments and be in unity with the others. In his opinion, human knowledge qua human being is an abstract universal. It is not that the intuitive knowledge in the class of accident and qualia is universal or abstract; on the contrary, it is as such that the subject of knowledge or what is known of things is a form and a mental content. While the ancients refer to this sort of knowledge metaphorically as universal and abstract, later scholars presumed the presence of a universal and abstract form in the intellect for want of an insight into the former's motivations. However, al-Rāzī appears to attribute universality not to knowledge itself, but rather to speak of the universality or abstraction of what is known of things,²⁰ which puts him at odds with a perspective that detects common properties at *res extensa*, particular features of which are abstracted, and then arrives at something generalizable and universalizable. In other words, the

19 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 236-37; Ibn Sinā, *al-Nafs*, 58-67; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 238. On the problem of abstraction in Avicenna, see Cristina D'Ancona, "Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna: How to Combine Aristotle's 'De Anima' and the 'Enneads'," in *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 47-71; Dag Nikolaus Hasse, "Avicenna on Abstraction," in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2001), 39-72; Jon McGinnis, "Making Abstraction Less Abstract: The Logical, Psychological, and Metaphysical Dimensions of Avicenna's Theory of Abstraction," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 80 (2007): 169-83. In the background of Avicenna's understanding of abstraction lies the radical distinction between the world of generation and decay perceived by the senses and the supreme, immaterial, and perpetual world perceived by the intellect. Thus, these two worlds never mingle, overlap, or conflict, and are juxtaposed only in humans. This happens as the base world is elevated by internal senses like sensation and estimation and the intelligible world tends toward it. See Robert E. Hall, "A Decisive Example of the Influence of Psychological Doctrine in Islamic Science and Culture: Some Relationships Between Ibn Sina's Psychology, Other Branches of His Thought, and Islamic Teachings," *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* (Aleppo) 3 (1979): 55-58, 64.

20 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 239-40.

perception of objects prior to abstraction is achieved by particularistic faculties, and those after it by universalistic faculties. The Avicennian system inserts internal senses as critical implements for abstraction and designated them for the transition between *sense* and *intellect*, *particular* and *universal*. Since this system contends that intellect or the human soul is associated with the perception of universals, and the animate soul that undertakes sensory perception is associated with the perception of particulars, abstraction follows a course from the particularistic faculties to the universalistic ones. But because of al-Rāzī's refutation of both the hierarchical and vertical course of abstraction in the Avicennian style that runs from particular to universal, and, as will be relayed below, the distinction between the particularistic and sensory faculties that discern the particulars and the intellectual faculties that perceive universals, both philosophers have a different idea of what the function that runs through the internal senses actually is. If we can speak of a sort of abstraction for al-Rāzī, even at a lateral plane, it should be determined how this is distinguished from the abstraction Avicenna had in mind.²¹

In this context, al-Rāzī mentions the negative relation that Avicenna established between *rationality* and *corporeality*. In other words, he criticizes Avicenna's conception of matter and its attachments' portrayal as inimical to being intelligible.²² Al-Rāzī also argues that when a thing's essence consists of a substratum and what comes across it, the former is matter and the latter is form, and that the former's intellection is no impediment to the latter's intellection. Therefore, the matter with no meaning other than the substratum cannot inhibit a thing's intelligibility.²³ On

21 al-Rāzī suggests that the stages of gradual abstraction of percept from particular to abstract in the Avicennian system are different sorts of perceptions within the soul. Idem, *Mabāḥith*, 2:428. In a sense, this means that al-Rāzī did not absolutely reject the abstraction that should somehow take place in order to achieve intellectual perception, but objected to the proposition that the abstraction is elicited by separate faculties and that the perceptions are myriad because of abstraction. At whichever stage the abstraction takes place, the resulting perception by all means remains a kind of the soul's perceptions in al-Rāzī. For his assessment of the course of abstraction, see idem, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā (Tehran: Mu'assasa al-Ṣādiq li-al-ṭibā'a wa-al-nashr, 1994), 2:277-79. His negative opinions are unequivocally accentuated in *al-Maṭālib*, one of his later works: "Know that these words [concerning abstraction] are popular, commonplace statements and they [philosophers] did not scrutinize them at all...Thus it is established that the form that comes across the soul is an abstract universal substance is a false and void statement. On the contrary, what comes across the soul is the knowledge about the substance and the awareness concerning them. This knowledge is a particular accident and attribute that comes across a certain soul at a certain time. Therefore the supposition that this form is an abstract universal form is devoid of meaning..." idem, *al-Maṭālib*, 7:165.

22 Note 17 above pointed out that al-Rāzī conceded that sensory perceptions like sensation and imagination are accompanied by intellectual perception, and vice versa for the human soul. Avicenna's refutation of the rationality-corporeality contrariety and his view of them as not polar opposites have to do with this.

23 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 242-43.

this point, al-Rāzī clearly objects to a basic notion upon which Avicennian scheme of the internal senses is built: intellection is immaterial, and therefore the corporeality of the external and internal senses is an obstacle to intelligibility. When discussing this, he first clarifies that matter does in fact mean the substratum, and then expresses that the intellection of the substratum does not obstruct the intellection of the essence coming across that substratum. Therefore, since corporeality impedes its intelligibility in Avicenna's opinion, it requires a course of abstraction that will shed the corporeality of things, and internal senses as an intermediary category in order to run this course. As a result, things are stripped of their material properties and arrive at the stage of intellectual perception, bereft of any materiality, where they are perceived as sheer intellectual forms because the soul, as an immaterial and incorporeal substance, cannot perceive the particulars without corporeal faculties or their prefiguration of sensory forms for the perception of the soul. While it retains the possibility for interaction in the Avicennian system between domains like *soul* and *body*, *intellectual perception* and *sensory perception*, *perception of the universals* and *perception of the particulars*, there are finer points such as at which stage and how exactly the transition from particularity to universality could take place, how the soul as an immaterial and incorporeal thing could relate to material body and particularistic faculties. Yet al-Rāzī regards materiality, which he takes in the sense of substratum, as no impediment to intellection. This stance deserves more extended studies, for both the Avicennian theory, to which the distinctions of universality-particularity and sensibility-rationality are central, and the probable conclusions drawn from al-Rāzī's theory of knowledge, seems to treat these distinctions as not being in such stark contrast as they were in Avicenna.

Al-Rāzī spells out certain criticisms on the internal senses in the context of an epistemological backdrop, certain aspects of which are only briefly mentioned here.²⁴ He states two basic issues that deserve articulation in his scrutiny of

24 al-Rāzī's critique of the internal senses was spelled out before him by Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī and others. It can be gathered from his expression that his standpoint was critical of not only the internal senses but, more generally, the attribution of different perceptions to different faculties. For al-Baghdādī's considerations of perceptions secured by the internal senses, which he called "mental perceptions," and the achievement of multiple perceptions by the soul, see idem, *al-Mu'tabar fi al-ḥikma*, ed. Yūsuf Maḥmūd (Doha: Dār al-Ḥikma, 2012), II, 444-46, 448, 450-53, 457-63. Moreover Suhrawardī, who has a similar stance with respect to the critique of internal senses, maintains the possibility of a faculty to elicit multiple perceptions. Nevertheless, his critique turns to the number of internal senses, rather than al-Rāzī's, which subsumes all internal and external perceptions under the soul. Thus, Suhrawardī regarded the faculties of formative imagination, compositive imagination, and estimation as the aspects of a single faculty and limited the internal senses to three: common sense, compositive imagination, and memory. In a sense, this is a return to the functions that Avicenna subsumed under formative imagination, compositive imagination, and estimation to the Aristotelian

internal senses and raises his arguments about departing from them. The first aspect involves demonstrating their existence. In respect of this, al-Rāzī criticizes first Avicenna's arguments concerning the being of each internal sense. He then proceeds to criticize the Avicennian approach that designates different loci for the internal senses in the brain (based on Galenic brain anatomy)²⁵ and the internal senses' role in the context of the soul moving the body. The next section therefore focuses on assessing his criticisms of the internal senses' existence and functions in the context of motion and their loci.

The Critique of the Existence of Internal Senses as Separate Faculties

Al-Rāzī set his critical gaze upon a framework of the scheme of internal senses that found its ultimate form in Avicenna and remained influential throughout the Middle Ages: (1) Common sense (*ḥiss al-mushtarak*), (2) Retentive imagination (*khayāl/muṣawwira*), (3) Compositive imagination/cogitation (*mutakhayyila/mufakkira*), (4) Estimation (*wahm*), and (5) Memory (*dhikr/ḥifẓ*).²⁶ He takes it

scheme, in which they were relegated to the single faculty of *phantasia*. See Şihabüddin es-Sühreverdi, *Hikmetü'l-işrāk-İşrāk Felsefesi*, trans. Eyüp Bekir Yazıcı and Üsmetullah Sami (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2015), 524-34.

25 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 247.

26 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 244-46. While there are minor differences in this general narrative on faculties, it can be traced over Avicenna's foundational texts. See Ibn Sinā, "Maqāla fi al-naḥs (Mabḥath 'an al-quwwa al-naḥsāniyya)," in *Aḥwāl al-naḥs: Risāla fi al-naḥs wa-baqā'ihā wa-ma'ādihā*, ed. Aḥmad Fu'ād Aḥwānī (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1952), 156-58, 171; idem, *al-Mabda' wa-al-ma'ād*, ed. 'Abd Allāh Nūrānī (Tehran: Mu'assasa-i Muṭāla'at-i Islāmī, 1984), 93; idem, "Risāla fi al-naḥs wa-baqā'ihā wa-ma'ādihā," in *Aḥwāl al-naḥs*, ed. A. F. Aḥwānī (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1952), 57-69; idem, *al-Shifā: al-Naḥs*, 39-51; idem, *Kitāb al-Najāt fi al-ḥikma al-mantiqiyya wa-al-ṭabi'iyya wa-al-ilāhiyya*, ed. Mājid Fakhry (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadida, 1985), 196-231 (hereafter *al-Najāt*); idem, *Uyūn al-ḥikma*, ed. Muwaffaq Fawzi al-Jabr (Damascus: Dār al-yanābī, 1996), 76-84. Avicenna's theory of internal senses has been (and continue to be) the subject of both brief and extended studies. For a sample, see Robert E. Hall, "A Decisive Example of the Influence of Psychological Doctrine in Islamic Science and Culture: Some Relationships Between Ibn Sina's Psychology, Other Branches of His Thought, and Islamic Teachings," 68-69; Deborah L. Black, "Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions," *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 219-58; Deborah L. Black, "Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations," *Topoi* 19 (2000): 59-75; Perviz Morewedge, "Epistemology: The Internal Sense of Prehension (*Wahm*) in Islamic Philosophy," *Essays in Islamic Philosophy Theology and Mysticism* (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2003), 139-79; Robert E. Hall, "Intellect, Soul, and Body in Ibn Sina: Systematic Synthesis and Development of the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Galenic Theories," in *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam*, ed. Jon McGinnis (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004), 65-69, 73-81; Robert E. Hall, "The *Wahm* in Avicenna's Psychology," in *Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 533-49; Carla Di Martino, "Memory and Recollection in Ibn Sina's and Ibn Rushd's Philosophical Texts Translated into Latin in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries: A Perspective on the Doctrine of the Internal Senses in Arabic Psychological Science," in

up by going over Avicenna's justification for limiting the internal senses to five. Thus, the five faculties that comprehend the particulars are either perceptive or operative (*mutaşarrif*).²⁷ If it is perceptive, it perceives either a particular form, just like we imagine someone's form of someone after he has disappeared, or particular meanings, like one of us perceives friendship or enmity toward another. The faculty that perceives the forms of sensible things is called *common sense*, and its repository is called the *formative imagination*. The faculty that perceives the particular meanings is called *estimation*, and its repository is the *memory*. The operative faculty, if run by estimation, is called *compositive imagination*, and if run by the intellect, *cogitation*.²⁸ At first glance, one may suppose that both al-Rāzī and Avicenna adopted the same scheme of internal senses. But al-Rāzī's criticisms concerning the soul and the theory of knowledge mentioned in the previous section, as well as his criticisms of internal senses will be tackled in this section, prevent such a facile judgment.

Al-Rāzī's most fundamental criticism of the Avicennian internal senses vis-à-vis this scheme was presented in *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* to justify the analysis of internal senses without mentioning the external senses in Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt*. In al-Rāzī's

Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, ed. H. Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 1-15; Deborah L. Black, "Rational Imagination: Avicenna on the Cogitative Power," in *Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 13th Century*, ed. Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp (Paris: J. Vrin, 2013), 59-81; eadem, "Imagination, Particular Reason, and Memory: The Role of Internal Senses in Human Cognition," in *Workshop on Varieties of Cognitive Theory in the Later Middle Ages: Towards a Status Quaestionis*, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, February 19, 2010; Dimitri Gutas, "İbn Sînâ Felsefesinde Hayâl-Oluşturucu Güç ve Aşkın Bilgi," in *İbn Sînâ'nın Mirası*, trans. M. Cüneyt Kaya (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2010), 149-68; Peter E. Pormann, "Avicenna on Medical Practice, Epistemology, and the Physiology of the Inner Senses," in *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. P. Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 102-07.

- 27 Al-Rāzī employs the word "operative" (*mutaşarrif*), which is not used by Avicenna, for compositive imagination. However, this usage does not seem to be critical. Avicenna distinguishes the internal senses in order to retain perception only or perception with action. He also expresses this distinction by saying that certain faculties are only perceptive and retentive, whereas others are also functional. Thus common sense, which is first in the order of his quinary scheme of internal senses that receive and retain the data coming from the five external senses, and the memory, which is last in the order that restores the meanings processed by compositive imagination and estimation and perceived by estimation, are only retentive and regarded as non-functional. In return, the faculties of compositive imagination and estimation play active roles as that faculties contain both perception and action. Ibn Sînâ, *al-Najāt*, 200-201; Ibn Sînâ, 'Uyün al-ḥikma, 78-79. Al-Rāzī uses "operative" for what Avicenna calls compositive imagination/cogitation, and by "operation" he means the functions of composition and discrimination on particular forms and meanings that are undertaken by compositive imagination/cogitation in Avicennian parlance. Therefore, it seems to be only a terminological difference.
- 28 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 246-47. For descriptions of al-Rāzī concerning the scheme of the internal senses, see al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, 2:250-51; al-Rāzī, *al-Nafs*, 77; al-Rāzī, *al-Mulakkhaṣ fi al-ḥikma wa-al-mantiq*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Şehid Ali Paşa 1730, 155b (hereafter *al-Mulakkhaṣ*); idem, *Sharḥ 'uyün al-ḥikma*, II, 243.

view, there is a debate over the existence of internal senses but not one over the external ones. In order to make sense of why Avicenna only analyzed the former, he next argues that the only benefit of studying the external senses is to learn about them, whereas speaking of the internal senses has the further benefit of discussing issues like conditions of prophethood and revelation or reporting from the unknown.²⁹ In fact, in a way al-Rāzī gives away his own view as soon as he puts forward this first issue. For even if we necessarily know of the existence of the sorts of different perceptions that Avicenna supposed were realized by separate internal senses, one can also suppose a single faculty for which these different perceptions by various organs are materialized.³⁰ After this, he moves on to point-by-point criticisms that can be made against Avicenna's arguments for each internal sense's existence and tries to buttress what he considered as a probability in the beginning.

The Criticism of Common Sense (Ḥiss al-mushtarak)

Avicenna, who defined common sense as the faculty that receives the sensible forms transmitted from the five external senses, argued for its existence by using the example of a drop falling down: a drop falls down after a straight line and a point rotating fast after a circular line. Following from invisibility and indiscernibility of absolute non-existence, he suggests that this line must have a presence in one of the faculties that sees it. But this faculty is not the eye, for only the form of what is present in the exterior is depicted in the eye, and this line has no such presence in the exterior. Avicenna therefore supposes that there has to be another faculty for it. He rules out the soul, because particular corporeal forms cannot be imprinted in the soul's substance, and decides upon common sense as the faculty that actually carries out this perception. Different forms of the drop appear during its presence in different locations, and it is perceived as a straight line when received together in the common sense. The condition of *the non-existence of the straight line formed by the drop in the exterior*, which was stated to be the reason for needing a different faculty like common sense in the Avicennian interpretation, is sustained by the form's

29 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 246. While al-Rāzī points out the use of the internal senses as beneficial to the discussion of revelation and prophethood, he himself is not really attentive to the internal senses' functions in the context of these issues in his critique of Avicennian internal senses. This reflection raises the questions of whether limiting the utility of internal senses to issues like revelation and prophethood excludes their other functions, whether this situation has to do with al-Rāzī's critical perspective of abstraction, or whether al-Rāzī as a theologian assumes that the roles that the faculty of compositive imagination plays with respect to prophethood, revelation, vision, or reporting from the unknown.

30 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 247.

appearance when the drop is present in another location and its disappearance, when transmitted to the common sense, then the formation of a new form when the drop shifted to another location and, in turn, its transmission to the common sense after the previous one.³¹ Al-Rāzī objects to it thus:

Why not the perceived straight line shall not be present in the exterior! As an explanation, it is probable to say: When a drop is present in a location, the air surrounding it is shaped by the drop's figure. Then, once the drop moves on and the first part of the air is formed next in another part of the drop, this part of the air is shaped after it before the disappearance of the first part of the air. This also applies to the other airborne parts. Thus, the drop certainly looks like a straight line when this figure remains in the air particles close to one another.³²

In a sense, as he himself says, al-Rāzī exemplifies over air what Avicenna did over location and tries to tell the difference between his and the philosophers' example by their not making any case for air. In addition, al-Rāzī surmises that the probability of the non-existence of some of what is seen in the exterior can also be regarded as applicable to all things that are seen, and that it would repeal the esteem in the existence of sensible things; so that he refutes it as sophistry and ignorance.³³

Another objection that he raises against the existence of common sense follows from the question why the locus of a form, which is said to be perceived by common sense, cannot be the eye or the soul. Avicenna opines that only the form of what is before the eye can be depicted in the eye. Al-Rāzī responds:

Our knowledge of only the form of what is before the eye will be depicted in the eye does not depend on a demonstration, but, to the contrary, on observation and experience. Herein, however, experience applies only after our knowledge of what perceives the falling drop as a line is not the eye because whenever we deem it possible, we never know that the eye perceives what is before it. Then we know that the eye will not perceive what is not before it only if we know that it is not the eye that perceives the drop as a line. If we acquired the knowledge that it is not the eye that perceives the drop as a line from the knowledge that the eye only perceives what is before it, then transference would be necessary. This is, however, invalid. Thus it is not certain that we would be sure to know that it is not the eye that perceives the drop as a line. If the proof of it is not possible, what they [philosophers] say will be invalid.³⁴

31 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 244-45; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 247-48.

32 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 248.

33 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 248-49.

34 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 250.

Al-Rāzī asks a similar question as why it is not soul that perceives the falling drop as a straight line. But as pointed above, he replies that the issue will be proven void later on as he relates it to the Avicennian general principle of the impossibility of imprinting particular corporeal forms in the soul.³⁵

Another criticism that he directed at the existence of the faculty of common sense is articulated via his objections to the perceptive subject's fragmentation across different faculties. On this point, al-Rāzī argues that it is not something in the brain that perceives it when we taste something. But the philosophers claim that common sense is located in the brain's frontal lobe. Even though he lends no credence to it, he deems it possible that what perceives flavours are other organs like nerves, liver, or the stomach, if one can say that what perceives tastes is the brain or something in the brain. His objections continue thus:

Either there is a faculty that carries out sight in the soul that sees, or not. If there is such a faculty, there are two things in us that see one thing when the eye and the common sense perceive it. In that case, our sight is doubled in seeing one thing. However, we observe the contrary. If there is no faculty of sight in the soul that sees, it would be sheer discourse as a token of demonstration, because this discussion would mean in the final analysis that what you call *common sense* I call the *faculty of sight*. Whatever appellation it would be, what follows from it is that there is no entity in humans *that sees things that were apprehended only as a single thing*.³⁶

Consequently, his refutation of common sense's existence fundamentally follows from such questions as why the locus of forms that common sense is supposed to perceive, at least in the Avicennian system, cannot be the eye or the soul.³⁷ Therefore, we can attest to the criticisms of both the existence of a faculty independent from an external sense like the eye, and the common Avicennian view that the particular corporeal forms are not imprinted in the soul, which is stated in al-Rāzī's evaluation of the common sense. After all, the entire Avicennian narrative on the internal senses is built on the perception of particular forms and this perception of particular forms, which could not be accomplished by the soul, is carried out by the internal senses. Al-Rāzī, who wants to relate all perceptions only to the perceptive subject's unitary consciousness, cannot easily adopt this stance

35 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 250.

36 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 255. For al-Rāzī's considerations of common sense, also see idem, *al-Mabāḥith*, 2:335-38; idem, *al-Mulakhkhaṣ*, 156a; idem, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, 2:243-46, 253.

37 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 250. For the details of al-Rāzī's criticisms of the justifications concerning common sense, see al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 248-55; al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, 2:335-38; al-Rāzī, *al-Mulakhkhaṣ*, 156a; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 243-46, 253.

and therefore objects to the parceling of the perceptive subject's holistic perception among different faculties in the specific criticism of common sense, as well as in the general frame of the internal senses.

The Criticism of Retentive Imagination (al-khayāl/muṣawwira)

The main motivation behind Avicenna's setting into play another faculty like retentive imagination is the presumed need of a required faculty for retrieving the forms of sensible things in case those forms fall beyond the external senses' zone of perception and perish. When the common sense discerns these forms in the retentive imagination, they are actually imagined, and when they leave the discernment they remain without consciousness (*shu'ūr*) of them. Subsequently, Avicenna attributes to the retentive imagination the function of *the retrieval of external sensory forms*.³⁸

The first argument that led him to criticize the philosophers' views of the retentive imagination in the person of Avicenna is their presumption that common sense is only a receptor (*qabūl*) of the external sensory form and that the retentive imagination is only a repository (*hifz*) of that form. In this case, they start from an argument and an example in al-Rāzī's narrative. Their argument opens with their primary principle that *only a single thing comes out of a single power*. Their example is water's *power to take* any shape, even though it lacks the *power to keep* that shape.³⁹ Al-Rāzī explains why this argument is weak: "Because the imagination that the philosophers deemed to be the retriever (*hāfiẓ*) of these things has to also be the receiver (*qābil*), for a thing that does not receive it cannot be the retriever of it. Therefore, their supposition that a single faculty cannot be the principle of both reception and retention is void."⁴⁰

On this point, al-Rāzī thinks of even common sense itself as counter-evidence, for although it is a single faculty, it nevertheless perceives forms that are seen, heard, tasted, smelled, and touched. Strongly implicating a connection with a primary principle for both philosophers' views on this point and his objections, al-Rāzī adds that the philosophers' proposition that *only one comes out of one* will be rejected.⁴¹

38 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 245; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 250-51.

39 Ibn Sinā, *al-Nafs*, 44; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 251.

40 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 251.

41 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 251-52. For al-Rāzī's emphasis on the principle of emanation as a backdrop to the philosophers' dispersion of different actions to different faculties, see idem, *al-Nafs*, 75-76. In *al-Mulakhkhaṣ*, he refers to the principle of emanation (156b-157a) and suggests that this principle is the ground rule of the philosophers' understanding of the separateness of faculties. He then lists

The philosophers' second argument for the existence of a faculty other than common sense, like retentive imagination, depends on whether the external sensory forms still exist when the perceptive subject has no consciousness of them, for humans are actually conscious of them when the imaginary forms are *conceived* (*ḥuṣūl*) in the common sense. Then, those forms have to be unconceived in the common sense when they are unknown to humans. In that case, however, if there is no faculty like retentive imagination where those forms can be restored, then the said forms have to be reacquired every time a human turns to the external forms. But philosophers deny that and accept the necessity of another faculty that restores those forms when they are readily available at the moment of common sense turning to them.⁴² Al-Rāzī also finds this argument weak.

This justification is weak, for the argument depends on the common sense's consciousness (*shu'ūr*) of the imaginary forms to have no other significance than the conception (*ḥuṣūl*) of those forms in common sense. However, we explained that the fact of the matter is not as such. Consciousness and perception are relative states. How could we tell that we might be unconscious of these forms when they are conceived in the imagination? If consciousness were not anything beyond the promptness of those forms, [what we say] would be impossible. This is a definite demonstration of the invalidity of what the philosophers say. If the consciousness is definitely something beyond the conception of those forms, then this demonstration would be null. In this respect, it is possible that those forms are conceived permanently in the common sense, but only when the state called consciousness takes place, the consciousness of them is realized, otherwise it would remain ignorant of those forms.⁴³

In a sense, philosophers identified the conception of forms in any faculty with the consciousness of those forms and the non-conception of the forms with the ignorance of forms. However, *consciousness* and *perception* are *relative* – we can also say *relational* – recalling his use of attachment (*ta'alluq*) for perception in passages from the third section of al-Rāzī's *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, where he discusses perception.

his objections and criticisms of this view. al-Rāzī, *al-Mulakḥḥaṣ*, 156b-158a. Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādi also emphasized and criticized the relation between the philosophers' narrative of the soul's faculties and their presuppositions that only a single action comes out of a simple essence. Cf. al-Baghdādi *al-Mu'tabar fī al-ḥikma*, II, 451-53, 457-63. For the relation set by the theologians between the philosophers' principle of "one comes out of one" and the theory of the soul's faculties, see Türker, "Kelām Geleneginde Adudüddin el-Îcî," 303-04.

42 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 252. At this point, al-Rāzī appears to comment on some passages about the differences of common sense and formative imagination in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-naḥs* and *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*. Cf. Ibn Sinā, *al-Nafs*, 154; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 246-47.

43 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 252. For al-Rāzī's statements on the philosophers' arguments for common sense and formative imagination as separate faculties, see idem, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 338-40.

Hence, as can be attested to in the example of retentive imagination, the *conception* of any form in any faculty does not necessitate a consciousness and perception particular to that form; rather, there has to be a relative or relational condition or orientation between the object and the subject of perception and consciousness. As can be inferred, al-Rāzī diverges on this point from Avicenna, who attributes each object of perception to different faculties, assumes a fragmentary perspective of the faculties, and supposes that consciousness and perception are formed in a unitary manner in human consciousness. While Avicenna adheres to the consciousness of the particular forms by common sense as a separate faculty during the forms' presence in the formative imagination, al-Rāzī, who attributes the functions (which Avicenna related to separate faculties) to a single faculty like the soul that allows for the subject's consciousness during the entire course of perception and refutes the existence of any objects of perception and consciousness peculiar to separate faculties, the conception of forms in a single faculty means the perceptive subject's consciousness of them.

Above it was pointed out that philosophers justify the existence of an independent faculty like retentive imagination, in which the external sensory forms are restored, by basing themselves on the probability of whether the forms exist when there is no *consciousness* of the forms. As can be inferred, when the forms themselves are unknown at this point, philosophers, particularly Avicenna, suppose that they exist in the retentive imagination, which is designated as a repository, if they do not exist in the common sense. They further suppose that these forms have to be reacquired each time in there is no faculty that can restore them.⁴⁴ Al-Rāzī criticizes this view, one of the philosophers' basic theses as regards the case of retentive imagination. He justifies his critique of this section, which appears to be a criticism of internal consistency within philosophers' system, based on three objections to the latter's contention of the necessity of reacquiring the forms if there is no faculty like retentive imagination.⁴⁵

After this point, al-Rāzī scrutinizes another of Avicenna's argument for the existence of both common sense and the retentive imagination. This new argument stems from the supposition that a relation between different particulars perceived by the different sensory faculties is necessary, and the existence of a faculty that would fulfil the combinatory function between different particulars. Thus, we are

44 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 252-53.

45 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 253.

capable of commanding the relation between any particular color and any particular taste, and the relation between the voice and the person, when we hear a human voice. In such a case, it would be necessary for the subject, who has command over separate things by linking up those things, to know both because the conception of different things occurs prior to the validation of them. Based on this, philosophers suppose the existence of a faculty within us that perceives the entire percept of external senses as a totality, a faculty that assumes the perception cannot be the external senses, each of which can perceive only a single kind of sensible things. Similarly, we cannot talk of the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqā*), which cannot perceive the particulars, as performing this unitary perception. Therefore, there has to be a faculty that perceives all of the sensory forms that the external senses perceive in a unitary manner, other than the external senses and the rational soul. Philosophers call it common sense, and its repository the retentive imagination.⁴⁶

Al-Rāzī expresses the same refutation with another example, namely, the connection we make between any particular color and any particular taste possessing that color is also made similarly when we judge a singular and particular individual to be a human but not a horse. Thus, the singular individual upon whom we passed judgment becomes a certain and sensible person, and the thing upon which we passed judgment becomes a universal essence. In this matter, al-Rāzī suggests that there is no point in discussing the validity of a judgment made by universals on particulars for three reasons.

First, if one cannot judge the particular by the universal, it would also be impossible to judge that the thing in “this” color is the thing in “that” shape, as in the example of philosophers. Second, al-Rāzī criticizes it along the philosophers’ own premises concerning their adherence to four sorts of predication in logic: particular to particular, universal to universal, particular to universal, and universal to particular. Third, in a sense he takes stock of self-consciousness, and suggests that when we turn over ourselves, we necessarily know the validity of a predication as expressed therein. This is so because our individual being, in the sense of being ourselves, indicates a certain, sensory, singular, and particular thing, whereas the predication of humanity on ourselves indicates a universal essence. Based on these criticisms, al-Rāzī argues that there are two possibilities for the person who judges between two things: he either has to “exhibit the two things that are judged readily available” or not. Saying that it is not necessary invalidates the philosophers’ claim, which means that the judgment on the relation between any

46 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 245; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 253-54.

particular color and any particular taste, if we recall the example in this case, could not be juxtaposed in a single perceptive faculty like common sense. In contrast, if something is to be juxtaposed with the one who judges, then the one who judges a singular individual to be human has to be the one thing or faculty that perceives both the singular individual and the human, albeit the former is particular and the latter is universal. Following the philosophers' presupposition that the rational soul perceives the human, which is universal, al-Rāzī concludes that what perceives the singular individual also has to be the rational soul, so that the rational soul can perceive the particulars. He reasons that the part concerning the soul in the philosophers' justification that the subject's integral and unitary perception concerning the different sensible objects of perception, as in their example, can only be undertaken by common sense, as opposed to the external senses or the soul, is thereby invalidated.⁴⁷

The Criticism of the Compositive Imagination/Cogitation (Mutakhayyila-Mufakkira)

The function of the faculty of compositive imagination, which was deemed to serve the faculty of estimation in the Avicennian system of internal senses, is designated as matching and distinguishing the meanings perceived by estimation and the forms coming from both the external and internal senses. If this faculty is run by the intellect, it is called cogitation (*mufakkira*), and if by estimation it is called the compositive imagination (*mutakhayyila*). For this reason, imagination is regarded as a faculty open to both estimation and intellect via estimation.⁴⁸ Al-Rāzī opens his discussion of the imaginative-cogitative faculties by stating two points of discussion.

Al-Rāzī's first point concerns whether this faculty is different and independent from the others. He notes the philosophers justify the compositive imagination's existence by relying on their supposition, which once again follows their own principle as well as that of Avicenna, that two effects will not originate from a single faculty and that the compositive imagination is an operative (*mutaṣarrif*) faculty,

47 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 254-55. For al-Rāzī's more extended assessments and criticisms of the formative imagination, see idem, *al-Mulakkkhaṣ*, 156a; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, 2:246-48. In *al-Maṭālib*, however, he speaks of the imagination as a human feature with the power to fabricate certain marvelous (*ajība*) artifices. This power has both a principle and an organ. The principle matches the imagination, which is capable of combining forms, and the organ matches the body. See al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib*, VII, 173.

48 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 245.

whereas the others are perceptive. While al-Rāzī refers to his previous criticism of the principle of a single effect coming out of a single faculty, he argues that this principle is faulty from three angles.⁴⁹

At this point, he first criticizes the philosophers' principle of attributing different functions to distinct faculties by means of the relation he established between the compositive imagination and consciousness. If this faculty, which runs operations like combination and decomposition over forms and meanings, has consciousness of the things that it operates on, one must accept a single faculty as both perceptive and operative, which would cause philosophers to contradict with their general principles. If we contend that the faculty that operates over forms and meanings has no consciousness of the things upon which it operates, al-Rāzī replies that that would be equivalent to the view that the compositive imagination cannot conceive of the truth of the matter. He finds this inconsistent with respect to the philosophers' aforementioned presumption that "the faculty that judges two things has to contain both [of those things] that it passes judgment on."⁵⁰ If the compositive imagination carries out operations over forms and meanings while remaining unconscious of the things that it operates on and therefore unable to conceive of them, this principle would be contradicted.

His second angle is also related to this inconsistency. Thus estimation, a perceptive faculty that uses the compositive imagination and cogitation, means that the estimative faculty operates (*taṣarruf*) on these faculties. Therefore, it seems that estimation is both perceptive and operative. To second that with another example, he notes that the rational soul is a faculty that can perceive intelligibles and operative over body.⁵¹ He claims that this point is also incompatible with the philosophers' presumption that a single effect springs from a single faculty.

The third angle of his criticism is posited against the philosophers' view that some of the soul's faculties are perceptive and others are operative faculties. In this main scheme, philosophers also divide the faculties of perception into two and place the compositive imagination as a faculty of internal perception under the perceptive faculties. Al-Rāzī infers that this case also invalidates the philosophers' view of a single faculty that cannot be both perceptive and operative.⁵²

49 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 262.

50 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 262.

51 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 262.

52 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 262.

The second point of discussion with which al-Rāzī identified the imaginative/cogitative faculties is concerned with these faculties running the estimative faculty. He criticizes the philosophers for their metaphorical use of “service” without further clarification based on demonstration.⁵³

As one can notice, Avicenna’s scheme presents compositive imagination and cogitation as intermediary faculties that allow the soul to operate on forms and meanings via the processes of composition and decomposition. Al-Rāzī, who does not agree with this, criticizes the functions of combination and discrimination between particular forms and meanings by means of the imaginative/cogitative faculties in a later section. Here he criticizes the Avicennian view that the soul operates on particular forms and meanings first by means of the estimative faculty and then with its cause by means of the cogitative faculty. Avicenna provides the reason for soul’s operation on particular forms and senses only by means of other faculties: The soul is receptive to intellectual forms. Again, al-Rāzī senses an inconsistency in the latter’s presumptions. As a probable objection, the soul’s ability to perceive particular forms and meanings invalidates what the philosophers say about the faculties and the soul’s use of different faculties, for al-Rāzī suggests that in a case where the soul does not perceive particular forms and meanings, it would have no command over them, and one cannot have command over something if one does not know it.⁵⁴

Al-Rāzī does not altogether ignore a probable response from the philosophers, but he is unable to accept it. The answer relates the soul’s command over particular forms and meanings to the cogitative faculty: The soul strives to use the cogitative faculty that it knows only in universals over particular forms and meanings that it knows also only in universals, which necessitates a particularistic command from the soul’s universalistic will that the cogitative faculty will have over particular forms and meanings. At first glance, the Avicennian system does contain some uncertainties in such cases as to whether soul could perceive (or could know) particular forms and meanings or have any command over them. The soul knows only in universals both the cogitative faculty and the particular forms and meanings upon which cogitation will operate; however, this necessitates an operation concerning the particulars from the soul’s universalistic knowledge. Al-

53 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 262-63. For al-Rāzī’s assessment of the imaginative/cogitative faculties, see idem, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 282-84; al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 341-42; al-Rāzī, *al-Mulakhkhas*, 156b; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ ‘uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 250-52.

54 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 282-83.

Rāzī criticizes and rejects the question over the dual distinction of whether the soul could know the nature of each particular that is perceived by the body's perceptive faculty, for if it already knows the essence of the particulars that the said particular faculty perceives in this case, then it would already know the universalistic essences before employing estimation or cogitation. If the soul already knows these universalistic essences without the estimative faculty, this knowledge is sufficient for the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. Thus, the soul would not need the particulars or the knowledge that would be obtained from them. In al-Rāzī's opinion, if the soul does not know the nature of things perceived by estimation or the senses, it could not rely on the cogitative faculty in tasks involving composition and decomposition over particulars. Finding the soul's use of the cogitative faculty inconsistent and inexplicable with respect to the Avicennian system, he rejects it.⁵⁵

The Criticism of Estimation (wahn)

According to Avicenna, estimation is designated as a faculty that perceives particular meanings that are present in sensible things, but that are not sensible or perceivable in themselves. His standard examples are a sheep's perception of the meaning of enmity in a certain, concrete, singular, and particular wolf in particulars; the ram's perception of a particular unperceivable meaning in the sheep; or the people's perception of compassion and friendship that they show each other.⁵⁶

Pointing out two issues about the estimative faculty that need to be discussed, al-Rāzī uses them to criticize estimation's existence as an independent faculty. The first issue has to do with the explanation of how this faculty differs from common sense and the formative imagination. First, al-Rāzī first suggests that there is no justification for the philosophers' general presumption that a simple faculty cannot maintain two kinds of perception since they hold the principle that *only one comes out of one*. He then refutes the premise.⁵⁷ In addition, he notes the need for explaining why the functions, which they attribute to different faculties, are not carried out by the soul – an issue about which Avicenna seems to have remained largely silent.

55 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 283-84.

56 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 245; Ibn Sinā, *al-Nafs*, 45, 166-67, 182-85. There is a widespread contention that Avicenna is the one who added the estimative faculty to the scheme of internal senses; however, its citation in this regard in Ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī's (d. 247/861) *Firdaws al-ḥikma* predates Avicenna. See Ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī, *Firdaws al-ḥikma fī al-ṭibb*, ed. Muḥammad Zubayr al-Ṣiddīqī (Berlin: Maṭba' Aftāb, 1928), 76-78. For al-Rāzī's assessment of the estimative faculty, see al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 342-43; al-Rāzī, *al-Mulakhkhaṣ*, 156b; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 249.

57 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 256.

All that the latter said, in al-Rāzī's opinion, while justifying his contention that the soul does not perceive the sensibles, is that one could only be certain that particular meanings concerning the sensible things are only perceived by a corporeal faculty if one could be certain that what perceives the sensibles is not the soul.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, according to al-Rāzī, Avicenna's best explanation concerning the existence and necessity of an independent faculty that perceives particular meanings, like the estimative faculty, can be stated in the following terms.

This enmity present in the wolf is perceived with respect to either its presence in the wolf, or else [in general]. If it is the first, the one who perceives the enmity with respect to its presence in the wolf has to perceive the wolf too, because the knowledge of the enmity with respect to its presence in the wolf depends on the knowledge of that wolf. But it became certain that what perceives that wolf is a body or corporeal, then the one that perceives the enmity has to be a body or corporeal, too. But if the enmity is perceived not *with respect to its presence in the wolf*, the perception of enmity takes place *with respect to its being enmity*. Enmity qua enmity, however, is a universal. However, our discussion is not about universalistic enmity, but on the contrary, about the particularistic enmity.⁵⁹

But al-Rāzī calls this weak and criticizes the explanation that expresses Avicenna's justification vis-à-vis the estimative faculty in full and can be understood in the best light as such. Al-Rāzī's critique at this point is directed toward the confusion among common sense, the retentive imagination, and estimation in the perception of particulars, for any faculty that perceives a particular meaning of enmity would also perceive the particular wolf in which the particular meaning is or is not present. If the first is valid, what perceives the wolf has to be the faculty that perceives the enmity. But Avicenna attributes the perception of the wolf to common sense or the retentive imagination. Therefore, al-Rāzī concludes that if the one that perceives the meaning and the one that perceives the object in which that meaning is present is one and the same faculty, then the faculties like common sense or retentive imagination that perceive the wolf would also perceive the meaning of enmity present in the wolf. When a faculty actually thinks of the meaning of enmity in a form, it would also think of similar meanings incessantly. As a result, when there is a faculty or faculties that can perceive particular forms, the existence of a separate faculty for the perception of particular meanings cannot be spoken of with certainty.⁶⁰

58 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 256-57.

59 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 257.

60 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 257.

The second aspect that lends support to al-Rāzī's first issue is that a faculty that perceives a particular meaning also perceives the particular wolf in which that particular meaning is present. In his opinion, one cannot infer the necessity of the corporeality of the faculty that perceives the enmity based on the corporeality of the faculty that perceives the wolf. At this juncture, as the possibility of what perceives the particular meanings could also be common sense or the retentive imagination arises in the first probability, in this second probability it concludes that what perceives the particular meanings could also be the soul. Al-Rāzī objects to inserting an independent faculty like estimation by in a sense telling Avicenna on account of both that common sense and the retentive imagination would suffice if a corporeal faculty perceives these particular meanings, and that the soul could perceive it in case it is not necessary for a corporeal faculty to perceive particular meanings.⁶¹

The second issue al-Rāzī picks up follows an inquiry concerning the particularity and universality of meanings that Avicenna supposes that the estimative faculty perceives. Al-Rāzī's example concerns the friendship (*ṣadāqa*) between a father and a son, for one can arrive at the consciousness of friendship only in universals, even if it is particular in itself between a father and a son. Moreover, friendship is an essence that does not exclude mutuality, although it is particularistic with respect to its presence in the son as an individual. The condition that can be attested to in this and all similar examples is that the *res extensa* that these meanings are present in is particularistic, whereas what the perceiving subject makes of them is universalistic. Al-Rāzī holds that what are perceived as particular meanings can be predicated on many particular things. If someone is conscious of *any friendship* between him and his son but not of *this particular friendship* personally between himself and his son, the meaning perceived by estimation has to be particularistic. But al-Rāzī finds it hard to demonstrate this. Given that we cannot point out meanings like friendship by sense and perception, we cannot say that humans and animals are conscious of *that particular friendship* only with respect to its being *that particular friendship*.⁶² To summarize, al-Rāzī's criticism is that the meanings as percepts of estimative

61 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 257.

62 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 257-58. The estimative faculty was criticized in problem 18 of al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* before al-Rāzī. See Gazzālī, *Tehāfütü'l-Felâsife: Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, trans. Mahmut Kaya and Hüseyin Sarıoğlu (İstanbul: Klasik Yay., 2005), 178-81; For some comments on al-Ghazālī's criticisms, cf. Timothy J. Gianotti, *Al-Ghazali's Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul: Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Ihya* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 95-103; Frank Griffel, "Al-Ghazālī's Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into Aš'arite Theology," *Arabic Science and Philosophy* 14 (2004): 131.

faculty that Avicenna established for the perception of particular meanings is more similar to universals than it is to particulars, for these meanings can be present in different percepts of estimation and can be perceived. Following from the observation that the estimative faculty could perceive general and universalistic aspects of the meanings, al-Rāzī objects to Avicenna's establishment of a faculty like estimation that responds to the perception of particular meanings.

The Criticism of Memory (Ḥāfiẓa/dhākira)

The last Avicennian scheme of internal senses, memory, is identified with various words, among them *ḥāfiẓa*, *dhākira*, and *mutadhakkira*.⁶³ In his first assessment of the faculty of memory, which restores the meanings perceived by estimation, al-Rāzī notes that the relevant positive and negative criticisms have already been made in the section on the retentive imagination.⁶⁴ In a sense, his critique relates to Avicenna's presumption of *the retentive imagination as the repository of external forms* and *memory as the repository of meanings* perceived by the estimative faculty. Just as al-Rāzī criticizes the distinction made between *the faculty that perceives forms* and *the faculty that restores forms*, he also takes the distinction between *the faculty that perceives forms* and *the faculty that perceives meanings* with a grain of salt. Furthermore, if we recall that al-Rāzī fundamentally opposes Avicenna's attribution of different functions to separate faculties, one can say that he would even object to the distinction made between *the faculty that perceives forms* and *the faculty that perceives meanings*. When he resumes his assessment of memory, however, he focuses on the similarities and differences between remembrance (*ḥāfiẓa*) and recollection (*dhākira*), for al-Rāzī based his discussion on the difference of retaining the meanings that estimation perceive from their retrieval after they had perished. If it is necessary to attribute each action to an independent faculty as set in the Avicennian scheme of faculties, the faculty of remembrance that restores meanings has to be different from the faculty of recollection that retrieves meanings after they perish. Al-Rāzī suggests that the number of internal senses would then be six then, not five.⁶⁵

63 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 246; Ibn Sinā, *al-Nafs*, 45, 167-68, 185-87. For al-Rāzī's assessment of memory, see al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 343-44; al-Rāzī, *al-Mulakhkhas*, 156b; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 249-50.

64 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 258.

65 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 263. Also see, al-Rāzī, *al-Nafs*, 76.

The Criticism against the Internal Senses' Functions in Movement

The internal senses à la Avicenna are functional for the soul with respect to both the cognition and the movement of the body. In addition, he contends that there are certain stages and degrees as to how the soul moves the body and the actualization of any action. Al-Rāzī analyzes these stages as *the principles of voluntary movements* along four degrees – (1) the power in muscles as the most proximate principle of the mobilizing powers, (2) resolution (*ijmā*), (3) powers of passion and rage, and (4) consciousness of the benefit or harm of the act, real or unreal, respectively⁶⁶ – and states that humans vary by degree.

There are similarities of beings in the superlunary and sublunary realms inasmuch as, according to Avicenna, they have differences. In this respect, he explains the movements of celestial beings that have intellect, soul, and substance and of humans that have intellect, soul, and body in similar forms.⁶⁷ According to this illustration, the heavens presumably have movers that possess both particular and universal wills. Thus, there are sensory and intellectual *perceptions*, sensory and intellectual *wills*, and sensory and intellectual *meanings* in both of these realms.⁶⁸ Similarly, Avicenna concedes the existence of a rational soul that moves and governs the heaven, but supposes that it is not the intellect but the soul. He contends that the heaven does not have an abstract intellect but a rational soul, is the perfection of all things that seek to take an action with that action, and that an imperfect thing that perfects cannot be an intellect. One of his system's basic premises in the context of explaining how a particular movement takes place in the heavens is that the heaven has a principle and a corporeal faculty that possesses a particular will, based on the principle that *a particular thing does not come out of a universal essence and objective*.⁶⁹ At this point, al-Rāzī again raises objections against the Avicennian system's basic premises and states that *the presumption of the existence of a corporeal principle that possesses particular will for the particular movements of the heavens' souls* causes inconsistencies within the system. On the one hand, philosophers suggest that the objective of the heaven's movement is to resemble the abstract intellects and accept that the motivation to resemble intellects is possible only

66 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 318; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 318-19. On the functions of internal senses with respect to action, see Yunus Cengiz, "İbn Sinā'nın Zihin Felsefesinde Eylem Süreci," *AÜİFD* 55/2 (2014): 101-05, 110-14.

67 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 325.

68 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 322; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 322-23.

69 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 326; Ibn Sinā, *al-Mabda' wa-al-ma'ād*, 29.

after perceiving what it strives to resemble. But on the other hand, if what moves the substance of the heaven as a matter of system is a corporeal faculty, there will appear its inability to perceive abstract things and, accordingly its inability to strive for intellect, for if something is not known, striving for it is impossible.⁷⁰

Al-Rāzī lists certain requisite points of agreement to avoid the blind alleys to which this issue leads: (1) *there is no need of particular perceptions for particular actions*, (2) *it is valid that the particular perceptions are in abstract substance*, (3) *it is valid that the corporeal faculty perceives abstract things*, and (4) *the objective of heaven's movement is not striving to resemble intellects*. If any one of these are agreed to, he claims, it would mean that the philosophers have abandoned one of their primary views.⁷¹ Thus, it appears that al-Rāzī mainly targets the philosophers' ambivalent idiom once again. Philosophers wish to make unambiguous distinctions between *sensory* and *intellectual*, *particular* and *universal*, *corporeal* and *incorporeal*, but nevertheless adopt precarious stances that upset the ground rules they have established at the start, between distinctions on topics like the perception of particulars or the actualization of particular movements. The Avicennian views invoked here can be considered, for the greater part, in the context of the heavens' particular movements and al-Rāzī's critique of this view in parallel with the description of the human rational soul's moving the body and the requirement of particular corporeal faculties to do so. For this reason, al-Rāzī's critique of falling into intra-system inconsistencies while searching for particular corporeal powers to actualize particular movements in the heavens can be adapted to the Avicennian stance that the human soul possesses myriad particular corporeal powers both in perception and in movement. While Avicenna wishes to presume *particular corporeal faculties for the emergence of the particular from the universal*, *particular will from the universal will*, *particular will and movement from the universal will* in the perceptions and movements of both celestial souls and human souls, al-Rāzī criticizes such explanations because of the changes in his own theory of knowledge, as noted in the section on the epistemological backdrop of his critique of internal senses. He therefore assumes a critical stand against particular corporeal faculties as independent faculties, in the process of the actualization of movement, as in perception, and against internal senses, even if he does not altogether deny their functions.

70 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 326-29.

71 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 329.

The Criticism against the Organs of the Internal Senses and Their Locations

Since the Avicennian scheme of internal senses is conveyed over Galenic anatomy for the major part, it became commonplace to presume that each internal sense has a different location in a different domain of the brain.⁷² Al-Rāzī's criticism of these locations is multi-layered. First, he deems it possible that the perceptions of the said faculties can take place not in the brain as conveyed, but at other parts of the body.⁷³ Second, he objects to presenting the attempt to locate these faculties as demonstrative on the grounds that doing so is empirical. Third, he refutes Avicenna's religious or teleological interpretation that the latter might have posited to buttress his final opinion in the second stage, probably due to his argument that the knowledge concerning the issue is empirical.

Al-Rāzī's criticism of locating the internal senses as Avicenna does first appears when he expresses his criticisms of common sense, which is based on the philosophers' presumption that the forms tasted are among the things perceived by common sense, by means of which we perceive different external sensory forms in a holistic manner, and that common sense is located at the brain's frontal lobe. In al-Rāzī's opinion, the place of the object of perception that comes from something tasted is not the brain, for if one can say that it is located there, one can also speak of the probability that what conducts perception is any part of the body, like the nerves, the liver, or the soul.⁷⁴

Al-Rāzī criticizes Avicenna's two expositions about the location of the internal senses in the brain. Avicenna holds that whenever there is a malady in any place of the brain that is matched by some deterioration in the states of the faculty that is supposed to be located there, the deteriorating faculty is located in the disordered sector of the brain. Al-Rāzī finds this justification weak, for, according to him, it is possible that these faculties are incorporeal. Moreover, even if they are corporeal, they can be located at a place other than the one Avicenna designated for them. Once again, al-Rāzī's criticism is leveled by means of the latter's own presumptions. Thus, the deterioration of the actions of a faculty associated with a sector of the brain if that sector exhibits disorder, al-Rāzī suggests, might be due to that location being the organ of that faculty. In other words, the relevant sector of the brain exhibits

72 Ibn Sinā, *al-Ishārāt*, 245.

73 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 255.

74 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 255.

disorder, the organ of the faculty associated with that sector degrades, and finally the actions of the faculty deteriorate. Another of al-Rāzī's examples is the presumption that intellectual perception deteriorates following the brain's disorder, even if the presence of reasoning faculty in the brain is not presumed. In a sense, the actions of a faculty that has no corporeal space in the brain, if not the faculty itself, might deteriorate due to the disorder at the relevant sector of the brain.⁷⁵ Therefore, al-Rāzī appears to distinguish between the faculties and the organs of those faculties. Thus, although it might be possible to pinpoint corporeal locations for the faculties' organs, the faculties themselves might not have a corporeal location. If this is the case, then the malady in a certain sector of the brain cannot be a certain proof of the presence of any faculty there because the actualization of deterioration in the faculty's function or action of a faculty does not require a material space for the faculty itself, but might run through the body's organs.

He also criticized Avicenna's second exposition concerning the faculties' location, which links these locations to God's (*ṣāni*) work. Avicenna stated that common sense and the retentive imagination are located at the brain's frontal lobe because of the relation between these two faculties and the external senses that are located in the face. The mystery of the presence of estimation and memory in the middle and at the back of the brain is the distance of the relations of these two faculties with the external senses. The rationale for the presence of compositive imagination, which is responsible for the composition and decomposition of forms and meanings, in the middle of the faculties is its orientation toward the imaginary forms, the meanings in the memory, and the operations of composition and decomposition between forms and meanings, when so desired.⁷⁶

In a general sense, al-Rāzī finds Avicenna's words about the internal senses' location rhetorical and without any continuity. He opines that there are external inconsistencies and that no reason will make the presence of any faculty at a different place more appropriate than at another place. Al-Rāzī supposes that these opinions on the faculties' location are not proper for analytical works.⁷⁷ As much as can be inferred, even if al-Rāzī does not really deny the actualization of the perceptions, supposedly carried out by the internal senses, in different parts of the body, he objects to assigning determined, particular places to them as well as to presenting it as a demonstration in the Avicennian sense, and implies that

75 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 263-64.

76 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 246.

77 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 264. For the details of al-Rāzī's critique of the internal senses' location, see al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 255, 259-64.

it is empirical. He also rejects the hierarchical relation that Avicenna establishes between the faculties and views each faculty possibly on a par with others as part and parcel of the human faculties of perception.⁷⁸ Consequently, al-Rāzī first criticizes the existence of internal senses as independent faculties and then the Avicennian stance that the internal senses need to be singular and corporeal faculties in order for movement to take place – a result of the steadfast distinction that is presumed to exist between universality and particularity. By the same token, he objects to hierarchical relations. Lastly, he argues against the Avicennian stance on the internal senses' different locations in the brain.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Interpretation of Internal Sensations

After his specific criticisms of the internal senses in the context of the epistemological backdrop stated above, al-Rāzī presents his general critique of the internal senses and his own views. His first criticisms of Avicenna's views concerning the internal senses originates from the occasionally evinced ambiguity in the latter's statements about the existence of different faculties. Avicenna talks of faculties that *perceive* or *restore* different objects of perception or *run operations of composition and decomposition* between them, justifies the presence of different internal sense as in this scheme, and uses expressions in certain places for the existence of faculties that can substitute for one another in different registers. For example, he seems to say in *al-Nafs* of *al-Shifā'* that the estimative faculty is, in a sense, the faculties of cogitation (*mufakkira*), compositive imagination (*mutakhayyila*), and retrieving memory (*mutadhakkira*) (remembrance [*hāfīzah*] and recollection [*dhākira*] in *al-Ishārāt*) with respect to its nature. In that case, estimation appears to be a commanding faculty vis-à-vis *its essence*, and compositive imagination and memory vis-à-vis *its movements and actions*. Therefore, this single faculty is compositive imagination *with respect to its operation over forms and meanings* and retrieving memory *compared to where this operation ends up*. Remembrance functions like the repository of estimation.⁷⁹

78 Cengiz, "Nefs Çözümlemesi Açısından Fahreddin er-Rāzī'nin İbn Sīnā ile İlişkisi," 444-47. Cengiz expounds on al-Rāzī's question of whether the soul perceives particular and corporeal things (*al-Mabāhith*, 2:330) and asks: "Do the sensory perceptions sight, imagination, estimation not conflate with intellectual perceptions, or is there an activity where sensory forms intermingle with intellectual forms in the course of perception?" While Avicenna opts for the former, al-Rāzī inclines to the latter. Therefore, one cannot speak of a hierarchical relation similar to what Avicenna imagined between the sensory and intellectual faculties of perception in a conception of perception in which all perceptions are conflated and each is a different function of the soul.

79 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Nafs*, 168-69; In his *al-Ta'liqāt*, which consists of his notes on Aristotle's *Peri Psychēs*, Avicenna points out that Aristotle classifies [functions] devoted to active (*fā'il*) faculties like estimation and cogitation, and to myriad faculties like formative imagination and recollection under compositive

Immediately after going over the Avicennian evidence for the existence of internal senses as independent faculties one by one, al-Rāzī reckons the conceptual ambiguities evident in some of Avicenna's expressions as an indicator of the latter's problems with the internal senses.⁸⁰ In al-Rāzī's point of view, Avicenna expends much effort to set up different actions with different faculties only to adopt, when it is convenient, an idiom implying that the different faculties are in fact differentiations in the functions of a single faculty vis-à-vis its essence. In a sense, this causes him to slip into inconsistency. At the end of his critique of the internal senses, al-Rāzī lays out what we may call his basic premise and lists his justifications to support it. At each point, in a sense he presents a critique of the internal senses as seen by Avicenna (i.e., independent faculties) and attributes the pertinent function to the soul, for al-Rāzī's main thesis is that the soul perceives everything that is subject to perception.

First, al-Rāzī reminds the readers of a rational principle that the philosophers also accept: *A faculty that passes judgment on two things has to contain within itself both of the things that it has judged.* Here, al-Rāzī maintains that a human can judge a thing in this color to have this taste, and, having this taste, it is this thing that is touched. In line with the above principle, the one who passes a judgment on two things must contain those two things (i.e., color and taste), within itself. Therefore, there has to be a single thing that perceives what the external senses perceived.⁸¹ At first glance, these statements that note a single thing that perceives different external sensory qualia might justifiably remind one of the common sense presented in the Avicennian scheme of the internal senses, for the function conveyed here is the same as that which Avicenna attributed to common sense. Thus, one might ask what the criticism is here. However, if remember his basic premise, as stated prior to these points, that the soul perceives all percepts, al-Rāzī's obvious motivation here and at the successive points is to attribute all perceptions to the soul.

Second, al-Rāzī contends that after seeing a human, when we imagine the form of that human and then see the person again, we judge that what we imagined is the image of the person we see. Following the principle of containing within oneself that which one has passed judgment on, he argues that the one who sees what is seen and

imagination. See Ibn Sinā, "al-Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥawāshī Kitāb al-Nafs li-Aristūṭālis," in *Sharḥ Kitābi al-Aṭhūlūjiyā wa-al-nafs li-Aristū*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Badawī (Paris: Dār Bibliyūn, 2009), 168.

80 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 263. Also see idem, *al-Mabāḥith*, 2:344.

81 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 264-65.

the one who imagines it after its disappearance must be one and the same thing in order to make the judgment that what is imagined and what is seen are the same.⁸²

Third, al-Rāzī also attributes the function of the estimative faculty on the grounds that one can judge the existence of the meaning of enmity in a certain person and friendship in another. A person who judges the existence of a particular meaning of enmity in a certain person has to perceive both that meaning and that person because of it, for making such a judgment necessitates both the knowledge of that person and that meaning of enmity. Al-Rāzī opines that only the soul perceives it.⁸³

Fourth, al-Rāzī assesses the functions that Avicenna attributed to the faculties of compositive imagination and cogitation, which enables us to run operations of composition and decomposition between different forms and meanings. Such operations between two things necessitate our consciousness of each of the two. If this is the case, then one can speak of the existence of a single thing that runs all of these operations. In that case, one single thing perceives something as imagination after it perishes, and the different particular meanings in sensibles like enmity and friendship as estimation. The same thing operates the functions of composition and decomposition between forms and meanings. Consequently, al-Rāzī suggests that all of the perceptions that Avicenna distributed among many faculties in various respects are for a single thing and faculty only.⁸⁴

Last, al-Rāzī claims that even the intellectual perception is undertaken by a single thing and faculty that perform the perceptions listed above because we can judge someone human. If so, any judgment that will be passed on the relation between two things necessitates the conception of each thing. Then, just as in the sorts of perceptions given above, there is a single thing that perceives both the universalistic human or humanity and the particular human being in this sort of perception too. Whatever perceives the particular human being similarly perceives each of the different objects of perception listed here.⁸⁵

82 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 265.

83 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 265.

84 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 264-65.

85 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 264-66. In *al-Mabāḥith*, al-Rāzī adds further demonstrations to the one he presented here in part concerning that the soul perceives all percepts, whether universal or particular. He also criticizes, both in general and in particular, the philosophers' arguments that the soul cannot perceive particulars and responds to the philosophers' explanations of why perceptions like imagination and estimation are performed by corporeal faculties. al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 345-57; al-Rāzī, *al-Matālib*, VII, 147-51.

Al-Rāzī considered an objection that might be the most fundamental response that philosophers, Avicenna in particular, could give to him in the context of internal sense:

This justification only demonstrates that the soul perceives particulars. We do not deny it; rather, we say: Imaginary forms and estimative meanings have to be present. However, they are not extended beings but only exist in mind. But their impression in the soul is impossible, because corporeal forms cannot be imprinted on an abstract substance. Thus, it necessitates the corporeal faculties that these forms and meanings will be imprinted upon. Then the soul conceives those forms and meanings from those corporeal nodes. So, these corporeal faculties that we determined become the organs of the soul in the perception of particulars.⁸⁶

Al-Rāzī refutes this objection from three angles. First, he claims to have demonstrated that imaginary forms cannot be imprinted on the brain. If a person imagines a sea, he cannot imprint such a vast form on a tiny corner of the brain.⁸⁷ Here, al-Rāzī is apparently trying to refute the philosophers' basic premise: Imaginary forms and meanings cannot be imprinted on the soul because corporeal forms cannot be impressed on an abstract substance. Thus, due to the need for corporeal faculties upon which the corporeal forms can be imprinted, the internal senses are inserted into the system as an intermediary category between particular sensible forms and universal intelligible meanings. The impossibility of impressing and imprinting imaginary forms and meanings on soul notwithstanding, al-Rāzī claims that these corporeal forms and meanings cannot be imprinted even on corporeal faculties.

Second, he suggests that what is stated in the philosophers' probable objection depends on the distinction between consciousness and impression, because they reject *impression* when they deem *consciousness* as something possible for the soul. In fact, this situation necessitates the distinction. Without any qualms, he accuses the philosophers of not adhering to their usual distinction.⁸⁸

Third and last, philosophers say that different faculties are organs of the soul and that the soul needs several organs in order to perform various functions. But al-Rāzī argues that this need can be satisfied with two faculties: a repository of sensible forms and a repository of estimative meanings. Thus, the forms and meanings kept in the repositories will be perceivable for the soul upon turning to

86 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 266.

87 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 266.

88 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 266.

one of them whenever the need to do so arises. He then reminds his readers that philosophers are not satisfied with these two repositories of storage function only, for they accept other corporeal faculties as being responsible for perception like common sense, estimation, and that compositive imagination that operates on the forms and meanings. Why, he asks, add more faculties when only two faculties are needed for the soul to reach its objectives – a question that remains unanswered. Al-Rāzī claims that the interpretation here does not accord with the philosophers' views and that the main issue is a certain demonstration of the invalidity of what philosophers argue.⁸⁹

Al-Rāzī views Avicenna's distinction between the rational soul's theoretical and practical faculties as one of the hindrances to demonstrating the existence of the internal senses. According to the latter, the practical faculty that is responsible for the soul governing the body (and also called practical reason) is defined as a faculty that allows for the acquisition of a practical faculty related to the action one has to take in order to arrive at deliberative goals. Al-Rāzī regards this as a concession to the soul's perception of particulars and argues that this premise and that of the internal senses' existence as independent faculties do not hold together.⁹⁰ He supposes that the problems that emerged as a result of determining distinct faculties, like whether the soul is operative over particular forms and meanings, and if so, how it could be elicited by means of which faculty or faculties, are necessary for Avicenna's presumption that the soul, as the most general thing

89 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 266-67.

90 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 268. Al-Rāzī suggests that someone moving voluntarily seeks a particular action and that he/she has to know its nature, because one cannot seek something without first conceiving of it. As a token of its nature, something that moves voluntarily has to perceive the nature of that action. In that case, it becomes certain that the one who perceives and the one that moves are one and the same. See al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 257. Al-Rāzī points to the same issue when assessing Avicenna's statements concerning the actions that emerge from the rational soul with the cooperation of body and corporeal faculties, to be intellection and reflection on particular things, about preferential and unnecessary things. What is problematic here is the uncertainty of what Avicenna means by "intellection," whether the perception of universals or particulars. If he means the former, he makes intellection an action that emerges out of rational soul without a need for the body. If it is the latter, he would be contradicting his own view that the perception of particulars would only take place with corporeal faculties. The same problem applies to reflection as well. Al-Rāzī finds it strange that a great man like Avicenna would turn to these self-contradictory statements. See al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 272. For the problems created by distinguishing between the rational soul's theoretical and practical powers with respect to the Avicennian system, see al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 279-80. In *al-Maṭālib*, al-Rāzī criticizes the philosophers' view, in particular that of Avicenna, that the soul cannot perceive particulars due to the problem of the substance of the soul's operation and government over body in their system. He finds it astonishing that philosophers are ignorant of such a clear justification, whereas they are busy with collecting weak aspects and filling up books with them. al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib*, VII, 152-53.

that governs things, must know these actions after he first distributes the actions to the faculties. However, such problems will not arise if the soul possesses all of these perceptions, as al-Rāzī advocates.⁹¹ After al-Rāzī evaluates in *al-Mabāḥith* Avicenna's arguments for the existence of different faculties due to the differences in the soul's actions, he expresses his main view thus: "We prefer all the percepts together with the thing that perceives all of what is perceived and moves them at will to be the soul but it is such that those different perceptions are bound to different organs and myriad conditions."⁹²

Here, one notes that al-Rāzī grants all responsibility to the soul both in terms of perception and knowledge as well as in actualizing movement. Avicenna views the internal and external senses, which carry out particular perceptions and movements, as corporeal faculties, whereas al-Rāzī holds that all faculties and principles are attributes that came into being for the soul's substance. Hence, he states, the soul could be qualified with faculties of perception and movement, a position for which he duly presents justifications.⁹³

Given his supposition that the debate on faculties is tied to the primary question of whether the soul can perceive particular and corporeal things,⁹⁴ in a sense al-Rāzī restates the claim that he initially stated at the beginning of his assessment of the internal senses and emphasized in almost all his texts, with greater elaboration: Even if the existence of different sorts of perception, which Avicenna supposed are undertaken with disparate internal senses, is deemed necessary and not entirely rejected, it looks probable that there is a single faculty like soul and that these different perceptions appear via various organs for the soul.⁹⁵

91 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 284.

92 al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 256. For the standpoint that associates both perception and movement with a single thing like the soul, see al-Rāzī, *al-Nafs*, 31, 32.

93 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 257-67; al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib*, VII, 149.

94 al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 344.

95 al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 247. For al-Rāzī's opinions in this context, see al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith*, II, 251-57, 345-57; al-Rāzī, *al-Nafs*, 31, 32, 77-78; al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-ḥikma*, II, 252-53; al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib*, VII, 147-55. For al-Rāzī's comments on the relation between myriad faculties and the soul's substance, see idem, *al-Nafs*, 79-84; *al-Maṭālib*, VII, 168-70. Al-Rāzī contends that the soul is a corporeal substance and denies different faculties. Given this, for comments on how a single soul could be the principle of various activities, the function of the heart herein, and how the human soul is related with both what al-Rāzī calls the "physical heart" residing in the heart, as well as the bodily activities, see Kaplan, *Fahruddin er-Rāzī Düşüncesinde Ruh ve Ahlāk*, 184-202. Cengiz comments that even if al-Rāzī does not explicitly state so, there are theological reasons behind the evolution of his conception, from the multiple faculties running different perceptions to the perceptions as different functions/attributes of the soul. This is because in the philosophers' diction of powers (*quwwāt*) they have permanence, and perception takes place naturally and necessarily in the absence of a malady in the organ of perception and when the

Conclusion

Although al-Rāzī's critique of the internal senses forms the main theme of this study, his critique is important for both its critical method in general and the problems associated with the theory of the internal senses in particular. While criticizing the internal senses, his non-implication of any religious, theological, or teleological stance is noticeable at first glance. Nonetheless, tracing his critique's background and extensions, one can sense certain theological inclinations. However, he does not rely on any certain and absolute presumption, religious or philosophical, unchanging, stationary, perennial, and eternal claim of demonstrativeness or truth aside from the strength and validity of the evidence he presents, especially in subjects that could be based on experience. In this sense, an example of his critical stance mentioned in the contemporary literature about his thought is attested to within the context of the particular problem studied herein. This stance gives important cues on how and by which means to assess and criticize multiple philosophical standpoints.

Al-Rāzī's critique of the internal senses has aspects linked to large-scale epistemological and psychological problems, like *the nature of the soul and whether it can abstract substance, the character of the soul-body relation and interaction, the nature of perception, the degrees of abstraction, the soul's relation with particulars, and its disposition of them*. In this respect, it appears that one cannot ignore the

conditions are fully present. However, in the conception of *qudra* for both the Asharites and al-Rāzī, which corresponds to the philosophers' notion of power (*quwwa*), the former have no permanence. But in every act, the actor operates with *qudra* generated in itself. See Cengiz, "Nefs Çözümlemesi Açısından Fahreddin er-Rāzī'nin İbn Sînâ ile İlişkisi," 441. Before al-Rāzī, theologians criticized the theory of powers because treating the soul's powers in causal necessity, in line with the deterministic approach that the philosophers' principle of "only one comes out of one," runs counter to the conception of God as an independent power (*al-qādir al-mukhtār*). Moreover, some of them tried to make it compatible with theological proclivities. Besides, later theologians like al-Ījī supported al-Rāzī's presumption of the soul that carries out all perceptions. Theologians identified two principles behind the philosophers' justification of disparate faculties: 1) refuting the conception of God as an independent power, and 2) the soul's inability to perceive particulars, and rejected both due to the implication of causality. Consequently, they returned to the presumption that the soul perceives all percepts and assumed the opinion that one essence can do many acts by means of different organs. If we take into account that al-Rāzī's critique of the internal senses turned into a general critique of the philosophers' theory of powers, then the presumption of the functions and their attribution to soul, while denying the faculties themselves, also outlived him, at least in the specific case of al-Ījī. Therefore, before al-Rāzī the critique of powers did not contest the existence, course, and number of the acts that they perform; but what did change was how actions were performed and their connection to soul. Nevertheless, the theory of the existence and diversity of powers was apparently still being defended because of its being tuned into theological inclinations, as pointed out. For the emphases noted here on the course of the philosophers' theory of powers after al-Rāzī, see Türker, "Kelâm Geleneğinde Adudüddin el-Îcî," 303-05.

aspects of those problems related to al-Rāzī's criticisms of Avicenna and his peculiar comments in the context of a specific problem, like the theory of the internal senses. In his thought, the *soul* is not conceived of resolutely as an abstract substance as it was by Avicenna, for at least its immateriality is a point of contestation. *Perception*, for al-Rāzī, is a *relation of attribution and attachment between the perceptive subject and the external sensory objects*, rather than *the impression of the forms of external sensible objects in the mind*, as it was for Avicenna. With this change in the conception of perception, the internal senses are no longer regarded as faculties that undertake the hierarchical process of abstraction that enables the formation of forms in the mind in the Avicennian sense. In the same way, while there is a sharp distinction between the human soul or intellectual faculty and the sensibles and particulars in Avicennan thought, the perception of the particulars is attributed to those faculties of the animal soul related with sensory, singular, and particular forms and the perception of the universals to the theoretical faculty of the human rational soul that is related to the universals. Al-Rāzī adopts a critical stance against this distinction and claims that *all perceptions, both particular and universal, and movement can be carried out by a single faculty like the soul*. In other words, what is obtained as a result of internal sensations that are actualized as various functions of the soul is not the universal intellectual forms that are abstracted from matter and all the things that are related to matter in the Avicennian sense. Thus, the nature of the Avicennian soul-body conception that regards the soul as an abstract substance, both distinct from the body and unable to make a direct connection with corporeal, sensory, and particular faculties, necessitates that they system incorporate some intermediary faculties, like the internal senses, to maintain the soul-body relation. In this sense, the internal senses exhibit a quintessential potentiality to overcome such strict dualisms as soul and body, intellect and sense, universal and particular, and to enable the soul-body interaction. But al-Rāzī's negative stance toward these strict distinctions that would have necessitated the myriad perceived faculties envisaged by Avicenna. This stance is critical with respect to avoiding a rigid dualist stance, allowing for diminishing the distance between soul and body and thereby enabling a closer interaction between them, and illustrating a more integral portrayal of the perceptive subject. Nevertheless, whether al-Rāzī went beyond facilitating the soul-body relation and propounded a holistic theory that would explain this interaction's mechanism remains unanswered. If he did in fact do so, then what are the elements of this mechanism? In other words, *what sort of mechanism can explain the relation of a single faculty like the soul, which is responsible for all perceptions and movements, and the body and bodily states?* For the time being, such issues remain beyond our knowledge and require more intensive research.

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